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ABSTRACT
MODELING HETEROGENEITY OF USER PREFERENCES IN CHOICE
PROBLEMS IN THE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
MAY 2016
MAHYAR AMIRGHOLY,
B.S., AMIRKABIR UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, TEHRAN
M.S., SHARIF UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, TEHRAN
M.S., RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERISY OF NEW JERSEY, NEW BRUNSWICK
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST

Directed by: Eric J. Gonzales
Users of transportation systems need to make a variety of different decisions for their trips
in the network, while their objective is to keep the generalized costs of their own trips
minimized. In the transportation network, there is a diversity of different factors that can
influence the decisions of the users, while the relative importance of these factors varies
among the heterogeneous users with different trip purposes. Nonetheless, the cumulative
result of the individual decisions of the users seeking to minimize their costs according to
their own preferences leads to the user equilibrium condition in which no one can reduce
his/her cost by changing his/her decision. In this research, we adapt the concept of the
efficient frontier from portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) in finance in order to model the
bicriterion choice behavior of users with heterogeneous preferences in transportation
networks. We show that the efficient frontier has a set of primary properties that remains
general in different problems. Thus, the primary properties of the efficient frontier can be
viii

employed to analytically model and solve different bicriterion choice problems in
transportation.
For the first application, we use these properties to propose an analytical model for the
morning commute problem when there is a heterogeneity associated with preferences of
the users (Vickrey, 1969; Daganzo, 1985). A dynamic pricing strategy is also proposed to
optimize the bottleneck by minimizing the total cost for users. In addition to the morning
commute problem, Vickrey’s congestion theory is also shown to have applications in
modeling and optimizing the operation of the demand responsive transit (DRT) system
with time-dependent demand and state-dependent capacity as queueing systems. The
efficiency of the DRT system can be improved by implementing a dynamic pricing
strategy. The analytical solution of the morning commute problem can be also extended
for modeling and pricing the DRT system when there is a heterogeneity associated with
the preferences of the DRT service users.
For another application of the efficient frontier in modeling choice problems in
transportation, we propose a traffic assignment model to account for the heterogeneity in
sensitivity of the users to travel time reliability in a network under travel time variability.
However, the proposed model can have wide applications in modeling the equilibrium
condition of different multicriterion choice problems in transportation.
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“People take different roads seeking fulfilment and
happiness. Just because they’re not on your road
doesn’t mean they’ve gotten lost.”
- Dalai Lama
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Research Problem
Rapid growth in the demand for transportation systems in the urban networks has given
rise to the critical need for the conscious plans and policies that can make efficient use of
available resources to maintain and improve the quality of service in the transportation
networks. In this respect, designing successful network plans and management policies
crucially depends on deep understanding of travel behavior of users in transportation
networks. To demonstrate the behaviors of the users of the transportation system, it can be
generally considered that rational users tend to follow their own interests by making the
decisions that maximize their utilities in the network. Nevertheless, the discrepancy in the
decisions that users make in comparable situations in the network can be attributed to the
heterogeneity in their preferences due to the dissimilarities in the socioeconomic
backgrounds and conditions in which they make these decisions. As a result, it is of great
importance to recognize the heterogeneity in preferences of the users as an aspect of their
decision-making procedure that should be taken into account in modeling and optimizing
the transportation systems.
Transportation system users need to make different decisions regarding the starting
time, destination, mode and route of their trip in a network. For each of these decisions,
users consider a variety of different factors in their decision-making procedures, while the
1

relative importance of these factors varies among the heterogeneous users with different
trip purposes. Rational users tend to make choices that minimize the cost of their trips
according to their own preferences. The cumulative result of the individual decisions of the
heterogeneous users is the user equilibrium condition in which no one can reduce his/her
cost by changing his/her decisions. In this respect, the focus of this research is to account
for heterogeneity in the preferences of users on their cumulative choice behavior in the
equilibrium condition of the network. For this purpose, we adapt the concept of the efficient
frontier from portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) in finance to represent the equilibrium
condition when there is heterogeneity associated with the preferences of users. The efficient
frontier can be shown to have primary properties that remain general in different problems.
Thus, we make uses of the primary properties of the efficient frontier to model the
equilibrium condition of different bicriterion choice problems with heterogeneous user
preferences in the transportation network.
The concept of the efficient frontier was introduced for the first time by Markowitz
(1952) as a part of portfolio theory in order to formulate the modern investment theory that
accounts for the heterogeneity in risk sensitivity of the investors in maximizing the
expected return and minimizing the associated risk of their investments in a free market.
The investment problem in finance can be shown to have many parallels with bicriterion
choice problems in transportation. On this basis, the concept of the efficient frontier can be
adapted to develop a bicriterion equilibrium model for different choice problems in
transportation.
2

As the first step, we show that when the generalized cost of the choices can be
approximated as a linear combination of the components weighted by their relative
importance factors among the heterogeneous users, the efficient frontier of equilibrium
choices has primary properties that remain general in different problems. It can be shown
that the efficient frontier is the convex hull of the equilibrium choices of the heterogeneous
users that remains non-increasing all the time. Moreover, the efficient frontier is shown to
have a specific geometric property that is determined by the probability distribution of the
preferences of the heterogeneous users. Thus, the primary properties of the efficient frontier
are used to model the equilibrium condition of different bicriterion choice problems in a
transportation network.
One important decision that users make in the network is what time to start traveling.
Vickrey (1969) introduced a model of congestion dynamics based on a first-in, first-out
single bottleneck with time-dependent demand and a fixed capacity. Insufficient capacity
of bottleneck to meet the demand results in the formation of a queue, which causes users
to experience a combination of delay and schedule deviation in their commutes. Rational
users tend to minimize the combination of these costs in their own trip by adjusting their
arrival times to the bottleneck. However, the relative importance of the components of the
cost may vary among the heterogeneous commuters with different trip purposes. Such
heterogeneity in preferences of the commuters can be represented by a set of independent
probability distributions over the population of the users. Competition between the users in
3

minimizing their own cost eventually leads to the user equilibrium condition in which no
one can reduce his/her cost by changing his/her own arrival time to the bottleneck.
In the first part of this research, we use the concept of the efficient frontier to propose
an analytical solution to this bicriterion choice problem when there is heterogeneity
associated with preferences of the commuters. On this basis, we analytically approximate
the equilibrium arrivals of the heterogeneous commuters to the bottleneck. We also use the
results to propose a dynamic pricing pattern to optimize the system by avoiding the
formation of a queue, which can also be adapted for designing dynamic pricing for an urban
network. The proposed model is also employed to derive a closed form solution for the

morning commute problem when the probability distributions of the preferences are
uniform. We also use the proposed model to solve a numerical example for different
distributions of the schedule penalty preferences. In addition, we provide an explanation
for retrieving independent probability distributions of the schedule penalty factors from a
joint distribution. We also demonstrate the approximation procedure of the schedule
penalty factors of the heterogeneous commuters using empirical data from observing
arrival time of the users at the bottleneck.
The congestion theory proposed by Vickrey (1969) can also have applications in
analyzing other transportation systems with fixed capacity and time-dependent demand that
can be modeled as a queueing system. In this respect, we show that a demand responsive
transit (DRT) service can be modeled as a queueing system with limited capacity and timedependent demand. Accordingly, Vickrey’s congestion model can be employed to analyze
4

and optimize the operation of the DRT system, while the analytical solution derived for the
morning commute problem can be extended to account for the heterogeneity in preferences
of the DRT service users. The operating cost of a DRT system strictly depends on the
quality of service that it offers to its users. The agency seeks to minimize the operating
costs, meanwhile keeping the quality of service high for the users. In this research, an
analytical model is employed to approximate the agency’s operating cost for running a
DRT system with dynamic demand and the total generalized cost that users experience as
a result of the operating decisions. The approach makes use of Vickrey’s (1969) congestion
theory to model the dynamics of the DRT system in the equilibrium condition and
approximate the generalized cost for users when the operating capacity is inadequate to
serve the time-dependent demand over the peak period without excess delay. The efficiency
of the DRT system can be improved by optimizing one of three parameters that define the
agency’s operating decision: 1) the operating capacity of the system, 2) the number of
passengers that have requested a pick-up and are awaiting service, and 3) the distribution
of requested times for service from the DRT system. Schedule management strategy and
dynamic pricing strategies are presented that can be implemented to manage demand and
to reduce the total cost of the DRT system by keeping the number of waiting requests
optimized over the peak period. Results of different optimization scenarios are also
compared in a numerical example.
Another important decision that users make in the network is to choose routes of their
trips. Rational users tend to minimize the cost of their trips by choosing the routes with the
5

shortest travel times; however, they are unable to predict the exact travel times in the
network. Instead, they consider the average duration and the reliability of travel time in
their route choice decision-making procedure according to the estimations from their
previous experiences in the network. However, the relative importance of these factors not
only depends on the purpose of the trip, but also varies from one person to another. The
cumulative result of the individual route choice decisions of the heterogeneous users
eventually leads to an equilibrium condition in which no one has incentive to switch to
another route. Accordingly, route choice decision-making of the travelers can be considers
as a choice problem with heterogeneous user preferences. In this research, we use the
concept of the efficient frontier to model the route choice behavior of the users under travel
time variability in the network when there is a heterogeneity associated with preferences
of the users regarding risk. The efficient frontier of route choice (EFRC) has specific
properties which are employed in a mathematical formulation of the problem. A solution
method is also proposed, which employs the analytical properties of the EFRC to provide
an efficient numerical solution to the traffic assignment problem. We use the proposed
method to solve a numerical example for this problem.

1.2 Literature Review
There are a variety different of decisions that transportation system users make in the
network to keep their costs minimized. In their decision-making procedures, users account
for different factors in the network; however, the relative importance of these factors may
6

vary among the heterogeneous users with different trip purposes. In this research, we adapt
the concept of the efficient frontier from portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952), in finance to
consider the effect of heterogeneity in preference of the users in the decision-making
procedure of transportation network users.
One of these decisions that travelers need to make ahead of their travel is what time to
start their trips. This problem is addressed in the congestion theory of the bottlenecks
(Vickerey, 1969), while its different aspects have been widely studied in the literature. In
this research, we use the primary properties of the efficient frontier to propose an analytical
solution to the morning commute problem when there is a heterogeneity associated with
preferences of the users. Interestingly enough, the congestion theory can be shown to have
applications in modeling systems with limited capacity and time-dependent demand that
can be compared to a queueing system. Demand Responsive Transit (DRT) service is one
of these systems. In this respect, we make use of the congestion theory to model and
optimize the operation of the DRT system.
Route choice is another important decision that users make in the network according to
their own preferences. There is a large body of research on a variety of different traffic
assignment models that provide more realistic approximations of the route choice behavior
of the users in the transportation network. We also employ the concept of the efficient
frontier to account for the heterogeneity in risk sensitivity of the users in modeling the route
choice behavior of the users in network under travel time variability.

7

In the following section, we review the literature on the efficient frontier in modern
finance theory, the morning commute problem, demand responsive transit systems, the
route choice problem.

1.2.1 Efficient Frontier in Modern Finance Theory
Modern finance theory refers to a set of innovations occurred in finance starting in the
1950s for pricing the financial instruments, largely stocks and bonds. The primary
components of modern finance theory are portfolio theory, the capital assets pricing model,
and options pricing theory (Boucher, 2014).
In formulating a theory of investments that accounts for the trade-off that investors
consider between maximizing expected return and minimizing risk, Markowitz (1952)
introduced the concept of an efficient frontier of investment choices as part of Portfolio
Theory. According to Portfolio Theory, individuals in a free market with diverse levels of
sensitivity to risk may choose different assets depending on the relative levels of risk and
return, while no one will invest in assets that have both higher levels of risk and lower
levels of return than other assets. The cumulative result of these individual decisions is a
set of dominant assets that make up the efficient frontier of the investment choice. The
characteristics of efficient frontiers were later discussed and verified in Merton (1972). The
concept of the efficient frontier can be adapted for the purpose of modeling bicriterion
choice problems in transportation.
8

A second element of modern finance theory is the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), introduced by Sharpe (1964) to address the risk-return tradeoff for an individual
asset in the free market. This theory defines a relative measure of dependency of the asset
to the market to determine the appropriate rate of return of the asset. Westin (1973) also
employs the CAPM to explain how this measure can be used for evaluating the industrial
investment projects under risk. This model is less relevant to transportation networks,
because the mechanism for pricing assets in a market is not the same as the mechanism of
traffic congestion on a link. We will make use of more realistic network performance
measures based on the transportation literature.
A third component of modern finance theory is option theory, which addresses option
contracts under risk (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973). Real option theory was
introduced by Myers (1977) to apply concepts from option theory to evaluate the alternative
courses of action in real investment projects. This application to real decision-making has
a strong potential application in modeling transportation systems, because travelers may
consider their options to change their decisions in response to real traffic conditions in the
network. The applications of the real option theory in analyzing transportation systems is
beyond the concept of this research, but it can be good extension for future research in this
area.
In this research, we first adapt the concept of the efficient frontier as the equilibrium
solution of the bicriterion choice problem with a linear cost function where there is
heterogeneity associated with the relative importance of its components. The efficient
9

frontier can be proven to have specific characteristics that can be generally employed in
modeling the bicriterion choice problems in transportation.

1.2.2 Morning Commute Problem
Heterogeneity of preferences among people is an important aspect of choice problems,
which should not be overlooked in modeling the decision-making procedure of the users
in the transportation network. In reality, heterogeneous users may consider different
weights for different factors, which results in a variety of different choices by users facing
the same conditions. In this respect, models that take the heterogeneity of user preferences
into account can provide a more accurate approximation of the solution of a choice
problem.
One important decision that users in a network make is what time to start traveling.
Vickrey (1969) introduced a model of congestion dynamics based on a first-in, first-out
single bottleneck problem with fixed capacity. Commuters are assumed to have identical
preferences for deviating from their preferred scheduled arrival at their destination; i.e. the
difference between wished and actual departure times from the bottleneck. When the
demand exceeds the capacity of the system it is not physically possible for everyone to be
on time. Commuters seek to minimize the combined cost of travel time, queueing delay,
and schedule penalty by choosing when to start their trip. Accordingly, the result would be
a user equilibrium condition in which no traveler can reduce the travel cost by changing
10

the start time of his/her own trip. The underlying assumption here is that commuters wish
to arrive to their destination punctually, so there is a schedule penalty associated they
experience in their commutes with arriving early or late. Hendrickson and Kocur (1981)
elaborated the model by considering a cumulative distribution of wished bottleneck
departure times for the commuters. Smith (1984) proved the existence of the equilibrium
condition in which no commuter has incentive to unilaterally change his/her arrival time
when the cumulative wished curve is S-shaped and schedule penalty function is smooth
and convex. Daganzo (1985) also shows that such an equilibrium is unique.
In addition to the heterogeneity associated with the schedule preferences of the
commuters, the penalty factor that they consider for arriving early or late to their destination
also varies with the purpose of the trips among the population of the commuters. The reality
that commuters do not all have identical schedule penalty preferences has been empirically
shown in the literature (Ott et al, 1980; Small, 1982). In this respect, Henderson (1974,
1977, 1981) first accounted for the heterogeneity in schedule penalty preferences of the
travelers in a dynamic congestion model by considering two demand groups with different
penalty factors. Newell (1987) considers different schedule penalty factors for nonidentical travelers with a continuous distribution of wished departure times in the morning
commute problem and concludes that the commuters subject to higher schedule penalty
choose their travel time closer to their preferred departure time, while more flexible
commuters tend to travel at the edge of the rush. Arnott et al. (1988) derives a similar set
of equilibrium results for a finite number of user groups with different schedule penalty
11

factors, but the same wished departure time. In another study, these authors investigated
the effect of the heterogeneity of user preferences on their route choice decisions based on
a reduced form of Vickrey’s bottleneck model (Arnott et al., 1992). The existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium solution of the single bottleneck problem with multiclass
users, who have heterogeneous schedule penalty preferences, is also proved in Lindsey
(2004). Nagurney and Zhang (2012) also develops the projected dynamical system which
is capable of accounting for the constraints in variational inequality problem. Recent
studies have proposed solutions to the heterogeneous problem based on a linear
complementary formulation for the single bottleneck problem (Ramadurani et al., 2010)
and taking steps to generalize the solution for a discrete set of schedule preferences to an
infinitely large number of preference groups (Qian and Zhang, 2011). Liu and Nie (2013)
also proposes a semi-analytical solution to the single bottleneck problem with general
heterogeneous commuters. Their proposed method employs the analytical solution of the
bottleneck problem to present an equivalent assignment model that can include the closedform cost functions, and they formulate and solve the problem in form of a variatinal
inequality problem (VIP). The effect of heterogeneity on equilibrium travel patterns has
been shown to affect demand patterns based on observations (Gonzales and Christofa,
2013). In this research, we adapt the concept of the efficient frontier from portfolio theory
to propose a general analytical solution for the single bottleneck problem with
heterogeneous commuters.

12

The concept of the efficient frontier was first time introduced as a part of portfolio
theory in Markowitz (1952) in order to formulate a theory of investment decisions that
accounts for the trade-off that investors consider between maximizing return and
minimizing risk. The concept of the efficient frontier can be easily adapted for the purpose
of modeling bicriterion problems in transportation where users account for a trade-off
between components of the costs in the equilibrium condition. On this basis, Dial (1996)
employs the concept of the efficient frontier to propose a bicriterion route choice model
with heterogeneous travel demand. In this research, we employ the concept of efficient
frontier to account for the heterogeneity of schedule penalty among users to analytically
model equilibrium arrival of commuter to the bottleneck. Then, we use this model to
propose a dynamic toll strategy that optimizes the system by minimizing the total cost for
the commuters.
Pricing policies have been widely studied as an effective demand management strategy
for optimizing the arrival of the commuters to the single bottleneck. Arnott et al. (1990)
proposes a dynamic pricing pattern that minimizes the total cost for the users by charging
a toll equal in value to the difference between the user equilibrium and system optimum
costs at each point in time to entirely eliminate the delay. The transition procedure from a
flat toll to optimal dynamic toll strategy has also been studied in the literature (Deakin et
al., 2011; Barnes et al., 2012). Heterogeneity in value of time (VOT) of the commuters is
a key factor in pricing the bottleneck that has been widely explored in the literature. Cohen
(1987) first accounted for such heterogeneity in dynamic pricing the bottleneck by
13

considering two demand groups with different values for time and schedule deviations.
This analysis has been elaborated by allowing for heterogeneity in wished departure times
as well as the relative importance of the early and late departures (Arnott et al., 1994). Van
den Berg and Verhoef (2011) also extends these studies by considering a continuous
distribution for the value of time of the users and also a price sensitive demand function.
Xiao et al. (2011) studies the effect of the single-step peak toll on the equilibrium solution
of the single bottleneck problem, and characterizes the optimum solution of the problem
when the value-of-time has a distribution over the population of the commuters.
The morning commute problem has been extensively studied as well for a single
bottleneck with a transit mode (Tabuchi, 1993; Braid, 1996; Huang, 2000; Danielis and
Marcucci, 2002; Kraus, 2003). Gonzales and Daganzo (2012) presents the user equilibrium
solution of the morning commute problem with competing modes, and proposes dynamic
toll and fare strategies that can optimize the system by avoiding delay in the bottleneck.
In this part of the research, we employ the concept of the efficient frontier to propose
an analytical model for the equilibrium arrival of the users to the bottleneck, where the
heterogeneity in preferences of the users are represented by independent probability
distributions of the schedule penalty factors over the population of the commuters. The
proposed analytical solution can be also used to approximate the equilibrium condition and
optimal pricing strategy of the bottleneck for a general S-shaped wished departure curve
and any independent distributions of the schedule penalty factors. We employ the proposed
model to derive a closed form solution for the equilibrium arrival of the commuters to the
14

bottleneck assuming the uniform distributions of the schedule penalty preferences are
given. A numerical example is also provided as an application of the proposed model for
different probability distribution of user preferences. We also propose a method to retrieve
independent distributions of preferences of the users from a given joint distribution. The
proposed solution of the problem can be also inversely employed to approximate the
distribution of preferences from observed arrival time of the users to the bottleneck. In
general, solving the morning commute problem analytically provides us intuitions about
travel behavior of the heterogeneous commuters, which can be crucial in predicting the
change in the overall condition of the bottleneck in case of prospective alteration in the
characteristics of the demand or the properties of the bottleneck.
The results of the research can also have applications in modeling and optimizing the
network or any other system that can be modeled as a queueing system on an aggregated
level.

1.2.3 Demand Responsive Transit Systems
Vickrey’s (1969) congestion theory also have applications in modeling transportation
systems with limited capacity and time-dependent demand as queueing systems. Demand
responsive transit (DRT) service is a type of such systems that can be modeled and
optimized by adapting the congestion theory. Thus, the analytical model proposed for the
morning commute problem with heterogeneous user preferences can be also adapted for
15

modeling a DRT system with a state-variable capacity and heterogeneous time-dependent
demand.
DRT systems are a class of transit services in which a fleet of vehicles dynamically
changes routes and schedules in order to accommodate demand within a service area. A
DRT system naturally has flexibility in providing service, which allows it to adapt to
variations in the demand. This property of DRT makes it possible to eliminate the access
distance for transit users by providing a curb-to-curb trip. The trade-off is that each user of
the system must wait for a vehicle to pick them up and spend time in the system while the
transit vehicles divert to pick up and drop off other passengers. The quality of service that
DRT provides its users can be improved by reducing the waiting and in-service times of
the users, as well as earliness and lateness that they experience in arriving to their
destinations.
Improvements in the quality of service also tend to raise the operating cost of the
service. From the agency’s point of view, however, the high operating cost should be
justified by the benefits for users; otherwise, the agency’s operating cost will be reduced at
the expense of a decline in the quality of the service. The resulting inconvenience to the
users due to inadequacy of the service quality (e.g., delay in both pickup and service, and
lack of punctuality reflected in the earliness or lateness of arrival) contributes to the total
costs that users experience in order to use the service. The inherent tradeoff between the
quality of the DRT service and its associated operating cost suggests that costs to the
agency and users should be balanced through the design and management of the system.
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As a result, the optimal balance can be introduced as a condition of the system in which the
total cost of the agency and users is minimized.
There are many variables that have a direct or indirect influence on the performance of
DRT services. These factors can be classified in three groups: network, operation, and
demand characteristics. A large body of research uses different approaches to study the
effects of these factors on the performance of the service. These approaches can be
classified generally into two groups: simulations and approximate mathematical methods.
Simulation is the appropriate method when the goal is to achieve a high level of
precision in results by including all the specific details of the DRT system in the model.
This method has been widely used to assess the effects of different operating factors, such
as zoning strategies and time windows, on the productivity of the DRT service. Dessouky
et al. (2005) employs the simulation method to evaluate the effect of these factors on the
total trip miles, deadhead miles, and fleet size of paratransit service in Los Angeles,
California. A similar method is also adopted for Houston, Texas, to compare the impacts
of centralizing and decentralizing the operations (Quadrifoglio and Shen, 2010) and using
transfers for inter-zonal communication (Shen and Quadrifoglio, 2011, 2012). Other
simulation studies have addressed schedule reliability (Fu, 1999) and the effect of travel
time variations on optimal routing (Fu and Teply, 1999). Although the precision of the
model is the main promise of the simulation method, it can be only fulfilled under the
condition that detailed data is available as input.
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Often, detailed data are not available, and precise vehicle routing solutions may not be
particularly useful since there are stochastic variations in the specific locations and times
of requested trips. For many types of systematic analysis, it is possible to formulate the
problem analytically by replacing detailed data with concise summaries. Although such
simplification in the problem can decrease the precision of the results, the ability to obtain
an exact analytical solution of the problem can reveal properties of the system by
identifying the relationships between involved variables. Having a clear understanding of
the tradeoffs at work enables us to quickly obtain insights about the effects of variations in
different factors on performance of the system (Daganzo et al., 2012).
There is a large body of research on analytical models of DRT systems. Daganzo (1978)
presents an analytical model to approximate the capacity of a DRT system for three
different pickup and drop-off strategies. This model accounts for the effect of the order that
the operator serves the requests in approximating the capacity of service as a function of
demand, operation, and network variables. Rahimi et al. (2014) adapts this analytical model
to approximate the fleet size, VHT, and VMT of the DRT system, and calibrates this model
for the ADA paratransit service in New Jersey. The study also shows that the operating
cost of the service is represented well by a linear combination of these components. Many
studies in recent years have used analytical approaches to model the relationships between
the parameters and the performance of DRT systems. Nagurney et al. (2002) models the
general equilibrium condition in a competitive supply chain network. Fu (2003) extends
Daganzo’s (1978) model to include additional variables, and uses the model to optimize
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total time and fleet size subject to a service quality constraint. Diana et al. (2006) proposes
a stochastic model to account for uncertainty in demand. Other models have been
developed to estimate the length of near-optimal tours (Daganzo, 1984; Figliozzi, 2008)
and to include constraints on tour duration and pickup time windows (Figliozzi, 2009).
These models consider demand as exogenous, and seek to optimize the supply of DRT
service that at least meets that capacity of the system. There remains a need to identify
ways to manage demand that are appropriate for the dynamics of DRT operations.
In real systems, peaks in demand occur during certain times of the day when the rate of
requests exceeds the operating capacity. As a result, users of the system can choose to adapt
the times when they travel in order reduce the time spent waiting or riding in vehicles, but
early or late arrival at their destination may be associated with costs of schedule deviation.
In this research, we describe the dynamic equilibrium that is associated with oversaturated
conditions in which the demand rate exceeds the operating capacity of the DRT system.
The oversaturated DRT system has commonalities with the fixed-capacity bottleneck
problem. Vickrey’s (1969) congestion model provides a useful structure for analyzing the
dynamic equilibrium and approximating the users’ costs in DRT systems. As a result, the
efficiency of the service can be enhanced by minimizing the total cost for the agency and
users by optimizing the operating capacity of the service as well as number of waiting
requests.
Conventional paratransit services, such as those in compliance with the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, provide complementary transit service for people with
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disability, typically schedule trips for users in the order that they are requested. By limiting
the number of requests per time that can be booked, the operator limits the scheduled
demand for trips to the capacity of the system. There are two problems with the current
operating strategy. First, service preference is given to users who know their schedule well
enough in advance that they can reserve a booking early, while later requests may be forced
to incur greater deviations from their preferred schedule due to lack of availability in peak
periods. Second, ADA requires that complementary paratransit for people with disabilities
schedule a pick up within one hour of the initial requested pick-up time, so very large peaks
in demand give operators no choice but to run more vehicles and employ more drivers.
The objective of this part of the research is to present a model and optimization
approach for DRT service that is used to minimize the total cost to the agency and users
combined. An analytical model for DRT systems based on Rahimi et al. (2014) and
Daganzo (1978) is employed to approximate the components of the operating cost of the
DRT system: fleet size, total vehicle hours traveled (VHT), and total vehicle miles traveled
(VMT) in the network. Given the service area of the DRT system, these components of the
agency cost can be approximated as functions of the number of waiting passengers that
have requested service and the maximum rate that operators can serve passengers per time
(i.e., operating capacity). The total operating cost for the agency can be estimated as a linear
combination of these components (Rahimi et al., 2014).
In addition to the expenses to the agency for running the service, it is also necessary to
account for the costs that users endure to use the service. To this end, Vickrey’s (1969)
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congestion theory is adapted to approximate the costs that the DRT users experience for
the service when the operating capacity of the system is inadequate to meet the demand. In
this case, the user equilibrium can be conceived as the result of competition between DRT
users who are each minimizing their own travel costs, which include the waiting time to be
picked up, the traveling time in the vehicle, and the cost for arriving earlier or later than
preferred. In an equilibrium condition, no one has an incentive to change his/her own travel
time. However, it is still possible to reduce the total costs of the system by optimizing the
DRT operations and managing the temporal distribution of demand. The capacity of the
service and the number of passengers awaiting pick-up are decision variables that can be
maintained at optimal levels over time to minimize the total cost of the system. Since
demand tends to peak during certain times of the day, an effective demand management
strategy that can spread the demand uniformly over time has a key role in optimizing the
operations of a DRT system.
In this part of the research, we model the dynamics of DRT system scheduling and
operations and identify a management strategy to incentivize users to adapt their request
times to be more uniform over time. The system optimum problem is formulated to
minimize the total cost of the agency and users in three possible scenarios: optimizing the
operating capacity of the service, optimizing the number of waiting requests, and
optimizing both together. In these scenarios, the system optimum problem also has an
analytical solution when the distribution of the wished request time is known. A dynamic
pricing policy can be implemented as an effective strategy to improve the efficiency of the
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DRT system by forming a uniform distribution of the demand and avoiding the
underutilization of the optimal capacity during off-peak times. As a result, the total cost of
the agency and users can be minimized by choosing optimal values for the system capacity
and the number of waiting requests. Meanwhile an appropriate demand management
strategy that can make the demand uniform is required to keep the system optimized over
time. We also provide a numerical example of a DRT system and an optimal pricing
strategy as well as a sensitivity analysis on the results.

1.2.4 Route Choice Problem
The route choice decision-making procedure can be considered to have two separate stages.
In the first stage, travelers need to observe different routes to collect information regarding
performance of different choices. In the second stage, this information is used to evaluate
the available route choices. We seek to identify the equilibrium when a heterogeneous
population of travelers simultaneously chooses routes based on travel time and reliability.
Conventional traffic assignment models simply presume that the trip duration is the only
important measure in the assessment of route performance. With perfect information, users
are assumed to able to anticipate the exact trip durations for each route. As a result, the
interaction between users that choose the route with the shortest travel time will lead to the
classic user equilibrium (UE) in which no one can improve his/her travel time by changing
his/her own route. In the user equilibrium condition, all the used routes between the origin
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and destination have identical travel times while routes with longer travel times remain
unused (Wardop, 1952). In spite of the simplicity of the theory, the accuracy of the
equilibrium model can be improved by elaborating the underlying assumptions.
First of all, there are aspects other than the duration of the trip that travelers also take
into account in their choice evaluation. The importance of such aspects to travelers not only
depends on the purpose of the trip, but also varies with the taste or preference of the
traveler, from one person to another (Beckmann et al., 1956; Dafermos, 1983).
Accordingly, different people may choose different routes to travel from the origin to the
destination. Jan et al. (2000) explores a comprehensive GPS dataset from households in
Lexington, Kentucky, to demonstrate the consistency of the choices made by the same
driver over time, even though these route choices vary among different drivers traveling
between very similar origins and destinations. Interestingly enough, it is also concluded
that these choices are often quite different from the shortest path. Furthermore, the future
cannot be anticipated with certainty, because the travel time is a stochastic process in
nature. Travel time variability is due to two main factors: 1) variability of the capacity and
2) variability of demand flows (Lo and Tung, 2003; Jia et al., 2011).
According to the anchoring phenomenon, introduced in Tversky and Kahneman (1974),
travelers will be unable to predict the exact travel times that they will experience. Instead,
they start making their choices according to their presumptions regarding the route travel
times and adjust their estimations by experiencing different choices over time. However,
Fujii and Kitamura (2000) shows how gaining information and experience can improve
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such estimation. Laboratory experiments conducted to study the learning effect and
dynamic adjustment indicate that passing time can diminish the influence of prior
experiences on travelers. In other words, more recent experiences have a deeper influence
on the travelers (Iida et al., 1992; Polak and Oladeinde, 2000). The day-to-day learning and
adjustment process based on real-time information can be modeled in framework of the
stochastic assignment procedure (Polak and Hazelton, 1998; Tian et al., 2012; Lu et al.,
2014; Ding et al., 2013; Ding and Gao, 2013). In this respect, impacts of real-time
information on route choice behavior of users as well as cost of the system are also studied
in stochastic time-dependent networks under generalized user equilibrium condition (Gao
et al., 2010; Gao, 2012; Gao and Huang, 2012).
Mahmassani and Chang (1987) uses simulation to study the day-to-day adjustments in
the route choice and departure time of travelers in response to their most recent experiences.
Accordingly, it suggests that such adjustments finally lead to the boundedly rational user
equilibrium (BRUE), in which all the travelers are satisfied with their route choices.
Although these routes may be different from the shortest path, the travelers are still not
incentivized to change their routes to improve their travel times (Lou et al., 2010). Fact that
the BRUE problem may not have a unique solution can be interpreted as the variability of
the equilibrium flows. As a result, a stochastic traffic assignment model, which treats the
travel time as variable, and recognizes taste variation among the users, can improve the
consistency of the route choice with the reality of individual travel behaviors.
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There is a large body of research on stochastic traffic assignment models that analyzes
the route choice behavior of the users from different perspectives. The stochastic user
equilibrium model (SUE), presented in Daganzo and Sheffi (1977) is one of the first models
that proposes an extension to the user equilibrium by adding a random component to the
travel cost functions. Such randomness can represent both errors in system performance
and user perceptions. As a result, the probability of the route choice is evaluated by the
probability that the route is the shortest path. De Palma et al. (1983) also proposed a
stochastic extension to the dynamic user equilibrium model (DUE) for a single bottleneck.
Dafermos (1980) accounts for the interaction between different links by formulating the
equilibrium route choice problem as set of variational inequalities. The proposed model is
also extended by considering the demand elastic in a multimodal network (Dafermos,
1982). Dafermos and Nagurney (1984b) shows that the equilibrium condition continuously
depends on the travel demand as well as the route cost functions. Ben-Akiva et al. (1986)
used it as the base model to expand the results for a network with multiple bottlenecks
located in parallel and series patterns. Ben-Akiva et al. (2012) also proposes a dynamic
traffic assignment model to account for effects of long queues and spillbacks according to
the real traffic conditions in congested networks. Although some of these models include
the inherent randomness associated with travel time, the ability of experienced users to
estimate travel time variability is still not explicitly recognized.
In another study, Mirchandani and Soroush (1987) suggests that not only is there
uncertainty with route travel times, but travelers are also unable to predict such travel times
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accurately. In this framework, the study proposes a generalized traffic equilibrium model
(GSTEP), which includes the randomness both in route travel times and perception of the
users. To take these effects into account, the route travel time is presumed to have a
probability distribution and to vary among different users. Nagurney and Zhang (1997) also
proposes a route choice adjustment model formulated as a dynamic system. Nevertheless,
none of these models recognizes the risk of arriving late associated with the travel time
uncertainty in different routes. Watling (2006) proposes the late arrival penalized user
equilibrium (LAPUE) as a general equilibrium model that also takes the schedule delay
into account in the route choice problem. However, users are able to minimize the
associated risk by choosing from a portfolio of routes. Tian and Gao (2013) develops a
probabilistic version of the priority heuristic process to model the route choice behavior of
the users under risk in travel times. Levinson and Zho (2013) suggests that users tend to
reduce the combination of their journey time and lateness. On this basis, it presents a
stochastic traffic assignment model in which users are assumed to choose multiple routes
for the same trip on different days, to keep their general trip costs minimized. This model
is also supported by GPS data collected in metropolitan Minneapolis–St. Paul, Minnesota.
However, the majority of research on traffic assignment problems has been based on the
assumption of similarity of taste among the network users, in spite of inherent diversity of
preferences among the travelers. Including the effect of heterogeneity in sensitivity of the
users to different factors can reveal the unseen motivation of different drivers for taking
different routes.
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Multi-objective choice models have a variety of applications in the transportation field.
In this regard, Dafermos (1972) considers individuals with different cost functions in
proposing a multiclass traffic assignment model. On this basis, a multiclass toll pattern is
also designed to optimize the network (Dafermos, 1973). In another paper, the same author
proposes a multicriteria model that accounts for the effect of heterogeneity in preference
of users on their route choice in the equilibrium condition of the transportation network,
and shows the existence and uniqueness of the solution (Dafermos, 1983). Dial (1996)
proposes a bicriterion traffic assignment model to take both the durations and the costs of
the trips into account in forecasting travelers’ route choices. It adapts the concept of the
efficient frontier to account for heterogeneity of users’ values of time, and it generalizes
the Frank-Wolfe (1956) algorithm to solve this problem. Recent studies have proposed
generalized cost functions that are nonlinear combinations of travel time and tolls (Chen et
al., 2010) and use probit-based bicriterion dynamic stochastic user equilibrium models to
account for heterogeneity of value of time (Zhang et al., 2013). Nagurney (2000) shows
that objectives that decision makers follow in the network might also be in contrast with
each other, and rise in one may result in drop in others. Nagurney and Dong (2002) also
considers a combination of the travel time and travel cost as the generalized cost of the
routes in developing a multiclass multicriteria network equilibrium model. Wang, Jia et al.
(2014) assumes that travelers choose their routes among the first several choices with the
lowest general disutility (travel time and cost), so it proposes a rank-dependent bicriterion
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equilibrium model for the route choice problem when there is stochasticity associated with
both the criteria measurements and the subjective preferences, simultaneously.
Route choice modeling with travel time risk is another application of bicriterion traffic
assignment models. In this respect, different approaches are proposed in the literature to
include the effect of the risk in the travel time in route choice modeling of users. Lo and
Tung (2003) assumes the degradation in capacity of the links due to incidents as the primary
cause of travel time variations in the network. On this basis, it proposes probabilistic user
equilibrium model to account for such uncertainty on long-term route choice behavior of
the users in the network. In addition to uncertainty of capacity, the stochastic nature of the
route choice decision of individual users, on an aggregate level, causes variations in travel
times in the network. In this regard, Chen and Zhou (2010) develops a mean-excess traffic
equilibrium model that takes both reliability and uncertainty associated with travel time
into account in route choice modeling. Wu and Nie (2011) also considers the heterogeneous
sensitivity of users to risk for traffic assignment by linking the first-, second-, and third
order stochastic dominance to concepts of insatiability, risk-aversion, and ruin-aversion
within the framework of utility maximization. In another study, Nie (2011) considers
travelers that choose routes to minimize the travel time budget required to guarantee their
on-time arrivals with a certain level of confidence, and proposes a multiclass percentile
user equilibrium traffic assignment model. Chen et al. (2011) proposes a solution algorithm
for the multiclass reliability-based user equilibrium problem. Xiao and Lo (2013) studies
route choice behavior of adaptive drivers in a stochastic network, and the proposed model
28

optimizes the expected prospect of the choices with acceptable travel time and arrival time.
Pothering and Gao (2013) accounts for the heterogeneity in risk attitudes of the users by
calibrating a multiclass user equilibrium model using laboratory data. Wang, Ehrgott, and
Chen (2014) proposes a general travel time reliability bi-objective user equilibrium model
(TTR-BUE), which simultaneously incorporates the travel time budget model (Lo et al.,
2006) and late arrival penalty model (Watling, 2006). This model has the advantage that it
can identify a range of possible solutions based on the rational behavior of the users,
regardless of the distribution of their preferences. Recent work has characterized
equilibrium route choices when routes have variability of travel time performances but
users are identical. Tan et al. (2014) assumes the link travel times are random variable
functions of the link flows under assumption that the variation in travel times are the result
of certain exogenous factors. So, route choice behavior of the users has been studied for
different types of generalized cost functions under travel time risk. As a result, the Paretoefficient route flow pattern is introduced as the equilibrium assignment of the users to the
non-dominated routes in terms of the mean and standard deviation of travel time. On this
basis, the general geometric properties of the mean-standard deviation (ES) indifference
curve has been related to the definition of the generalized cost function as a combination
of the mean and standard deviation of the travel time. This body of work addresses the
need to account for heterogeneity in networks with travel time variability, but there remains
a need for an analytical approach to determine the assignment of traffic across routes in a
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network when travelers have heterogeneous preferences and the travel times on individual
routes exhibit variability.
In this part of the research, we propose a traffic assignment model that includes the
effect of travel time reliability on the user’s route choice. In the proposed model, we
consider a statistical distribution for route travel times. Research shows that travelers
consider a generalized cost for their trips in the network that can be approximated as a
linear combination of its mean and standard deviation, regardless of the shape of the
distribution (Fosgerau and Karlström, 2010; Fosgerau and Engelson, 2011). Both mean and
standard deviation of the travel times are assumed to be functions of traffic flows in the
network, while there is also a relationship between the mean and standard deviation of the
travel time (Fosgerau, 2010; Mahmassani et al., 2013; Noland et al., 1998). Network users
are also assumed capable of estimating mean and standard deviation of travel times, while
the relative importance of these variables varies among the heterogeneous travelers with
different trip purposes.
In this problem, network users are assumed to seek the route that best matches their
preferences while the heterogeneity of such preferences among the users is captured in
form of a probability distribution of their risk sensitivity. The cumulative result of
individual decisions leads to an equilibrium condition in which users have no incentive to
change their choices. Such equilibrium can be represented by the concept of the efficient
frontier.
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The problem of investment decision-making in a financial market has many parallels
with the travelers’ decision-making in a transportation network. Thus, we use the concept
of the efficient frontier to accounts for the fundamental heterogeneity of preferences among
traveler in their route choice decision-making procedure. As a result, the concept of the
efficient frontier of the route choice (EFRC) is defined based on the distribution of
preferences and physically accurate link performance models. In the definition of the
EFRC, each user can just choose a single route from a discrete set of choices for his/her
trip, as opposed to the portfolio set of different choices in the investment problem. As a
result, we define the EFRC as the convex hull that connects the discrete set of the
cumulative route choices result in an increasing order of their equilibrium travel time
standard deviations in the standard deviation-expected travel time plane. Thus, the concept
of the EFRC can be employed to develop a bi-objective traffic assignment model under
travel time variability with heterogeneous travelers’ sensitivity to risk. The EFRC has
specific characteristics, which makes it possible to propose a new formulation and solution
algorithm for this problem. A numerical example of a sample network is also included,
which compare the result of proposed traffic assignment method with that of conventional
approaches.
The proposed model benefits from a basis on the analytical results directly derived from
the concept of the efficient frontier. So, the proposed model can provide intuition about the
primary characteristics of the solution in the equilibrium condition. In addition, the
proposed model can reveal the route choice ranking of the heterogeneous users according
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to their own preferences, which makes it possible to predict the consequences of
prospective changes in the network on the route choice behavior of the users. The main
advantage of the proposed solution algorithm also is that using the known properties of the
EFRC as the equilibrium solution of the problem eliminates the need to explicitly find the
cheapest path for each user with different sensitivities to travel time risk. As a result, the
proposed algorithm can be very efficient for solving the route choice problem under travel
time variability when the heterogeneity in the demand is extensive. Although in this part
of the research, the focus is on the problem with a single origin-destination network, the
solution method can be employed in the existing equilibration algorithms to solve the multi
origin-destination problems (Nagurney, 1999).

1.3 Research Contribution
Heterogeneity in preferences of the users is an aspect of the choice problems in
transportation that has been mostly overlooked in formulating the transportation choice
problems in the literature. In this research, we adapt the concept of the efficient frontier
from portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) in finance, and introduce the result as an
appropriate tool for modeling the choice problems in transportation. In the equilibrium
condition of a bicriterion choice problem, it is known that no one can reduce one of the
components of his/her costs by changing his/her choice without a rise in the other
component. As a result, the population of the heterogeneous users will be distributed along
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the efficient frontier of dominant choices. In this respect, we employ the concept of the
efficient frontier to represent the equilibrium condition of the choice problems with
objectives linearly combined in a generalized cost function, when there is heterogeneity
associated with the relative importance of these objectives. We show that the efficient
frontier in the equilibrium condition has primary properties that remain general in different
problems in transportation.
We first use the concept of the efficient frontier to derive an analytical solution for the
morning commute problem with a general S-shaped wished departure curve when the
schedule penalty preferences of the users have a probability distribution over the
population of the commuters. On this basis, an optimal pricing strategy is proposed that
can eliminate the total delay by avoiding the formation of the queue in the bottleneck. We
also propose a method to retrieve independent distributions of user preferences from a
given joint distribution. The proposed analytical solution of the problem can be inversely
used to approximate the distribution of preferences from the empirical data of observed
arrival time of the commuters to the bottleneck. The results can also have applications in
modeling and optimizing the network or any other transportation system that can be
modeled as a queueing system on an aggregated level. In this respect, we show that the
DRT system with state-variable capacity and time-dependent demand can be modeled as a
queueing system. Thus the analytical solution of the morning commute problem can be
extended for analyzing the DRT system when there is a heterogeneity associated with the
preference of users. Considering the heterogeneity in preferences of the users not only
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allow us to draw a more accurate picture of the system in the equilibrium condition, but
also enable us to propose a more effective dynamic pricing pattern for optimizing the
system. Moreover, deriving analytical solutions for these problems can provide intuitions
about the role of different factors and the interaction between them in the equilibrium
condition of the system.
In addition, we use the concept of the efficient frontier to propose a traffic assignment
model for route choice behavior of the heterogeneous users in a network under travel time
variability. The analytical basis of the proposed model can provide intuitions about the
primary characteristic of the equilibrium solution of the problem. Moreover, it can reveal
the route choice ranking of users with different sensitivity to reliability of travel time, which
can be critical for assessing consequences of any prospective changes in the network or
preferences of the users.

1.4 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 adapts the concept of the efficient
frontier from portfolio theory, and demonstrates its specific properties for a linear cost
function. Chapter 3 uses these specific properties to propose an analytical model for the
equilibrium arrival of the commuters to the bottleneck when there is a heterogeneity
associated with their preferences regarding schedule deviations and penalty factors. On this
basis, we propose a dynamic optimal pricing strategy to minimize the total cost of the
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traveler by avoiding formation of the queue in the bottleneck. Chapter 4 shows that a
demand responsive transit (DRT) system with a state-variable capacity and time-dependent
demand can be modeled as a queueing system. Hence, the analytical solution of the
morning commute problem can be also adapted to optimize the operation of the DRT
system by implementing the proposed pricing strategy. Chapter 5 employs the concept of
the efficient frontier to model the route choice behavior of the users with heterogeneous
sensitivity to reliability of travel time in a network under travel time variability. Finally,
Chapter 6 includes a summary of contributions, conclusions, and proposal of the future
extension.
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CHAPTER 2
EFFICIENT FRONTIER OF BICRITERION CHOICE PROBLEM WITH
HETEROGENEOUS USER PREFERENCES
Decision-making is a multi-criterion optimization process by nature in which individuals
tend to minimize their costs or maximize their benefits according to their own preferences.
However, the heterogeneity of preferences among users makes the problem complicated.
In this section, we adapt the concept of the efficient frontier to represent the equilibrium
solution of bicriterion choice problems with linear cost functions in transportation. In the
equilibrium condition, no one can reduce both components of the generalized cost by
changing his/her choice as drop in one component of the cost corresponds to rise in another
one and vice versa. Thus, the population of the users with heterogeneous preferences
regarding the relative importance of components of the generalized cost will be distributed
along the efficient frontier of dominant choices in the equilibrium condition. Here, we show
that this efficient frontier has three specific characteristics that remain general for all of the
problems. In the next chapters, we use these characteristics of the efficient frontier to model
different bicriterion choice problems with heterogeneous user preferences in the
transportation network.
In a decision-making procedure in which different choices come with different costs,
users tend to minimize their own disutilities by making choices with lowest possible cost.
However, in the equilibrium condition that there is a trade-off between components of the
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generalized cost, a drop in one of them will result in a rise in another. In this trade-off, the
relative importance between these costs plays an important role in optimizing the balance
between these costs. On this basis, the generalized cost function of the choice problem can
be defined as the linear combination of these costs, weighted by their relative importance,
which varies among the individuals as follows:
𝐶𝑝,𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖1 + 𝛼𝑝 𝐶𝑖2

(2.1)

where, 𝐶1𝑖 and 𝐶2𝑖 represent the components of the cost associated with the choice 𝑖, which
can represent different costs in different bicriterion problems. The coefficient 𝛼𝑝 denotes
the relative importance of these costs for users in the preference group 𝑝. To include the
heterogeneity of the preferences among the users, we may presume a discrete (green) or
continuous (blue) probability distribution over the demand, as illustrated in the Fig 1. As a
result, 𝐶𝑝,𝑖 is the generalized cost of choice 𝑖 for the users in group 𝑝. With this definition
of the generalized cost function, users with higher values for 𝛼𝑝 give more importance to
the second component of the cost, while their sensitivity to the second component
diminishes with decrease in 𝛼𝑝 .
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Figure 2.1. Hypothetical probability distribution of the user preferences

In this case, heterogeneous users with different values for 𝛼𝑝 find different choices
minimizing their generalized costs according to their own preferences. As a result, the
concept of the efficient frontier can be employed to represent the set of dominant choices
for non-identical users with heterogeneous values for 𝛼𝑝 .

2.1 The Efficient Frontier of Choices
The concept of the efficient frontier was introduced in Portfolio Theory by Markowitz
(1952) to represent the cumulative result of individual bicriterion decisions of the
heterogeneous investors in a free market. The market offers the investor a variety of assets
with different levels of return; nonetheless, there is always a risk associated with the
investment in the market. So, heterogeneous investors who tend to optimize the balance
between risk and return of their investments may find different assets to maximize their
benefits according to their own preferences. In this respect, more conservative investors
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will prefer assets with a lower level of risk in spite of their lower returns. In contrast, risktakers will invest in assets with higher levels of return, although their investments might be
subject to higher levels of risk as well. However, no one will invest in assets with higher
level of risk and lower level of return dominated by an alternative asset with a lower level
of risk and higher level of return. As illustrated in Figure 2.2a, the heterogeneity of
preferences among the individuals causes them to invest in different assets along the
efficient frontier (green points), while no one is inclined to invest in the assets dominated
by the efficient frontier (pink points).

(a)

(b)

Figure 2.2. The efficient frontier of (a) the dominant assets in a free market (b) the choices with
heterogeneous preferences

The analogy between the bicriterion problems in finance and transportation disciplines
makes it possible to adapt the theory by substituting the concepts of the risk and return by
the components of the users’ generalized cost for modeling the bicriterion decision making
problems in transportation.
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Definition (Efficient frontier of choices). The efficient frontier of choices is the convex
hull of the equilibrium choice set in the 𝐶 2 - 𝐶 1 plane that have the minimum generalized
cost according to (2.1) for the users with heterogeneous preferences regarding the relative
importance of the components of the cost (𝛼).

Recognizing that the rational users tend to minimize their costs by seeking for the
choice with the lowest cost, they may make variety of different - but dominant - choices
due to heterogeneity in their presences. In the other words, each user is looking for a
specific optimal balance between these costs that can minimize his/her generalized cost
according to his/her preferences regarding relative importance of these criteria. However,
as illustrated in Figure 2.2b, there might be choices (pink points) that are always dominated
by their alternatives (green points) with lower associated costs in all the components, which
no one with any preferences would not choose them. Accordingly, the cumulative result
of individual decisions with heterogeneous preferences regarding the relative importance
of the criteria can be well presented by the efficient frontier of the choices.
When the generalized cost of the heterogeneous users can be approximated as a linear
combination of components of the costs as presented in (2.1), the efficient frontier of the
choices can be proven to have a set of primary characteristics that remains general for the
solution of the different bicriterion problems. Once these characteristics are identified, they
can reveal the key properties of the solutions of the bicriterion problems.
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2.1.1 Differentiable Efficient Frontier of Choices
In cases that the choice set of the users has a continuous nature, e.g., arrival time to the
bottleneck, and user preferences have a continuous distribution, then the efficient frontier,
𝐶 1 (𝐶 2 ), is a continuous and differentiable function as illustrated in Figure 2.3a, with
following characteristics:

(a) Differentiable efficient frontier

(b) Piecewise linear efficient frontier

Figure 2.3. Efficient frontier of continuous set of choices

Proposition 2.1 (monotonicity). The efficient frontier, 𝐶 1 (𝐶 2 ) , is a non-increasing
function of 𝐶 2 .

Proof. The proof is made by contradiction. Let 𝐶 1 (∙) represent the continuous
differentiable efficient frontier function. According to the definition of decreasing
monotonicity, the efficient frontier will not be a decreasing monotone function if and only
if there exist at least two points on the efficient frontier satisfying the following conditions
(see Figure 2.4a):
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𝐶12 < 𝐶22

(2.2)

𝐶 1 (𝐶12 ) < 𝐶 1 (𝐶22 )

(2.3)

Multiplying both sides of the inequality (2.2) by any nonnegative 𝛼𝑝 and adding the result
to the inequality (2.3), we get the following inequality:
𝐶 1 (𝐶12 ) + 𝛼𝑝 𝐶12 < 𝐶 1 (𝐶22 ) + 𝛼𝑝 𝐶22 ,

∀𝛼𝑝 ≥ 0

(2.4)

According to the definition of (2.1), left and right sides of the inequality (2.4) represent
generalized costs of the points 1 and 2, respectively.
𝐶𝑝,1 < 𝐶𝑝,2,

∀𝛼𝑝 ≥ 0

(2.5)

Inequality (2.5) indicates that point 2 is always dominated by point 1, for any nonnegative
value of 𝛼𝑝 . This is in direct contradiction with the definition of the efficient frontier as set
of dominant choices, so point 2 cannot be on the efficient frontier. Therefore, if (2.2) holds,
then 𝐶 1 (𝐶12 ) ≥ 𝐶 1 (𝐶22 ) on the efficient frontier; thus, decreasing monotonicity of the
efficient frontier is guaranteed. ∎

Proposition 2.2 (convexity). The efficient frontier, 𝐶 1 (𝐶 2 ), is a convex function of 𝐶 2 .

Proof. The proof is made by contradiction as well. By definition, a convex function must
satisfy the following:
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𝜃𝐶 1 (𝐶12 ) + (1 − 𝜃)𝐶 1 (𝐶22 ) ≥ 𝑡(𝜃𝐶12 + (1 − 𝜃)𝐶22 ),

∀𝐶12 , 𝐶22 , ∀𝜃 ∈ [0,1].
(2.6)

Therefore, the efficient frontier will not be convex if and only if ∃𝐶12 , 𝐶22 , and ∃𝜃 ∈ [0,1]
such that
𝜃𝐶 1 (𝐶12 ) + (1 − 𝜃)𝐶 1 (𝐶22 ) < 𝑡(𝜃𝐶12 + (1 − 𝜃)𝐶22 ),

(2.7)

In other words, if there exist at least at one point on the efficient frontier that lies above
a linear combination of these two points, the convexity condition is violated (see Figure
2.4b).
To derive the generalized costs of points 1 and 2, we can use the following algebraic
equality:
𝛼𝑝 𝜃𝐶12 + 𝛼𝑝 (1 − 𝜃)𝐶22 = 𝛼𝑝 (𝜃𝐶12 + (1 − 𝜃)𝐶22 ) ,

∀𝐶12 , 𝐶22 , 𝜃, 𝛼𝑝

(2.8)

We hold the inequality (2.7) by adding the left and right sides of (2.8) to the left and right
sides of (2.7), respectively. According to the definition of the generalized cost in (2.1), the
left side of this inequality is a weighted sum of the generalized cost of points 1 and point
2. The right side is also the generalized cost of a third point associated with 𝐶32 = 𝐶12 +
(1 − θ)𝐶22 , which we denote simply as 𝐶𝑝,3 . Following from the conditions of (2.7) and
(2.8) that ∀𝛼𝑝 , ∃𝐶12 , 𝐶22 , and ∃𝜃 ∈ [0,1] , we have:
𝜃𝐶𝑝,1 + (1 − 𝜃)𝐶𝑝,2 < 𝐶𝑝,3
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(2.9)

According to the definition of the efficient frontier, a rational user with preference 𝛼𝑝
who chooses between points 1 and 2 in the absence of better alternatives will choose the
route with the lower generalized cost of 𝐶𝑝,min = min{𝐶𝑝,1 , 𝐶𝑝,2 } . Using the
identity, 𝐶𝑝,min = 𝜃𝐶𝑝,min + (1 − 𝜃)𝐶𝑝,min , we can see that
𝐶𝑝,𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝜃𝐶𝑝,𝑚𝑖𝑛 + (1 − 𝜃)𝐶𝑝,𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝐶𝑝,1 + (1 − 𝜃)𝐶𝑝,2 < 𝐶𝑝,3

(2.10)

because 𝐶𝑝,min ≤ 𝐶𝑝,1 and 𝐶𝑝,min ≤ 𝐶𝑝,2 . So, existence of a 𝜃 for which condition (2.7)
holds means that there exist at least a point on the efficient frontier with a generalized cost
lower than point 3, for any value of 𝛼𝑝 . This contradicts the inherent dominancy of the
efficient frontier, thus the efficient frontier must be convex everywhere. ∎

(a)

(b)

Figure 2.4. (a) monotonicity of the efficient frontier; (b) convexity of the efficient frontier
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Proposition 2.3 (geometric property). The slope of the differentiable efficient frontier at
each point is 𝑚𝑖 = −𝛼𝑝 of the users choosing that point (see Figure 2.3a)

Proof. According to the definition of the efficient frontier as a set of dominant choices,
users pick the choices that minimize their generalized cost according to their own
preferences. Since the efficient frontier is defined continuous and differentiable, the first
derivative of the generalized cost of each choice i on the efficient frontier for demand group
𝑝 with respect to 𝐶𝑖2 should be equal to zero. By substituting the definition of the
generalized cost from equation (2.1), we can rewrite the first order condition as follows:
𝜕𝐶𝑝,𝑖
𝜕𝐶𝑖2

𝜕𝐶 1

= 𝜕𝐶𝑖2 + 𝛼𝑝 = 0

(2.11)

𝑖

As a result, the slope of the efficient frontier at choice 𝑖, 𝑚𝑖 , picked by group 𝑝, can be
determined as below:
𝜕𝐶 1

𝑚𝑖 = 𝜕𝐶𝑖2 = −𝛼𝑝

(2.12)

𝑖

∎
Corollary 2.1 (assignment order). Labeling the choices in an increasing order of their 𝐶 2 ,
the heterogeneous users pick these choices in a decreasing order of their α𝑝 . According to
the monotonicity property (Proposition 2.1), 𝐶 1 will be a decreasing function of 𝐶 2 . In the
meantime, the convexity property (Proposition 2.2) ensures that the negative slope is
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increasing (i.e., becoming less steep). Then, the geometric property (Proposition 2.3)
implies that the assignment starts with the greatest 𝛼, where the negative slope is steepest,
and progresses sequentially to the lowest 𝛼, where the slope is flattest (See Figure 2.3a).
Now that the general properties of the efficient frontier are revealed, we extend the
results for a discrete distribution of 𝛼.

2.1.2 Piecewise Linear Efficient Frontier of Choices
In the case that the distribution of the user preferences is discrete, according to the
Proposition 2.3, the efficient frontier,𝐶 1 (𝐶 2 ), turns out to be a piecewise linear function,
as illustrated in Figure 2.3b, with very similar characteristics as the differentiable function.
For one thing, the efficient frontier is still monotonically deceasing exactly as demonstrated
in Proposition 2.1. For another, the piecewise linear efficient frontier is also a convex
function as showed in Proposition 2.2. Finally, the pricewise efficient linear efficient
frontier has the same geometric property presented in Proposition 2.3. However, since 𝛼
has a discrete distribution, the slope of the segment (i,j) of efficient frontier (𝑚𝑖,𝑗 ), which
includes a range of choices from i to j, will be equal to −α𝑝 of the group of users picking
these choices, as depicted in the Figure 2.3b.
𝑚𝑖,𝑗 = −𝛼𝑝

(2.13)
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Accordingly, the assignment order that explained in Corollary 2.1 also holds for a
discrete distribution of 𝛼, and the heterogeneous users pick these choices in a decreasing
order of their α𝑝 .
Now that these specific characteristics of the efficient frontier are known, they can be
employed to analytically model the single bottleneck problem with distributions in the
schedule penalty factors of the commuters as a bicriterion choice problem with
heterogeneous user preferences.
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CHAPTER 3

MORNING COMMUTE PROBLEM WITH HETEROGENEOUS USER
PREFERENCES

Choosing the starting time of a trip is one of the important decisions that users need to
make ahead of their trips according to their own preferences. Rational users of a bottleneck
tend to minimize the generalized cost of their trips by adjusting their arrival times to the
bottleneck. Thus, the cumulative result of the individual decisions of the users leads to the
user equilibrium condition in which no one can reduce his/her cost anymore by changing
the starting time of his/her trip. This problem is first introduced in Vickrey’s (1969)
congestion theory based on a first-in, first-out single bottleneck model with fixed capacity,
and elaborated in the literature by considering heterogeneity in schedule preferences of the
users (Hendrickson and Kocur ,1981; Smith, 1984; Daganzo, 1985). In this section, we
employ the concept of the efficient frontier to propose an extension to the user equilibrium
and optimum pricing models of the bottleneck by accounting for the heterogeneity in
schedule penalty preferences of the users in modeling the travel behavior of the commuters.
In addition, the proposed analytical solution for the morning commute problem can have
applications in modeling and optimizing the aggregated networks that can be modeled as
queueing systems (Daganzo, 2007; Geroliminis and Daganzo, 2008; Gonzales and
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Daganzo, 2012). An applicable method is also proposed to retrieve independent
distributions of preferences of the users from a given joint distribution. The proposed
analytical solution of the problem can also be inversely used to approximate the distribution
of user preferences from the empirical data from observations.

3.1 Trip Scheduling Problem with Heterogeneous Traveler Preferences
The trip scheduling problem for a single bottleneck was introduced in Vickrey (1969),
which explains how users adjust the timing of their travel to minimize their own costs when
time-dependent demand exceeds a bottleneck’s fixed capacity, 𝜇. As a result of queuing, a
commuter who arrives at the bottleneck will experience a combination of queueing delay
and schedule penalty, depending on whether the departure time from the bottleneck is
before or after their preferred schedules, in addition to the free flow travel time of the
bottleneck. Thus, the total cost for the commuter 𝑁, with earliness penalty factor 𝑒𝑝 and
lateness penalty factor 𝑙𝑝 , can be expressed as a linear combination of the free flow travel
time (𝜏𝐹 ), delay (𝜏𝐷 ), and earliness (𝜏𝐸 ) or lateness (𝜏𝐿 ) that this commute experiences:

𝐶𝑝 (𝑁) = 𝜏𝐹 + 𝜏𝐷 (𝑁) + 𝑒𝑝 𝜏𝐸 (𝑁) + 𝑙𝑝 𝜏𝐿 (𝑁)
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(3.1)

Here, the schedule penalty factors 𝑒𝑝 and 𝑙𝑝 recognize the weights of the schedule
deviation relative to queueing delay depending on the preferences of the heterogeneous
commuters commuter denoted by 𝑝.
The pattern of arrivals and departures from the bottleneck may be represented by
cumulative counts of the number of passengers to arrive by time 𝑡, 𝐴(𝑡), and the number
to depart by time 𝑡, 𝐷(𝑡). So the delay can be represented as the horizontal distance
between arrival and departure curves. As illustrated in the Figure 3.1a and 5b, such delay
increases from zero at start of the peak period, 𝑡𝑠 , to its maximum value, 𝜏𝑐 , at time 𝑡̂, then
it decreases back to zero at the end of end of the peak, 𝑡𝐸 . The schedule deviation is the
difference between the time that a commuter wishes to have departed the bottleneck as
described by a cumulative wished curve, 𝑊(𝑡), and the actual departure. Thus, the
earliness and lateness are a consequence the cumulative arrivals and resulting queues. If
commuters choose when to start their trips to arrive at the bottleneck at a time 𝑡, the user
equilibrium is defined by the 𝐴(𝑡) that allows no commuter to reduce his/her own
generalized cost by changing his/her own arrival time. Daganzo (1985) proves that a unique
user equilibrium exists when 𝑊(𝑡) is S-shaped, with slope that exceeds bottleneck capacity
between two time points and is less outside. Assuming that demand is homogenous with
identical earliness (e) and lateness (l) penalty factors, Fig 4a, b illustrate queueing diagrams
of the well-known conventional user equilibrium respectively for a stepwise and an Sshaped wished and departure curve.
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(a) Stepwise wished curve

(b) S-shaped wished curve

Figure 3.1. Queueing diagram of bottleneck user equilibrium

Two conditions describe the user equilibrium when commuters have homogeneous
schedule penalties. First, the arrival curve is piecewise linear with specific slopes in the
user equilibrium condition.

𝑑𝐴(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡

={

𝜇/(1 − 𝑒), for commuters who depart early
𝜇/(1 + 𝑙), for commuters who depart late

(3.2)

Second, the proportion of the commuters who experience earliness, 𝑁𝑒 , to those who
are late, 𝑁𝑙 , equals the proportion of lateness penalty to earliness penalty.
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𝑁𝑒
𝑁𝑙

𝑙

=𝑒

(3.3)

In the equilibrium condition, no one can reduce his/her generalized cost by changing
his/her arrival time to the bottleneck. The underlying assumption of the congestion theory
is that all commuters have identical schedule penalties for departing early and late from the
bottleneck. However, empirical evidence shows that in reality there is a heterogeneity
associated with the schedule penalty factors that commuters account for them in their trips
(Small, 1982; Gonzales and Christofa, 2013). To include such heterogeneity of the users’
preferences, we employ the concept of the efficient frontier of choices, to propose an
analytical solution to the morning commute problem with heterogeneous users. First, in
section 3.1.1, we explain the methodology under the simplifying assumption that
commuters have a stepwise wished curve as depicted in Figure 3.1a. Then, in section 3.1.2,
we show that a same approach can be followed in case that the departure curve has a general
smooth S-shape as illustrated in Figure 3.1b. On this basis, we propose a general
formulation of the model when there is heterogeneity associated with both schedule and
schedule penalty preferences of the bottleneck commuters.

3.1.1 Stepwise Wished Curve
In a simplified case of the morning commute problem of Figure 3.1a for users with an
identical wished departure time (𝑡̂) and the same schedule penalty factors as in Arnott et al.
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(1990), the generalized cost of the trips remains equal among the homogenous commuters
in the equilibrium condition, as depicted in Figure 3.2a. It is worth pointing out that the
delay that commuters experience decreases linearly with their earliness and lateness with
slopes −𝑒 and −𝑙, respectively, as depicted in the Figure 3.2b and 6c. In addition, it can be
shown that earliness and lateness of the users vary linearly with their departure order from
bottleneck with slope 1/µ (See Figure 3.1a). The result is depicted in Figure 3.2a with delay
increasing linearly with slope e/µ for early commuters to its maximum value 𝜏𝑐 and then
decreasing with slope -l/µ to zero for late commuters. Meanwhile, the generalized cost of
travel remains constant for all the commuters.

(a) Variation of commuters’

(b) Delay-earliness relationship

(c) Delay-lateness relationship

generalized cost
Figure 3.2. Variation of the components of the generalized cost for homogenous commuters in user
equilibrium
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To account for the heterogeneity of the user preferences, we may consider a probability
distribution for the schedule penalties of the commuters like the one plotted in Figure 2.1.
In this case, the morning scheduling problem can be viewed as a choice problem with
heterogeneous user preferences. The heterogeneous commuters seek to minimize the
generalized cost of their trips according to their own preferences by adjusting their arrival
time to the bottleneck. In this problem, the commute cost of equation (3.1) can be compared
to the generalized cost function (1), where the associated delay and schedule deviation are
the components of the generalized cost that users experience to commute through the
bottleneck. In this respect, each commuter chooses the arrival time to the bottleneck that
minimizes the combined delay and schedule deviation that he or she experiences according
to his/her own schedule penalty factors.
The cumulative result of the individual bicriterion decisions in the equilibrium
condition can be well represented by the efficient frontier of choices. Accordingly, the
population of the heterogeneous commuters will be distributed along the efficient frontier
of arrival times in the equilibrium condition. As a result, the concept of the efficient frontier
can be employed to demonstrate the relationships of delay with earliness and lateness of
the equilibrium arrival of the users as illustrated in Figure 3.3b and 7c. In these figures,
each point on the efficient frontier corresponds to a specific arrival time, which is
represented by its associated delay and schedule deviation. So, the slope of the efficient
frontier, 𝜏𝐷 (∙) as function of 𝜏𝐸 or 𝜏𝐿 , at each point equals to the negative value of the
schedule penalty of the user who chooses the corresponding arrival time (𝑡𝐴 ) of this point,
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−𝑒𝑡𝐴 or −𝑙𝑡𝐴 for earliness and lateness periods, respectively. In the other words,
commuters with lower schedule penalty factors tend to arrive to the bottleneck closer to the
beginning (𝑡𝑆 ) and the end (𝑡𝐸 ) of the peak period, where they will experience a lower delay
although they may significantly deviate from their schedule. In contrast, commuters with
higher schedule penalty factors prefer to arrive to the bottleneck in the middle of the peak
period to arrive to their destinations with a lower deviation from their schedules in spite of
higher delays that they experience in the bottleneck. Ignoring the free flow travel time of
the users, the variations in generalized cost of equation (3.1) for heterogeneous commuters
can be illustrated as in Figure 3.3a.

(a) Variation of commuters’

(b) Delay-earliness relationship

(c) Delay-lateness relationship

generalized cost
Figure 3.3. Variation of the components of the generalized cost for heterogeneous commuters in user
equilibrium
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As shown in the Chapter 2, the efficient frontier of choices has specific properties that are
general for all problems. In the next section, we use these properties to propose an
analytical solution to the morning commute problem with an S-shaped wished curve and
heterogeneous user schedule penalty factors.

3.1.2 S-Shaped Wished Curve
To account for the heterogeneity in the schedule preferences of the users, we may assume
a smooth S-shaped wished curve for the commuters. Meanwhile, we account for the
heterogeneity of the schedule penalty factors of the users by considering probability
distributions for earliness and lateness penalty factors. Heterogeneous users choose
arriving times to the bottleneck that make the combination of the delay and schedule
deviation of their commutes minimized according to their own preferences. The cumulative
result of the individual decisions will be an equilibrium condition in which no commuter
will have an incentive to change his/her arrival time to the bottleneck to be earlier or later.
Accordingly, the concept of the efficient frontier can be employed to represent the
equilibrium condition of the bottleneck with heterogeneous commuters. Thus, we use
specific properties of the efficient frontier, 𝜏𝐷 (∙) as function of 𝜏𝐸 or 𝜏𝐿 , to demonstrate
the relationship of arrival times of the commuters to the bottleneck with their schedule
deviation penalty factors. On this basis, we can derive the arrival distribution of the
heterogeneous commuters over time in the equilibrium condition.
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In Section 3.1.2.1, we first use the main properties of the efficient frontier, presented in
Chapter 2, to specify the properties of the equilibrium arrival of the heterogeneous
commuters to the bottleneck. On this basis, in Section 3.1.2.2, we derive an analytical
solution for the equilibrium arrival of the commuter to the bottleneck given the PDFs of
the schedule deviation penalty factors. In section 3.1.2.3, we show that the proposed
analytical solution derived based on the properties of the efficient frontier is necessary and
sufficient for the equilibrium conditions of the bottleneck derived according to Daganzo
(1985).

3.1.2.1 Efficient Frontier of Arrival Choices
The main objective of this part of the research is to derive the arrival distribution of the
heterogeneous users over time who find different arrival times minimizing the generalized
cost of their commutes according to their own schedule deviation penalty preferences. In
this respect, commuters can be tagged with their arrival times to the bottleneck as well as
their earliness or lateness penalty factors. Once we figure out the relationship between
arrival times of the commuters with their schedule deviation penalty factors, we can derive
the equilibrium solution for the arrival of the commuters to the bottleneck. For this to
happen, let variable 𝑡𝐴 denotes the arrival time of the commuters to the bottleneck. So
𝑁𝑡𝐴 = 𝐴(𝑡𝐴 ) is the cumulative arrivals of the commuters by time 𝑡𝐴 while the earliness (or
lateness) penalty factor of the commuter who arrived to the bottleneck at time 𝑡𝐴 is
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represented by 𝑒𝑡𝐴 (or 𝑙𝑡𝐴 ). On this basis, we can derive the relationship between these
variables in the equilibrium condition using the concept of the efficient frontier.
In this section, we use the main properties of the efficient frontier, 𝜏𝐷 (∙) , according to
Chapter 2, to demonstrate the properties of the equilibrium arrivals of the heterogeneous
commuters to the bottleneck. According to the Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, the efficient
frontier is a monotonically decreasing convex function. However, we need to specify the
geometric property of the efficient frontier in Proposition 2.3 for the morning commute
problem to identify the differential relationship between the delay and schedule deviation
that users experience in the equilibrium condition, as demonstrated in Proposition 3.1.
Knowing the relationship between schedule deviation for the users and their departure
times from the bottleneck in the equilibrium condition, we derive the differential
relationship between delay that users experience and their departure times as an equivalent
for the geometric property of Proposition 3.1, as presented in Corollary 3.1. Moreover, we
use the result of the Corollary 3.1 to adapt the assignment order rule of the Corollary 2.1
specifically for the morning commute problem in Corollary 3.2. In Section 3.1.2.2, we use
the results of the Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2 to derive the analytical solution for the morning
commute problem given the PDFs of the schedule deviation penalty factors.

Proposition 3.1 (geometric property). Each point on the efficient frontier, 𝜏𝐷 (𝜏𝐸 ) (or
𝜏𝐷 (𝜏𝐿 )), represents the combinations of delay and earliness (or lateness) with minimum
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costs, which directly corresponds to choosing an arrival time (𝑡𝐴 ) to the bottleneck. On this
basis, the slope of the efficient frontier at each point equals to −𝑒𝑡𝐴 (or −𝑙𝑡𝐴 ) for the early
(or late) commuter 𝑁𝑡𝐴 who chooses arrival time 𝑡𝐴 .
∂τ𝐷,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

𝑚𝑡𝐴 =

∂τ𝐸,𝑁𝑡

= −𝑒𝑡𝐴 , for commuters who depart early

𝐴

∂τ𝐷,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

{

∂τ𝐿,𝑁𝑡

(3.4)
= −𝑙𝑡𝐴 , for commuters who depart late

𝐴

Proof. Rational users tend minimize their generalized cost according to their own
preferences. In the equilibrium condition, heterogeneous users arrive to the bottleneck in
an order in time that each of them experiences the minimum possible generalized cost
according to his/her preference. So, the first derivative of the generalized cost for
commuters at each arrival point in time, 𝑡𝐴 , and earliness penalty factor 𝑒𝑡𝐴 , with respect
to N should be equal to zero.
𝜕𝐶𝑡𝐴 (𝑁𝑡𝐴 )
𝜕𝑁

=

𝜕𝐶𝑡𝐴 (𝑁𝑡𝐴 ) 𝜕𝜏𝐸,𝑁𝑡𝐴
∙ 𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝜏𝐸,𝑁𝑡

=0

(3.5)

𝐴

According to the definition of the schedule deviation, the earliness of commuter N can be
approximated as the difference between the wished and actual departure times:
𝑁

𝜏𝐸,𝑁 = 𝑊 −1 (𝑁) − 𝐷−1 (𝑁) = 𝑡𝑤,𝑁 − 𝜇 , for the commuter who departs early
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(3.6)

In this relation, 𝑊 −1 (. ) and 𝐷−1 (. ) are the inversed cumulative wished curves, which
denote the time corresponding to commuter 𝑁, respectively. Here, 𝑊 −1 (𝑁) has a fixed
value for the commuter N, 𝑡𝑤,𝑁 . Moreover, since bottleneck has a fixed capacity, the
departure time of the commuter N can be derived as 𝐷 −1 (𝑁) = 𝑁/𝜇. As a result the first
derivative of the earliness of the commuter N with respect to N can be derived as bellow:
𝜕𝜏𝐸,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

𝜕𝑁

=−

1
𝜇

(3.7)

By substituting the definition of the generalized cost from equation (3.1), we can rewrite
the first order condition (3.5) as follow:

1

𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡

− 𝜇 (𝜕𝜏

𝐴

𝐸,𝑁𝑡
𝐴

+ 𝑒𝑡𝐴 ) = 0

(3.8)

As a result, the slope of the efficient frontier at each arrival point in time, 𝑚𝑡𝐴 =
𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡 /𝜕𝜏𝐸,𝑁𝑡 , is negatively proportional to the earliness penalty factor of the commuters
𝐴

𝐴

who choose that arrival time in the equilibrium condition, 𝑒𝑡𝐴 . A very similar conclusion
also can be drawn for the commuters who depart the bottleneck later than they wished as
generalized in condition (3.4).∎

Corollary 3.1 (equivalent geometric property). As it is illustrated in Figure 3.4, in the
equilibrium condition, the first derivative of the delay that a commuter experiences with
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respect to his departure time, 𝐷−1 (𝑁) = 𝑡𝐷 , equals to 𝑒𝑡𝐴 (or −𝑙𝑡𝐴 ) of that commuter in the
earliness (or lateness) period.
𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

𝜕𝑡𝐷

+𝑒𝑡𝐴 , for commuters who depart early
={
−𝑙𝑡𝐴 , for commuters who depart late
(3.9)

Figure 3.4. Variation of components of the generalized cost over time for heterogeneous commuters in
user equilibrium

Proof. According to the differentiation chain rule we have:
𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

𝜕𝑡𝐷

=

𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

𝜕𝜏𝐸,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

∙

𝜕𝜏𝐸,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

(3.10)

𝜕𝑡𝐷

For one thing, we have the value of first term (𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡 / 𝜕𝜏𝐸,𝑁𝑡 ) from equation (3.4) of
𝐴

𝐴

Proposition 3.1. For another we need to determine the value of the second term
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( 𝜕𝜏𝐸,𝑁𝑡 /𝜕𝑡𝐷 ). By substituting 𝑊 −1 (𝑁) with 𝑡𝑤,𝑁 and also D−1 (𝑁) with 𝑡𝐷 in the
𝐴

definition of earliness in equation (3.6), the first derivative of the earliness with respect to
𝑡𝐷 can be derived as below:
𝜕𝜏𝐸,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

𝜕𝑡𝐷

= −1

(3.11)

Thus, the condition (3.9) for the early commuters can be derived by substituting the
equations (3.4) and (3.11) in the equation (3.10). A similar result also can be derived
following the same approach for late commuters. ∎

Corollary 3.2 (assignment order). As it can be inferred from Figure 3.4, early commuters
arrive to the bottleneck in an increasing order of their earliness penalty factor from time 𝑡𝑆
to 𝑡̂ . In contrast, late commuters arrive to the bottleneck in a decreasing order of their
lateness penalty factor from time 𝑡̂ to 𝑡𝐸 . In other words, commuters with lower schedule
penalty factors are more sensitive to delay and tend to minimize their generalized costs by
adjusting their arrival times closer to the beginning (𝑡𝑆 ) and end (𝑡𝐸 ) of the peak period. On
the contrary, commuters with higher schedule penalty factors have less sensitivity to delay
and prefer the arrival times closer to the rush of the peak period (𝑡̂).
According to Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, the efficient frontier of arrival choices is a
monotonically decreasing convex function. Thus, it can be concluded from comparing
Proposition 3.1 with Corollary 3.1 that the delay first monotonically increases to its
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maximum value, 𝜏𝑐 , from time 𝑡𝑆 to 𝑡̂, and then monotonically decreases back to zero from
time 𝑡̂ to 𝑡𝐸 . However, this function remains convex in the earliness part as well as the
lateness part, which means that the slope of delay curve is monotonically increasing and
decreasing in earliness and lateness parts, respectively. According to the Corollary 3.1, this
slope at each arrival time, 𝑡𝐴 , equals to the e𝑡A or −l𝑡𝐴 of the early or the late commuter(s)
who chooses that arrival time, respectively. As a result, it can be concluded that commuters
arrive to the bottleneck in an increasing and a decreasing order of their schedule penalty
factors in the earliness and lateness periods, respectively.
As it is mentioned Daganzo (1985), the earliness penalty factor of the users can vary
between 0 and 1, and the lateness penalty factor is nonnegative. Accordingly, as illustrated
in Figure 3.4, the slope of delay curve monotonically increases from zero at time 𝑡𝑆 to unity
at time 𝑡̂ . At this point, the slope of the delay drops to negative infinity, then it again
monotonically increases back to zero to time 𝑡𝐸 .

3.1.2.2 Equilibrium Arrival of the Heterogeneous Commuters
Rational users minimize their own generalized costs by adjusting their arrival times to the
bottleneck in order to balance delay and schedule deviation that they experience during
their commutes through the bottleneck. The cumulative result of these individual decisions
is the user equilibrium condition in which the population of the commuters will be
distributed along the efficient frontier of the arrival choices. Here, we use the concept of
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the efficient frontier to derive an analytical solution for the morning commute problem
given the PDFs of the schedule deviation penalty factors of the users. To this end, we first
we use the introduced properties of the efficient frontier, presented in Section 3.2.1, to
determine the relationship of the arrival times of the commuters to the bottleneck with their
schedule deviation penalty factors. On this basis, we derive the cumulative arrival of the
heterogeneous commuter to the bottleneck as well as their generalized cost of commute
according to their own preferences in the equilibrium condition.
In this respect, we combine the equivalent geometric property of the Corollary 3.1 with
the assignment order rule of the Corollary 3.2 to determine the equilibrium arrival times of
the heterogeneous commuters to the bottleneck given the PDFs of their schedule deviation
penalty factors. Corollary 3.1 relates the variations of delay at each point in (departure)
time to the schedule deviation penalty factor of the user that experiences that delay in the
equilibrium condition.
According to condition (3.9), the first derivative of the delay for each early user with
respect to his/her departure time equals to his/her earliness penalty factor, etA . By
employing the differentiation chain rule we can rewrite the condition (3.9) for an early
commuter, 𝑁𝑡𝐴 , as below:
𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

𝜕𝑡𝐷

=

𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁
𝑡𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐷
𝜕𝑡𝐴

= 𝑒𝑡𝐴
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(3.12)

For one thing, we need to derive 𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡 /𝜕𝑡𝐷 to substitute it back into equation
𝐴

(3.12).In this respect, the delay of this early commuter can be approximated as the
horizontal distance between the cumulative arrival and departure curves, as illustrated in
the Figure 3.5a:

𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡 = 𝐷−1 (𝑁𝑡𝐴 ) − 𝐴−1
𝑒 (𝑁𝑡𝐴 ) =
𝐴

(a) Variation of delay in the queueing diagram

𝑁𝑡𝐴
𝜇

− 𝑡𝐴

(3.13)

(b) Probability distribution of earliness penalty factor

Figure 3.5. Relation between the equilibrium arrivals of the early commuters with the distribution of the
earliness penalty factor

In the equation (3.13), we need to approximate the value of the cumulative arrival of
heterogeneous commuters at time 𝑡𝐴 , 𝑁𝑡𝐴 = 𝐴(𝑡𝐴 ). According to the Corollary 3.2, early
commuters arrive to the bottleneck in an increasing order of their earliness penalty factor
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in the equilibrium condition. So, arrival of a commuter with earliness penalty factor 𝑒𝑡𝐴 to
the bottleneck at time 𝑡𝐴 can be interpreted as arrival of the all commuters with earliness
penalty factors less than 𝑒𝑡𝐴 ahead of this user. Given the probability density function
(PDF) of the earliness penalty factor of the early commuters, 𝑓𝑒 (𝑒) , the cumulative
proportion of the early commuters who arrive before time 𝑡𝐴 , 𝑁𝑡𝐴 /𝑁𝑒 , is approximated as
the cumulative probability density function (CDF) of the earliness penalty factor at 𝑒𝑡𝐴 ,
𝐹𝑒 (𝑒𝑡𝐴 ), which represents the area under the 𝑓𝑒 (𝑒) up to 𝑒𝑡𝐴 , as illustrated in Figure 3.5b.
As a result, the cumulative number of the arrivals at time 𝑡𝐴 can be approximated as
cumulative probability distribution of the earliness penalty factor at 𝑒𝑡𝐴 times the total
number of early commuters:
𝑒

𝑁𝑡𝐴 = 𝑁𝑒 𝐹𝑒 (𝑒𝑡𝐴 ) = 𝑁𝑒 ∫0 𝑡𝐴 𝑓𝑒 (𝑒)𝑑𝑒

(3.14)

By substituting 𝑁𝑡𝐴 from equation (3.14) in equation (3.13), delay of the commuter can be
approximated as below:

𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡 =
𝐴

𝑒𝑡
𝑁𝑒 ∫0 𝐴 𝑓𝑒 (𝑒)𝑑𝑒

𝜇

− 𝑡𝐴

(3.15)

Accordingly, the first derivative of the delay to the arrival time can be derived as follows:
𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

𝜕𝑡𝐴

=

𝑁𝑒
𝜇

𝑒̇𝑡𝐴 𝑓𝑒 (𝑒𝑡𝐴 ) − 1

(3.16)
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where, 𝑒̇𝑡𝐴 = 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝐴 /𝑑𝑡𝐴 .
For another, we need to derive 𝜕𝑡𝐷 /𝜕𝑡𝐴 to substitute it back into equation (3.12).
According the definition of delay from equation (3.13), we can relate 𝑡𝐷 and 𝑡𝐴 as follows
(See Figure 3.5a):
𝑡𝐷 = 𝑡𝐴 + 𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡

(3.17)

𝐴

By taking the first derivative of the equation (3.17) with respect to 𝑡𝐴 we will have:

𝜕𝑡𝐷
𝜕𝑡𝐴

= 1+

𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

(3.18)

𝜕𝑡𝐴

By substituting 𝜕𝑡𝐷 /𝜕𝑡𝐴 from equation (3.18) in equation (3.12), it can be rewritten as
below:
𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁
𝑡𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐴
𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁
𝑡𝐴
1+
𝜕𝑡𝐴

= 𝑒𝑡𝐴

(3.19)

Now, we plug 𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡 /𝜕𝑡𝐷 from equation (3.16) into equation (3.19):
𝐴

𝑁𝑒
𝑒̇ 𝑓 (𝑒 )−1
𝜇 𝑡𝐴 𝑒 𝑡𝐴
𝑁𝑒
𝑒̇ 𝑓 (𝑒 )
𝜇 𝑡𝐴 𝑒 𝑡𝐴
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= 𝑒𝑡𝐴

(3.20)

By substituting ė 𝑡𝐴 with its equivalent term 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝐴 /𝑑𝑡𝐴 and a little algebraic manipulation
equation (3.20) can be rewritten as below:

𝑑𝑡𝐴 =

𝑁𝑒
𝜇

(1 − 𝑒𝑡𝐴 )𝑓𝑒 (𝑒𝑡𝐴 )𝑑𝑒𝑡𝐴

(3.21)

Taking the integral of both sides of the equation (3.21), the analytical solution of the
morning commute problem with heterogeneous user preferences is given by the following:

𝑡𝐴 =

𝑁𝑒
𝜇

𝑒

𝑡
∫0 𝐴 (1 − 𝑒)𝑓𝑒 (𝑒)𝑑𝑒

(3.22)

Accordingly, the equilibrium arrival of the heterogeneous users to the bottleneck can be
determined based on their own penalty preferences for the early departure from the
bottleneck.
Numerical methods can be employed here to estimate the arrival of the heterogeneous
commuters using this relation specifically when it is not analytically simple to take the
integral of the probability density function of the earliness factors analytically. However,
the cumulative arrival of the heterogeneous commuters also can be analytically derived
using relation (3.22), when the integral has a definite solution. In this case, we simply need
to solve equation (3.22) for e𝑡𝐴 and substitute the result in equation (3.14). As a result, the
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cumulative arrival of heterogeneous early commuters in the equilibrium condition can be
approximated as below:

𝐴𝑒 (𝑡𝐴 ) = 𝑁𝑒 𝐹𝑒 (𝑒̂𝑡𝐴 )

(3.23)

where, 𝑒̂𝑡𝐴 denotes the solution of equation (3.22) as a function of 𝑡𝐴 .
On this basis, we also can derive the distribution of the earliness factor of the equilibrium
arrivals by inverting the function (3.23):

𝑁𝑡

𝑒𝑡𝐴= 𝐹𝑒−1 ( 𝑁 𝐴 )

(3.24)

𝑒

By substituting the equations (3.6), (3.13), and (3.24) in the generalized cost function (3.1),
we can rewrite the generalized cost function of early commuters as below:

C𝑡𝐴 (N𝑡𝐴 ) = 𝜏𝐹 + (

𝑁𝑡𝐴
𝜇

𝑁𝑡

𝐴
−1
− 𝐴−1
𝑒 (𝑁𝑡𝐴 )) + 𝐹𝑒 ( 𝑁 ) ∙ (𝑡𝑤,𝑁𝑡 −
𝑒

𝐴

𝑁𝑡𝐴
𝜇

) , 𝑁𝑡𝐴 ∈ [0, 𝑁𝑒 ] (3.25)

Similar results also can be derived for the equilibrium arrival of the heterogeneous
commuters who depart the bottleneck later than they wished. In this respect, having an
auxiliary coordination system for the queueing diagram with origin at (𝑡𝐸 , 𝑁𝑄 ) and both
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axes in the opposite directions with the original system as depicted in Figure 3.6a, can
significantly simplify the solution of the problem. Thus, we define the new axes as 𝑡̃ =
̃ = 𝑁𝑙 − 𝑁 , where the length of the lateness period is denoted by 𝑇𝑙 =
𝑇𝑙 − 𝑡 and 𝑁
̃ (𝑡̃) also denote cumulative arrival and departure
𝐴−1 (𝑁𝑙 ). In this system, 𝐴̃𝑒 (𝑡̃) and 𝐷
curves of late commuters, respectively. Notice as well that the slopes of the curves remain
exactly the same in the auxiliary coordinate system due to inversion of the both axes in this
system. So, here, we first employ the auxiliary coordination system to derive the
equilibrium arrival of the late commuters, and then rewrite the solution in the original
coordination system.

(a) Variation of delay in the queueing diagram

(b) Probability distribution of lateness penalty factor

Figure 3.6. Relation between the equilibrium arrivals of the late commuters with the distribution of the
earliness penalty factor
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The equilibrium arrival of the late commuters in the auxiliary coordinate system is very
similar to the early commuter problem. So, with same line of reasoning for the relation
(3.22), the arrival time of the late commuters in the auxiliary coordinate can be formulated
as below:

𝑁 𝑙
𝑡𝐴̃ = 𝜇𝑙 ∫0 𝑡̃𝐴 (1 + 𝑙)𝑓𝑙 (𝑙)𝑑𝑙

(3.26)

where, l𝑡̃𝐴 denotes the lateness penalty factor of the commuter who arrives to the bottleneck
at time 𝑡𝐴̃ in the auxiliary coordination system, corresponding to 𝑡𝐴 in the original system.
f𝑙 (𝑙) and F𝑙 (𝑙) also represents PDF and CDF of the lateness penalty factor and of the late
commuters, respectively, as illustrated in the Figure 3.6b.
Accordingly, the cumulative arrival of heterogeneous late commuters in the equilibrium
condition can be approximated as below:

𝐴̃𝑙 (𝑡𝐴̃ ) = 𝑁𝑙 𝐹𝑙 (𝑙̂𝑡̃𝐴 )

(3.27)

where, 𝑙̂𝑡̃𝐴 denotes the solution of equation (3.26) as a function of 𝑡𝐴̃ .
As a result, we can rewrite the equation (3.27) in the original coordination system as
below:
71

𝐴𝑙 (𝑡𝐴 ) = 𝑁𝑙 − 𝐴̃𝑙 (𝑇𝑙 − 𝑡𝐴 ) = 𝑁𝑙 (1 − 𝐹𝑙 (𝑙̂𝑡𝐴 ))

(3.28)

Here, 𝑙̂𝑡𝐴 represents the solution of the equation (3.26) by plugging 𝑡𝐴̃ = 𝑇𝑙 − 𝑡𝐴 .
Moreover, we can derive the distribution of the lateness factor of the equilibrium
arrivals following similar approach as for the earliness factor as below:

̃𝑡
𝑁

𝑙𝑡𝐴 = 𝐹𝑙−1 ( 𝑁𝐴 )

(3.29)

𝑙

The generalized cost of the late commuters can be approximated similar to generalized
cost of early commuters, presented in equation (3.25), as follows:

̃ 𝑡̃ ) = 𝜏𝐹 + (𝐴̃−1
̃
C𝑡̃𝐴 (N
𝑙 (N𝑡̃𝐴 ) −
𝐴

̃𝑡
𝑁
𝐴
𝜇

̃ 𝑡̃
N

) + 𝐹𝑙−1 ( 𝑁𝐴 ) ∙ (𝑡𝑤,Ñ𝑡̃ −
𝑙

𝐴

̃ 𝑡̃
N

𝐴

𝜇

̃ 𝑡̃ ∈ [0, 𝑁𝑙 ] (3.30)
), N
𝐴

3.1.2.3 Equilibrium Condition of the Efficient Frontier
Previously, we derived an analytical solution for the morning commute problem given the
PDFs of the schedule deviation penalty factors of the heterogeneous users. In this section,
we show that the proposed analytical solution of the problem is necessary and sufficient
for satisfying the equilibrium conditions of the bottleneck derived according to Daganzo
(1985).
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In the equilibrium condition, no commuter should have an incentive to change his/her
arrival time to the bottleneck to be earlier or later. To generalize the first equilibrium
condition, we consider the effect of changing arrival time for a single commuter with arrival
time 𝑡𝐴 , which is earlier than his/her wished time 𝑡𝑤,1 , as illustrated in Figure 3.7a. So, we
denote the earliness penalty factor of this commuter with 𝑒𝑡𝐴 . The effect of a small shift in
the arrival time by ∆𝑡 earlier will result in departing the bottleneck 𝐴𝑒̇ (𝑡𝐴 )∆𝑡/𝜇 earlier in
time, where 𝐴𝑒̇ (𝑡𝐴 ) denotes the slope of the arrival curve at time 𝑡𝐴 ∈ (𝑡𝑠 , 𝑡̂) . In
equilibrium, earliness must increase in the same amount as the reduction in delay for the
commuter. Accordingly, the resulting change in delay and earliness of the commuter can
be calculated as follows:

∆𝜏𝐷 = 𝜏𝐷,2 − 𝜏𝐷,1 = +∆𝑡 −
∆𝜏𝐸 = 𝜏𝐸,2 − 𝜏𝐸,1 = +𝑒𝑡𝐴

𝐴̇𝑒 (𝑡𝐴 )∆𝑡
𝜇

𝐴̇𝑒 (𝑡𝐴 )∆𝑡
𝜇

(3.31)
(3.32)

In the equilibrium condition, users should not be able to reduce their generalized cost
by changing their arrival times. Thus, a marginal shift in arrival time by ∆𝑡 should not
affect the generalized cost for the user. So, the following condition must hold:

∆𝜏𝐷 + ∆𝜏𝐸 = 0
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(3.33)

By substituting (3.31) and (3.32) into (3.33), 𝐴̇𝑒 (𝑡𝐴 ) can be solved in terms of 𝑒𝑡𝐴 as
illustrated in the Figure 3.7b:
𝜇
𝐴̇𝑒 (𝑡𝐴 ) = 1−𝑒

𝑡𝐴

, ∀𝑡𝐴 ∈ (𝑡𝑠 , 𝑡̂), 𝑒𝑡𝐴 ∈ [0,1)

(3.34)

The same approach can also be followed to derive the slope of the second part of the
equilibrium arrival curve 𝐴̇𝑙 (𝑡𝐴 ) in terms of the lateness penalty factor of the commuter
who arrives to the bottleneck at time 𝑡𝐴 , 𝑙𝑡𝐴 , and departs the bottleneck later than wished,
as illustrated in Figure 3.7b:
𝜇
𝐴̇𝑙 (𝑡𝐴 ) = 1+𝑙

𝑡𝐴

, ∀𝑡𝐴 ∈ (𝑡̂, 𝑡𝐸 ), 𝑙𝑡𝐴 ∈ [0, ∞)

Queueing

(3.35)

(a) Variation of delay and earliness for a user

(b)

diagram

resulting from a shift of ∆𝑡 in the arrival time.

bottleneck user equilibrium

of

Figure 3.7. Bottleneck user equilibrium of heterogeneous commuters with an S-shaped wished curve
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The schedule penalty factors are inherently defined as nonnegative, while the earliness
penalty factor also needs to be less than one to remain within its domain in equation (3.34).
On the basis of assignment order rule in Corollary 3.2, the slope of the arrival curve
generally starts increasing monotonically from 𝜇 when 𝑒𝑡𝐴 = 0 at point 𝑆, and goes to
infinity as 𝑒𝑡𝐴 → 1 when delay is at the maximum possible value, 𝜏𝑐 . Then, this slope drops
to near zero at the beginning of the lateness period where 𝑙𝑡𝐴 is greatest. The slope of arrival
curve monotonically increases towards 𝜇 at point 𝐸 as 𝑙𝑡𝐴 → 0.
In the Proposition 3.2, we show that the first equilibrium condition of (3.34) and (3.35)
hold if and only if the arrival time choices of the commuters are along an efficient frontier
with the specific properties discussed in Section 3.1.2.2.

Proposition 3.2 (equilibrium condition). The first equilibrium condition of equations
(3.34) and (3.35) holds if and only if the heterogeneous commuters are distributed along
the efficient frontier of arrival choices according to the property (3.9).

Proof.
Part 1: Equations (3.34) and (3.35) hold if property (3.9) governs.
We first prove this argument for the early commuters and then extend the proof for the late
commuters.
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According to the relation (3.17), we can take the first derivative of delay with respect
to the departure time using the differentiation chain rule, where 𝑡𝐴 = 𝐴−1 (𝑁) :
𝜕𝜏𝐷,𝑁𝑡

𝐴

𝜕𝑡𝐷

= 1−

𝜕𝐴−1
𝑒 (𝑁𝑡𝐴 )
𝜕𝑁

𝜕𝑁

∙ 𝜕𝑡

(3.36)

𝐷

For one thing, with a little algebraic manipulation in equation (3.34) we have:
𝜕𝐴−1
𝑒 (𝑁𝑡𝐴 )
𝜕𝑁

= 𝐴̇

1

𝑒 (𝑡𝐴

=
)

1−𝑒𝑡𝐴
𝜇

(3.37)

For another, the slope of the cumulative departure curve equals to the fixed capacity of the
bottleneck:
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝐷

=

𝜕𝐷(𝑡𝐷 )
𝜕𝑡𝐷

=𝜇

(3.38)

By substituting the equations (3.37) and (3.38) in (3.36), we can derive the property (3.9)
for the early commuters. With same line of reasoning we can derive the property (3.9) for
the late commuters as well.

Part 2: Property (3.9) holds if equations (3.34) and (3.35) govern.
Equation (3.23) is directly concluded from condition (3.9).So, following from equation
(3.23), we can take the first derivative of the arrival curve with respect to time using the
differentiation chain rule:
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∂Fe (𝑒𝑡 𝐴 ) 𝜕𝑒𝑡𝐴
𝐴̇𝑒 (𝑡𝐴 ) = 𝑁𝑒 𝜕𝑒
∙ 𝜕𝑡 = 𝑁𝑒 fe (𝑒𝑡 𝐴 )𝑒̇𝑡𝐴
𝑡𝐴

𝐴

(3.39)

By solving the equation (3.21) for fe (𝑒𝑡 𝐴 ) and substituting the result in the equation (3.39),
we can conclude the equation (3.34) for the early commuters. Likewise, equation (3.35)
can be derived following a similar approach for the late commuters.∎

The second equilibrium condition (3.3) also can be generalized for heterogeneous
commuters. In this respect, the peak period demand of the bottleneck, 𝑁𝑄 , should split
between the earliness and lateness periods such that the maximum delay of the both periods
is the same, 𝜏𝑐 . The delay of the commuters 𝑁𝑒 and 𝑁𝑙 , is horizontal the difference between
the arrival and departure curves in the earliness and lateness periods (See Figure 3.5a and
6a), respectively, which equals:

𝜏𝑐 =

𝑁𝑒
𝜇

𝑁𝑙
̃−1
− 𝐴−1
𝑒 (𝑁𝑒 ) = 𝐴𝑙 (𝑁𝑙 ) − 𝜇

(3.40)

With a little manipulation, we can conclude from (3.40) that in the equilibrium condition
the combined duration of the earliness and lateness periods equals the time it takes for the
queue to disappear from the bottleneck:

̃−1
𝐴−1
𝑒 (𝑁𝑒 ) + 𝐴𝑙 (𝑁𝑙 ) =
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𝑁𝑞
𝜇

(3.41)

As a result, the second condition (3.41) sheds light on the relation between 𝑁𝑒 and 𝑁𝑙 in
the equilibrium condition, where the schedule penalty factors have probability distributions
over the population of the users.

The generalized first and second equilibrium conditions proposed in this research can
determine the equilibrium arrival of the heterogeneous users to the single bottleneck. Given
the PDFs of the schedule penalty factors, f𝑒 (𝑒) and f𝑙 (𝑙), the arrival time of the early and
late commuters can be numerically estimated in terms of 𝑁𝑒 and 𝑁𝑙 using the relations
(3.22) and (3.26), respectively. Knowing the distribution of the arrivals, it is possible to
̃−1
estimate the values of 𝐴−1
𝑒 (𝑁𝑒 ) and 𝐴𝑙 (𝑁𝑙 ) in terms of of 𝑁𝑒 and 𝑁𝑙 , respectively. Thus
the relation between 𝑁𝑒 and 𝑁𝑙 in the equilibrium condition can be determined by plugging
the results into the equation (3.41). Although this problem can be solved numerically for
any given distribution of schedule penalty factors, it has a closed form solution when that
the integrals of relations (3.22) and (3.26) have definite solutions. In the following section,
we use these results to propose a dynamic pricing pattern that can optimize the system by
avoiding the delay. In section 3.3, a closed form solution of the morning commute problem
is derived when the probability distributions of schedule penalty factors are assumed to be
uniform over the population of the users.

78

3.2 System Optimum and Pricing
Rational users tend to minimize the generalized cost of their own commutes by adjusting
their arrival time to the bottleneck. The cumulative result of the individual decisions leads
to the user equilibrium condition in which no one can improve his/her cost by shifting
his/her own arrival time individually. In the user equilibrium condition, each commuter
experiences a combination of delay and schedule penalty, in addition to the free flow travel
time, for travelling through the bottleneck. Nonetheless, the total generalized cost for the
commuters can be minimized by avoiding unnecessary delay in the bottleneck. As a result,
such a system can be optimized by dynamically charging the users as much as the delay
they expect in the user equilibrium condition in order to eliminate the delay entirely (Arnott
et al., 1990; Gonzales and Daganzo, 2012).
In the general case that schedule penalty factors of the users have a probability
distribution over the population of the commuters, equation (3.9) can demonstrate the
variation of delay over time in equilibrium as illustrated in Figure 3.4. By plugging the
̃ = 𝑁𝑄 − 𝜇𝑡 in equations (3.24) and (3.29), and substituting the
values of 𝑁 = 𝜇𝑡 and 𝑁
results in equation (3.9), we can derive the dynamic pricing pattern that can optimize the
system by avoiding delay, as illustrated in Figure 3.8:
𝜇𝑡

𝐹𝑒−1 (𝑁 ) ,

t ∈ (𝑡𝑠 , 𝑡̂)
𝑒
̇$(𝑡) = {
𝑁 −𝜇𝑡
−𝐹𝑙−1 ( 𝑄𝑁 ) , t ∈ (𝑡̂, 𝑡𝐸 )
𝑙
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(3.42)

where, $̇(𝑡) denotes the variation rate of the optimal price unit of time over the peak period.

Figure 3.8. The system optimal dynamic pricing of the bottleneck with heterogeneous demand

As explained in the Corollary 3.1, such slope monotonically increases from zero at time
𝑡𝑆 to unity at time 𝑡̂, then it drops to negative infinity but monotonically increases back to
zero at time 𝑡𝐸 .
As explained in Geroliminis and Levinson (2009) and Gonzales and Daganzo (2012),
system optimum prices for single bottlenecks also apply to pricing networks. A bottleneck
is typically assumed to have a constant or nearly constant capacity that is independent of
the length of the queue that forms. The dynamics of congestion in networks differ from
queueing at bottlenecks, because the capacity of a network to serve vehicle trips is a
function of the accumulation vehicles (or the vehicle density) in the network. When queues
in the network are long enough to spill back and block upstream intersections, the result is
a reduction in network-wide flows as represented by the characteristic downward sloping
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branch of the macroscopic fundamental diagram (Daganzo, 2007; Daganzo and
Geroliminis, 2008).

In this respect, Zheng et al. (2012) combines the macroscopic

congestion theory with an agent-based simulator to propose a dynamic cordon pricing
scheme that accounts for the complexity in the travel behavior of the users in an urban
network. Zheng et al. (2015) also presents a more efficient and equitable area-based pricing
scheme for a bi-model network based on macroscopic fundamental diagram by considering
the heterogeneity in income level and value of time of the travelers. Moreover, the
macroscopic model of the traffic congestion has applications in dynamic pricing the limited
parking in a multimodal urban networks (Zheng and Geroliminis ,2014). System optimum
prices for bottlenecks eliminate queues by incentivizing users to travel when there is
bottleneck capacity available to accommodate their trip. The same holds for networks. By
incentivizing users to spread their travel over time, optimal bottleneck prices can be applied
to networks in order to prevent vehicle accumulations from reaching the congested
conditions associated with queue spillbacks. In this way, flows on the network can be
maintained at efficient uncongested traffic states so that the network behaves like a single
bottleneck with fixed capacity. In this respect, Zheng et al. (2012) com

3.3 Closed Form Solution for Uniformly Distributed Schedule Penalty Factors
In this section, we use the proposed equilibrium model to derive the closed form solution
for a special case of the morning commute problem at a single bottleneck with
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heterogeneous travel demand. In this case, both schedule penalty factors of the commuters
are assumed to have uniform PDF functions, distributed from zero to their maximum values
𝑒𝑚 and 𝑙𝑚 , while 𝑒𝑚 also needs to be less than one, as illustrated in Figure 3.9a,b.
However, it is worth pointing out that the proposed analytical approach remains general for
the distributions of schedule penalty factors for which the integrals of the relations (3.22)
and (3.26) are well defined functions.

(a) Earliness penalty factor

(b) Lateness penalty factor

Figure 3.9. Uniform probability distributions of the schedule penalty factors

In this case that distributions of the schedule penalty factors are defined by uniform
PDF functions, the result of the first equilibrium condition in relations (3.22) and (3.26)
can be further simplified to approximate the arrival time of early and late commuters,
respectively:

𝑁

𝑡𝐴 = 𝜇𝑒𝑒 (𝑒𝑡𝐴 −
𝑚

𝑒𝑡2

𝐴

2

) , 0 ≤ 𝑒𝑡𝐴 ≤ 𝑒𝑚
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(3.43)

𝑁
𝑡𝐴̃ = 𝜇𝑙 𝑙 (𝑙𝑡𝐴 +
𝑚

𝑙𝑡2

𝐴

2

) , 0 ≤ 𝑙𝑡𝐴 ≤ 𝑙𝑚

(3.44)

On this basis, the cumulative arrival of the early and late commuters in the equilibrium
condition can be derived according to the relations (3.23), (3.27), and (3.28) as follows:

𝑁

𝐴𝑒 (𝑡𝐴 ) = 𝑒 𝑒 (1 − √1 −

2𝜇𝑡𝐴 𝑒𝑚
𝑁𝑒

𝑚

)

(3.45)

𝑁
2𝜇𝑡̃ 𝑙
𝐴̃𝑙 (𝑡𝐴̃ ) = 𝑙 𝑙 (−1 + √1 + 𝑁𝐴 𝑚 )
𝑚

(3.46)

𝑙

𝑁

𝐴𝑙 (𝑡𝐴 ) = 𝑁𝑙 − 𝑙 𝑙 (−1 + √1 +

2𝜇(𝑇𝑙 −𝑡𝐴 )𝑙𝑚
𝑁𝑙

𝑚

)

(3.47)

where, the length of the lateness period, 𝑇𝑙 , can be derived in this problem as below:

𝑇𝑙 = 𝐴−1 (𝑁𝑙 ) =

𝑁𝑙
𝜇

(1 +

𝑙𝑚
2

)

(3.48)

The generalized cost for early and late commuter also can be approximated by substituting
the inverse cumulative arrival functions derived from relations (3.45) and (3.46) and
inverse CDF of the uniform schedule factor according to the Figure 3.9a,b in relations
(3.25) and (3.30):
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𝑒𝑚 𝑁𝑡2

C𝑡𝐴 (N𝑡𝐴 ) = 𝜏𝐹 + ( 2𝑁

𝑒

𝐴

)+
𝜇

̃𝑡2
𝑙𝑚 𝑁

𝐴
̃ 𝑡̃ ) = 𝜏𝐹 + (
C𝑡̃𝐴 (N
)+
𝐴
2𝑁 𝜇
𝑙

𝑒𝑚 𝑁𝑡𝐴
𝑁𝑒

̃𝑡
𝑙𝑚 𝑁
𝐴
𝑁𝑙

∙ (𝑡𝑤,𝑁𝑡 −

𝑁𝑡𝐴

∙ (𝑡𝑤,Ñ𝑡̃ −
𝐴

) , 𝑁𝑡𝐴 ∈ [0, 𝑁𝑒 ]

(3.49)

̃ 𝑡̃ ∈ [0, 𝑁𝑙 ]
), N
𝐴

(3.50)

𝜇

𝐴

̃ 𝑡̃
N

𝐴

𝜇

In addition, the relation between 𝑁𝑒 and 𝑁𝑙 can be revealed through the second equilibrium
condition by substituting the inverse cumulative arrival functions derived from (3.45) and
(3.46) in equation (3.41):
𝑁𝑒
𝑁𝑙

𝑙

= 𝑒𝑚

𝑚

(3.51)

Following from above, the maximum delay that commuters experience in the equilibrium
condition can be approximated according to the equation (3.40):

𝜏𝑐 =

𝑒𝑚 𝑁𝑒
2𝜇

=

𝑙𝑚 𝑁𝑙
2𝜇

(3.52)

As explained in Section 3.2, such delay can be entirely avoided in the system optimum by
charging the commuters a dynamic price equal to the cost of the delay they expect in the
user equilibrium condition, according to the equation (3.42):
𝑒𝑚 𝜇𝑡

,
t ∈ (𝑡𝑠 , 𝑡̂)
̇$(𝑡) = { 𝑁𝑒
𝑙 (𝑁 −𝜇𝑡)
− 𝑚 𝑁𝑄
, t ∈ (𝑡̂, 𝑡𝐸 )
𝑙
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(3.53)

As it can be inferred from equation (3.53), the time-variant price monotonically rises
from zero, at time 𝑡𝑆 , to its maximum value 𝜏𝑐 , at time 𝑡̂, meanwhile its rate also increases
from zero to 𝑒𝑚 . At this point, it rapidly decreases with slope of negative infinity back to
zero, where its slope goes to zero as well, at time 𝑡𝐸 .

3.4 Numerical Example
To provide a numerical example, we employ the proposed model to solve the morning
commute problem for a single bottleneck with a fixed capacity of 100 vehicles per minute.
This bottleneck is assumed to have a peak period demand of 10,000 vehicles over 100
minutes with a smooth s-shaped wished curve as illustrated in Figure 3.10. To observe the
effect of heterogeneity in the preferences of the commuters, the equilibrium arrival of the
users is plotted for three different distribution scenarios of the schedule penalty factors in
Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10. Queueing diagram of bottleneck user equilibrium in three different heterogeneity scenarios

In the first scenario, commuters are assumed to have homogeneous schedule penalty factors
𝑒 = 0.5 and 𝑙 = 1. In this case, the equilibrium arrival of the homogenous users (purple
curve), 𝐴𝐻 (𝑡), turns to a piecewise curve with the slopes of 200 veh/min and 50 veh/min
in the earliness and lateness periods, respectively. So, the total delay that users experience
during their commutes can be approximated as the area between the arrival and departure
curves, which in the first scenario equals to 2777.5 hours. In the second scenario, we
assume the distributions of the schedule penalty factors uniform over time as illustrated in
Figure 3.9a,b where 𝑒𝑚 = 1 and 𝑙𝑚 = 2. In this scenario, the equilibrium arrival of the
commuter with uniform distribution of schedule penalty factors (pink curve), 𝐴𝑈 (𝑡), can
be analytically approximates according to (3.45) and (3.47). Finally, in the third scenario,
the schedule penalty factors of the users are assumed to have truncated normal distributions
with average values 𝑒̅ = 0.5 and 𝑙 ̅ = 1, standard deviations 𝜎𝑒 = 𝜎𝑙 = 0.12, and the same
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upper and lower bounds as the aforementioned uniform distributions in the second scenario.
In this case, the equilibrium arrival of the users with both normally distributed schedule
penalty factors (red curve) , 𝐴𝑁 (𝑡), can be estimated using the relations (3.22) and (3.26).
As illustrated in Figure 3.10, the arrival curve of the users with normal distributions of the
schedule penalty factors falls between the arrival curves of the users with homogenous and
uniform distributions of schedule penalty factors all the points over time. Accordingly, the
total delay of the commuters reduces by 33% and 9% in the second and third scenarios,
respectively; however, the maximum delay remains exactly the same, 𝜏𝑐 = 33.3 min, in
all scenarios.

3.5 Probability Distributions of the Schedule Penalty Factors
In this research, we proposed an analytical solution to the morning commute problem when
there is a heterogeneity associated with the schedule penalty factors of the users. The
underlying assumption here is that the probability distributions of the earliness and lateness
penalty factors are known independently for early and late commuters, respectively.
Nevertheless, it may be more realistic to assume a joint probability distribution function
for the schedule penalty factors that defines the proportion of (𝑒, 𝑙) pairs among the
population of the commuters. In this section, we propose a method to retrieve the
independent probability distributions of earliness and lateness penalty factors from a given
joint distribution.
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Rational users tend to minimize their own cost by adjusting their arrival time to the
bottleneck. Assuming that values of the both schedule penalty factors vary over the
population of the heterogeneous commuters, they choose their arrival time to the bottleneck
by comparing the minimum possible costs of the earliness and lateness periods according
to their own schedule preferences. In this respect, we define the equivalent schedule penalty
factor curve as a set of penalty factor pairs and each point represents an equivalent earliness
and lateness penalty factors with equal generalized cost in the earliness and lateness
periods, respectively. This relation between the equivalent schedule penalty factors can be
determined by equalizing the generalized cost functions (3.25) and (3.30), and expressing
̃ = 𝑁𝑙 𝐹𝑙 (𝑙) in the result in terms of 𝑒 and 𝑙. Since we are writing this
𝑁 = 𝑁𝑒 𝐹𝑒 (𝑒) and 𝑁
equation in terms of schedule penalty factors, it is now possible to denote the generalized
cost for commuters with 𝐶(∙) for the purpose of simplification:

𝐶(𝑁𝑒 𝐹𝑒 (𝑒)) = C(𝑁𝑙 𝐹𝑙 (𝑙) )

(3.54)

This equation reveals the relationship between the equivalent schedule penalty factors in
the equilibrium condition. For example, in case that schedule penalty factors have uniform
probability distributions as assumed in Section 3.3, equation (3.54) can be simplified to a
linear relation between the equivalent schedule penalties factors as below:

88

𝑙

𝑙𝑒𝑞 (𝑒) = 𝑒𝑚 𝑒
𝑚

(3.55)

where, 𝑙𝑒𝑞 (𝑒) represents the equivalent lateness penalty factor of a earliness penalty factor.
As a result, for a given value of 𝑒𝑜 , commuters with 𝑙 > 𝑙𝑒𝑞 (𝑒𝑜 ) will depart earlier than
they wished to minimize their generalized cost. In contrast, commuters with 𝑙 < 𝑙𝑒𝑞 (𝑒𝑜 )
prefer late departures in order to keep their generalized costs minimized in the equilibrium
condition. Assuming the joint PDF of the schedule penalty factors given, 𝑝𝑒,𝑙 (𝑒, 𝑙), we can
derive 𝑓𝑒 (𝑒) and 𝑓𝑙 (𝑙) by projecting the area under 𝑝𝑒,𝑙 (𝑒, 𝑙) for early and late commuters,
as illustrated in the Figure 3.11.

Figure 3.11. Joint probability distribution of the schedule penalty factors

On this basis, the value of the 𝑓𝑒 (𝑒𝑜 ) is proportional to the area under 𝑝𝑒,𝑙 (𝑒𝑜 , 𝑙) for 𝑙 >
𝑙𝑒𝑞 (𝑒𝑜 ), which represents the early commuters. Likewise, 𝑓𝑙 (𝑙𝑜 ) is also proportional to the
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−1 (𝑙 ),
area under 𝑝𝑒,𝑙 (𝑒, 𝑙𝑜 ) for 𝑒 > 𝑙𝑒𝑞
𝑜 which represents the late commuters. Notice as well

that we are splitting a joint distribution function 𝑝𝑒,𝑙 (𝑒, 𝑙) into two parts. Thus it is
necessary to divide each of these areas by the total volume under 𝑝𝑒,𝑙 (𝑒, 𝑙) for both early
and late commuters, to convert these numbers back to probabilities to derive the
independent PDFs, 𝑓𝑒 (𝑒) and 𝑓𝑙 (𝑙):

𝑓𝑒 (𝑒) =

𝑙
𝑒𝑞
𝑒𝑚 𝑙𝑚
∫0 ∫𝑙 (𝑒) 𝑃𝑒,𝑙 (𝑒,𝑙)𝑑𝑙𝑑𝑒
𝑒𝑞

(3.56)

𝑓𝑙 (𝑙) =

𝑒𝑚
𝑒𝑞
𝑒𝑚
𝑙
∫0𝑚 ∫𝑙−1 (𝑙) 𝑃𝑒,𝑙 (𝑒,𝑙)𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑙
𝑒𝑞

(3.57)

∫𝑙 𝑚(𝑒) 𝑃𝑒,𝑙 (𝑒,𝑙)𝑑𝑙

∫𝑙−1 (𝑙) 𝑃𝑒,𝑙 (𝑒,𝑙)𝑑𝑒

As a result, we can use these relations to retrieve the probability distributions of
earliness and lateness factors independently for the commuters who depart the bottleneck
early and late, respectively. Having the PDFs 𝑓𝑒 (𝑒) and 𝑓𝑙 (𝑙), it becomes possible to
employ the proposed model to analytically solve the morning commute problem with
heterogonous user preferences.
The proposed analytical solution of the morning commute problem can be also
inversely used to approximate the distribution of schedule penalty factors of the
heterogeneous users from empirical data of users’ cumulative arrivals to the bottleneck.
Having the cumulative arrival curve of the heterogeneous users to the bottleneck in the
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equilibrium condition, 𝐴(𝑡) , we can employ the proposed equilibrium model to
approximate the actual PDFs of the independent schedule penalty factors, 𝑓𝑒 (𝑒) and 𝑓𝑙 (𝑙),
using the empirical data from the bottleneck. Observations of traffic approaching the San
Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge show that queues regularly develop for traffic heading
westbound across the bridge into San Francisco each morning. An empirical analysis of
these queueing patterns has been presented in Gonzales and Christofa (2013). Analysis of
traffic flows across a series of loop detectors shows that the queue and corresponding
queueing delay increases in a convex way at the beginning of each rush and decreases in a
convex way at the end of each rush in a pattern similar to the shape in Fig. 7. Such data can
be used to estimate the distribution of earliness and lateness penalty factors.
In this respect, we use equation (3.14) to relate the CDF of the earliness penalty factor
of the heterogeneous users to their cumulative arrivals to the bottleneck. Relation (3.34)
also determines the earliness penalty factor of a commuter as function of his/her arrival
time to the bottleneck. As a result, the CDF, and subsequently PDF, of the earliness penalty
factor of the users can be approximated using the empirical data from equilibrium arrival
of the heterogeneous users to the bottleneck by combing the relations (3.14) and (3.34).
Distribution of the lateness penalty factors of the users also can be estimated using the
empirical data in a very similar way.
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As the first step, we replace 𝑁𝑡𝐴 = 𝐴𝑒 (𝑡𝐴 ) in the equation (3.14) to derive the CDF of the
earliness penalty factors of the heterogeneous commuters in term of the cumulative arrival
function of the users to the bottleneck as follows:

𝐹𝑒 (𝑒𝑡𝐴 ) =

𝐴𝑒 (𝑡𝐴 )
𝑁𝑒

(3.58)

Then, we relate the arrival time of the heterogeneous users to their schedule preferences by
solving equation (3.34) for 𝑡𝐴 as below:
𝜇
𝑡𝐴 = 𝐴̇−1
𝑒 (1−𝑒 )
𝑡𝐴

(3.59)

where, 𝐴̇−1
𝑒 (∙) denotes the inverse arrival function for the early arrivals. In case that the
cumulative arrival of the heterogeneous commuters can be estimated using the empirical
data as a differentiable function 𝐴𝑒 (∙), CDF of earliness penalty preferences of the early
commuters can be approximated by plugging 𝑡𝐴 from equation (3.59) into relation (3.58)
𝐴𝑒 (𝐴̇−1
𝑒 (

as below:𝐹𝑒 (𝑒𝑡𝐴 ) =

𝜇
))
1−𝑒𝑡
𝐴

𝑁𝑒

(3.60)

Alternatively, when the cumulative arrival of commuters is a discrete dataset that cannot
be estimated with a differentiable function, the arrival time 𝑡𝐴 corresponding to 𝑒𝑡𝐴 can be
numerically calculated at each point using the empirical arrival time data of the
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heterogeneous commuters to the bottleneck according to the equation (3.59). Subsequently,
𝐹𝑒 (𝑒𝑡𝐴 ) can be estimated for previously determined 𝑡𝐴 based on the relation (3.58).
Similar steps can be also followed to derive a same set of results for the distribution of
the lateness penalty preferences of the users. In this respect, equation (3.60) can be adapted
to approximate the CDF of the lateness penalty factor of the late commuters as follows:

𝜇
𝐴𝑙 (𝐴̇−1
))
𝑙 (
1+𝑙𝑡
𝐴

𝐹𝑙 (𝑙𝑡𝐴 ) = 1 −

𝑁𝑙

(3.61)

where, 𝐴̇−1
𝑙 (∙) denotes the inverse arrival function for the late arrivals.
As a result, the PDF of the schedule penalty factors can be derived by taking the first
derivation of their CDFs. Approximating PDF of the heterogeneous users quantifies the
heterogeneity in the preferences of users, which can be useful for modeling systems with
similar characteristics of demand. Thus, the approximated PDFs can be used in analyzing
the effects of alteration in characteristics of demand and system on the equilibrium
condition. Moreover, designing a dynamic pricing strategy that can optimize the system by
minimizing the total costs strictly depends on accurate approximation of PDF of the
schedule penalty preferences of the commuter. Hence, it is of great importance to have an
accurate approximation of the heterogeneity in preferences of the users based on the
empirical data from the network.
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3.6 Summary
This paper adapts the concept of the efficient frontier from Portfolio Theory to propose an
analytical solution for the equilibrium condition of the linear bicriterion choice problem
when there is a heterogeneity associated with relative importance of such criteria among
the users. More specifically, we study the morning commute problem of a single bottleneck
with a fixed capacity and time-dependent demand when there is heterogeneity associated
with the schedule penalty factors of the users. When the bottleneck capacity is insufficient
to fulfill the time-dependent demand, users experience a combination of delay and schedule
deviation in their commutes, while the relative importance of these factors varies among
the heterogeneous users. The rational tendency of users to minimize their own generalized
cost by adjusting their arrival times to the bottleneck eventually leads to the user
equilibrium condition in which no one can improve his/her generalized cost by individually
shifting his/her arrival time. This bicriterion choice problem has strong similarities with the
investment problem in the free market, which makes it possible to adapt the concept of the
efficient frontier from finance to propose an analytical solution to the morning commute
problem with heterogeneous users’ preferences.
In this research, we first showed that the efficient frontier of the choices has specific
properties that remain general for different problems. Given the independent PDFs of the
schedule penalty factors, we employed such properties to analytically derive the
equilibrium arrival of the heterogeneous commuters with a general s-shaped wished
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departure curve to the bottleneck. On this basis, a dynamic pricing pattern is also presented
for the bottleneck with heterogeneous demand that can optimize the system by avoiding
delay. The proposed dynamic pricing strategy is also adapted to improve the performance
of the network. Deriving an analytical solution for the morning commute problem with
heterogeneous user preferences also provides intuition regarding the effect of different
factors on the travel behavior of the user in the equilibrium condition. The intuition
obtained from the analytical solution of the problem can be crucial for predicting the change
in the equilibrium condition in case of alternations in characteristics of the demand or
system. To provide an example of the proposed model, we derived a closed form solution
of equilibrium arrivals of commuters as well as an optimal dynamic pricing for the
bottleneck assuming that schedule penalty factors have uniform probability distributions.
However, the proposed model can be employed to solve the morning commute problem for
any given probability distributions of the schedule penalty factors and a general s-shaped
wished departure curve. Finally, we provide an explanation on how independent PDFs of
the schedule penalty factors can be retrieved from their general joint PDF. It is also shown
that the analytical results can be inversely employed to approximate the distributions of the
schedule penalty factors from the empirical data on arrival time of the heterogeneous users
to the bottleneck. Such information can be vital in analyzing the equilibrium condition and
designing a dynamic pricing strategy that can effectively optimize the system.
The result of this research can be extended for other transportation systems with limited
capacity and time-dependent demand that can be modeled as queueing systems. For
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example, Vickrey’s theory has been used to propose an analytical model for a demand
responsive transit (DRT) service that provides a door-to-door service for users with timedependent demand (Amirgholy and Gonzales, 2015b). As a result, the analytical solution
proposed in this paper for the morning commute problem can be also employed to include
the heterogeneity in user preferences of a DRT system. Accordingly, the dynamic pricing
strategy presented in Section 4 can be also implemented to optimize the DRT system by
minimizing the total cost of the operator and DRT service users. Furthermore, in this
research we adapted the concept the efficient frontier to include heterogeneity in schedule
penalty factors of the users in the analytical model we propose for the morning commute
problem with a general distribution of the wished departure times. Nonetheless,
heterogeneity of the users’ value of time is another key factor that can be included in model
to improve the effectiveness of the dynamic pricing policy. In this respect, the reality that
non-identical users consider different values for the time should be taken into account to
propose an optimal pricing strategy that can entirely eliminate the delay and minimize the
total generalized cost for the commuters.
As the next step, we propose an extension to this model to also account for the
heterogeneity in value of time of the commuters. In this way, we can determine the optimal
pricing of the bottleneck by considering heterogeneities in relative importance of the
deviation from the schedule as well as the value of the time to the users in the analytical
model. In general, the concept of the efficient frontier has been identified an appropriate
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tool for modeling the equilibrium condition of multi-criterion choice problems with
heterogeneous preferences regarding the relative importance of the conflicting criteria.
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CHAPTER 4
DEMAND RESPONSIVE TRANSIT SYSTEMS WITH TIME-DEPENDENT
DEMAND
Demand responsive transit (DRT) systems are a class of transit services in which a fleet of
vehicles dynamically changes routes and schedules in order to accommodate demand
within a service area. A DRT system naturally has flexibility in providing service, which
allows it to adapt to variations in the demand. This property of DRT makes it possible to
eliminate the access distance for transit users by providing a curb-to-curb trip. Nonetheless,
the quality of the service depends on the operating capacity of the DRT system as well as
spatiotemporal characteristics of the demand. The operating capacity of the DRT system
can be defined as the maximum number of requests that can be served in unit of time. In
this part of the research, we show that the DRT system with limited operating capacity and
time-dependent demand can be modeled as a queueing system. On this basis, we propose
a model and optimization approach for DRT service that is used to minimize the total cost
to the agency and users combined.
An analytical model for DRT systems based on Rahimi et al. (2014) and Daganzo
(1978) is employed to approximate the components of the operating cost of the DRT
system: fleet size, total vehicle hours traveled (VHT), and total vehicle miles traveled
(VMT) in the network. Given the service area of the DRT system, these components of the
agency cost can be approximated as functions of the number of waiting passengers that
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have requested service and the maximum rate that operators can serve passengers per time
(i.e., operating capacity). The total operating cost for the agency can be estimated as a
linear combination of these components (Rahimi et al., 2014).
In addition to the expenses to the agency for running the service, it is also necessary to
account for the costs that users endure to use the service. To this end, Vickrey’s (1969)
congestion theory is adapted to approximate the costs that the DRT users experience for
the service when the operating capacity of the system is inadequate to meet the demand. In
this case, the user equilibrium can be conceived as the result of competition between DRT
users who are each minimizing their own travel costs, which include the waiting time to
be picked up, the traveling time in the vehicle, and the cost for arriving earlier or later than
preferred. In an equilibrium condition, no one has an incentive to change his/her own travel
time. However, it is still possible to reduce the total costs of the system by optimizing the
DRT operations and managing the temporal distribution of demand. The capacity of the
service and the number of passengers awaiting pick-up are decision variables that can be
maintained at optimal levels over time to minimize the total cost of the system. Since
demand tends to peak during certain times of the day, an effective demand management
strategy that can spread the demand uniformly over time has a key role in optimizing the
operations of a DRT system.
The objective of this Chapter is to model the dynamics of DRT system scheduling and
operations and to identify a management strategy to incentivize users to adapt their request
times to be more uniform over time. A dynamic pricing policy can be implemented as an
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effective strategy to improve the efficiency of the DRT system by forming a uniform
distribution of the demand and avoiding the underutilization of the optimal capacity during
off-peak times. As a result, the total cost of the agency and users can be minimized by
choosing optimal values for the system capacity and the number of waiting requests.
Meanwhile an appropriate demand management strategy that can make the demand
uniform is required to keep the system optimized over time.
The analytical solution of the morning commute problem presented in Chapter 3 can
be used with the proposed model for the operation of DRT system in this chapter to account
for the heterogeneity in schedule penalty preferences of the users. Accordingly, the
dynamic pricing strategy proposed for the DRT system will be adapted as well.

4.1 Modeling Tools
Agencies possess limited equipment, crews, and facilities with which to operate DRT
services, and the costs of acquiring additional resources can be very expensive so agencies
have an incentive to use their resources as efficiently as possible. On the other hand, when
the demand rate exceeds the operating capacity of the system, users must to tolerate higher
delay, in-service travel time, earliness, and lateness due to lack of adequate capacity in the
system. To improve the quality of the service, an agency needs to increase its operating
capacity, which may raise its operating cost as well. Therefore, it is of great importance for
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the decision makers to have an accurate approximation of the potential operating cost and
users’ cost in order to optimize the balance between them.

4.1.1 Agency Operating Cost Model
The expenses that the operator incurs to run a DRT service can be categorized into three
parts: costs attributed to fleet size, VHT, and VMT. Rahimi et al. (2014) adopts a
continuum analytical model based on Daganzo (1978) to approximate these components
for three prevalent loading-unloading operating strategies:


Strategy 1: The operator aims to minimize the total distance traveled by finding the
next closest pickup or drop-off point from each stop.



Strategy 2: The operator alternates between pickup and drop-off phases in order to
minimize the variance of the riding time. To achieve this, each vehicle starts by
collecting 𝑛𝑣 requests in the pickup phase and then delivers them to their
destinations in the drop-off phase.



Strategy 3: Each pickup is followed by the closest drop-off point and vice versa. In
this operating strategy the vehicle first picks up 𝑛𝑣 requests and then continues to
alternate between the closest pickup and the closest drop-off.

On this basis, the total operating cost of the different strategies can be estimated as a
summation of aforementioned components. In this part of the research we employ this
analytical model to estimate the total agency operating cost as a function of operating
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capacity of the system, 𝜇, as well as number of pickup requests awaiting service, 𝑛𝑤 . The
maximum rate that requests can be served depends on the fleet size and other characteristics
of the system, so we call this rate the capacity for the given operating conditions.
The required fleet acquisition and its associated expenses are the key capital component
of agency cost for running the service. Given the fixed and variable costs per vehicle, the
fleet cost can be estimated as a linear function of the fleet size. In this regard, the following
analytical model is used to approximate the required fleet size for each of the operating
strategies:

1

𝑀𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) = 𝜇 (𝑏 + 2𝑣 𝑘𝑖 𝑟√𝐴)

(4.1)

where 𝑀𝑖 is the fleet size (number of vehicles) that the agency needs to operate to provide
the operating capacity 𝜇 (number of requests served per unit of time) in the service area of
size 𝐴 (units of area) in each operating strategy 𝑖. Here, 𝑏 represents the boarding-alighting
time (unit of time), which represents the total time that it takes the operator to load and
unload a passenger at the start and in the end of a single requested passenger trip,
respectively. The average moving speed in the network of vehicles traveling between the
loading/unloading stops is represented by 𝑣 (distance per unit of time), which depends on
a variety of factors like characteristics of the network, properties of the vehicles, and even
the type of service they are providing to the users. All other network and operation
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characteristics that remain fixed in the short run, like the geometry of the network and
routing of the vehicles, are reflected in a unitless network travel parameter, 𝑟. The value of
this parameter can be estimated through calibration of the model using available data from
the same (or similar) service operation. To keep the structure of the model general for all
three operating strategies, we define the parameter 𝑘𝑖 in terms of 𝑛𝑤 and 𝑛𝑣 for each of the
different strategies as below:
1

𝑖=1

√2𝑛𝑤

𝑘𝑖 =

1
√𝑛𝑤

+

√2+4𝑛𝑣 −1.45

1

{

√𝑛𝑤

+

𝑛𝑣
1
√𝑛𝑣

𝑖=2

(4.2)

𝑖=3

Given the values of its parameters, this model demonstrates the relationship between
the operating capacity of the system, the number of awaiting requests, and the fleet size as
the main decision variables of the system. Having two variables out of three, this model
can be employed to approximate the third. For simplicity, we consider here that the required
fleet size for running the service can be approximated as a function of the operating
capacity that it needs to provide and the number of awaiting requests. In Section 4.2.3, we
use the same model to approximate the operating capacity of the system based on available
fleet size and number of requests waiting for the service.
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The total hours of driving time are associated with costs like driver wages and benefits.
Thus, the analytical model can be used to approximate the VHT operated to serve a total
demand 𝑁𝑄 within a time period using each of the different strategies as follows:

𝑉𝐻𝑇𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 ) = 𝑀𝑖

𝑁𝑄
𝜇

1

= 𝑁𝑄 (𝑏 + 2𝑣 𝑘𝑖 𝑟√𝐴)

(4.3)

Note that VHT is independent of the operating capacity of the system and depends only
on the number of waiting requests.
Expenses like fuel cost, maintenance, and vehicle depreciation costs directly depend on
the total distance that vehicles travel in the network. The VMT of the service can be
approximated for the different loading-unloading strategies as below:

1

𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 ) = 2 𝑁𝑄 𝑘𝑖 𝑟√𝐴

(4.4)

This expression shows that VMT also depends only on the number of waiting requests.
To sum up, the total operating cost of the agency in strategy 𝑖, 𝐴𝐶𝑖 , can be represented
as a linear function of these components minus the total fare that all users pay for the
service. The total fare for all customers in scenario i is represented by 𝑃𝑖 . This expression
can be also interpreted as the minimum budget that the agency needs to run such a service.
It is worth pointing out that the parameters of the model, 𝛼𝑗 and 𝛽𝑗 , can be estimated
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through calibration. In principle, these parameters are interpreted as the fixed and variable
unit costs of providing each component, indexed by 𝑗.

𝐴𝐶𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) = [𝛼1 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 )] + [𝛼2 + 𝛽2 𝑉𝐻𝑇𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 )] + [𝛼3 + 𝛽3 𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 )] − 𝑃𝑖
(4.5)

Note that the agency operating cost turns out to be an increasing function of the
operating capacity (𝜇) and a decreasing function of the number of waiting requests (𝑛𝑤 )
when the total demand (𝑁𝑄 ) is fixed. Consequently, cuts in operating capacity are one way
to reduce costs, but changing the number of waiting requests also has an effect on the
agency’s costs.

4.1.2 User Cost Model
In an undersaturated system, the demand rate always remains below the capacity of the
system, so customers can be served at their desired times without delay. However, this may
not always be the case in reality due to the high cost of providing adequate capacity. In
fact, the incentives for agencies to reduce operating costs as much as possible will tend to
affect the quality of the service making oversaturated conditions an expected outcome. In
this case, users will experience delay in pickup, longer in-service times, and earliness or
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lateness in delivery as unpleasant consequences of excessive requests for the operating
capacity of the system.
This problem is comparable to the morning commute problem in traffic flow theory in
many ways. In both problems, the system has a limited capacity to serve users, where the
delay, earliness, and lateness are undesirable consequences of a demand rate that is higher
than the capacity of the system. Users may be expected to account for the delay and inservice time as well as the earliness or lateness that they experience relative to their
preferred travel schedule when making travel decisions. Accordingly, rational users will
attempt to reduce their costs by adjusting the times they request to travel. The cumulative
result of individual decisions will eventually lead to an equilibrium condition in which no
one has incentive to change his/her request time. Due to these similarities, Vickrey’s (1969)
congestion theory is adopted as a basis for modeling the equilibrium in the oversaturated
condition.
Users of a DRT service have different desired service times, which can be represented
as a distribution of demand over time. However, this demand rate may exceed the capacity
of the system at some points making delays inevitable. Assuming that experienced users
have perfect information regarding the generalized cost associated with the service at each
point in time, they will adapt their request times by advancing or postponing their requests
to keep their costs minimized. This generalized cost has different components that users
experience when served by the DRT system.

In the oversaturated condition, it is

impossible to serve all users at their requested time due to inadequacy of the operating
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capacity of the system, so users will experience some delay for pickups at their origins.
After the passengers are picked up, in-service time is experienced until the DRT system
delivers the passengers to their destinations.
While in-service time for the users depends on the operating strategy that the agency
follows for processing the requests, it is worth noting that the variations of in-service time
in each strategy are small enough to be neglected. We use the average time that users spend
onboard the vehicles (i.e., in-service) to calculate the total time in-service. Therefore, the
in-service time of the users can be treated as a fixed part of the cost that they pay for service
and does not impact their scheduling decisions. Finally, requests may be delivered to their
destinations earlier or later than their desired times, and have to accept the penalty for such
deviation from the preferred schedule. Accordingly, the generalized cost for all users in
each strategy, 𝑈𝐶𝑖 , can be formulated as below:

𝑈𝐶𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) = 𝑉𝑂𝑇 (𝑇𝐷 (𝜇)+𝑇𝑆,𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) + 𝑒𝑇𝐸 (𝜇) + 𝑙𝑇𝐿 (𝜇)) + 𝑃𝑖

(4.6)

where 𝑉𝑂𝑇 denotes the value of time for users, 𝑇𝐷 (𝜇) is the delay, 𝑇𝑆,𝑖 is the in-service
time for operating strategy 𝑖, 𝑇𝐸 is the earliness, 𝑇𝐿 is the lateness, and 𝑒 and 𝑙 represent
the relative cost of earliness and lateness times in equivalent units of travel time. The
interaction between users will eventually result in an equilibrium condition in which no
one will be able to reduce his/her own costs by unilaterally changing his/her requested
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time. Note that a flat fare will have no effect on the request times that users choose to
minimize their costs.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the cumulative counts of passengers using the DRT system in the
equilibrium condition. The S-shaped curve, 𝑊(𝑡), depicts the cumulative distribution of
wished request times. The slope of this curve at each point in time represents the wished
demand rate of the users. Here, we assume that the wished demand rate continuously
increases such that it exceeds the operating capacity of the service at time 𝑡1 . It continues
to increase to its maximum value, which exceeds 𝜇, then starts decreasing such that it drops
below the operating capacity after time 𝑡2 . The performance of the system, with operating
capacity of 𝜇, is also illustrated by the cumulative service curve, 𝑆(𝑡), which describes the
times when passengers are picked up by DRT vehicles.
For operations, the agency is assumed to collect users’ requests and add them to the
pool of 𝑛𝑤 requests waiting to be picked up. Nonetheless, the available capacity may be
insufficient to serve the users at the rate their requests for pickup are made, and delays will
ensue. On the flip side, users are assumed to be able to predict the delay and delivery times
so that they can consider the inevitable earliness or lateness when choosing a request time.
The request curve, 𝑅(𝑡), represents the cumulative distribution of the individual user
requests when each minimizes their own travel cost. The user equilibrium condition exists
when no one has an incentive to alter his/her own requested time. In this condition, the
number of waiting requests at each point in time can be approximated as the vertical
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distance between the request curve and the service curve. As indicated in Figure 4.1, the
number of requests awaiting service does not remain constant in the equilibrium condition;
in contrast, it varies with the rise in demand over time.

Figure 4.1. User equilibrium queueing diagram for the S-shaped wished curve

When the wish-curve has a smooth S-shape, Daganzo (1985) proves that a unique user
equilibrium is associated with two conditions. First, the proportion of the users who
experience earliness, 𝑁𝑒 , to users who are late, 𝑁𝑙 , equals the proportion of lateness penalty
to that of earliness.
𝑁𝑒
𝑁𝑙

𝑙

=𝑒
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(4.7)

Second, the request curve is piecewise linear with specific slopes in user equilibrium
condition. The first 𝑁𝑒 users make their requests early, and next 𝑁𝑙 requests are made late.

𝜇
𝑑𝑅(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡

=

{1+𝑒
𝜇

, for users who are served early

, for users who are served late.
1−𝑙

(4.8)

In the equilibrium condition, components of the user cost can be approximated
according to the queueing diagram. The delay that each user experiences for the service is
the difference between his/her requested and actual pickup times, 𝜏 (i.e., the horizontal
distance between the request and service curves in Figure 4.1. Delay in the service starts
at time 𝑡𝐴 and increases linearly to its maximum value, 𝜏𝑐 , at time 𝑡̃ . Then it linearly
decreases back to zero at time 𝑡𝐹 . Accordingly, the total delay that all the users experience
waiting for the service can be approximated as the area between 𝑅(𝑡) and 𝑆(𝑡) in Figure
4.1.

𝑁 2 𝑒𝑙

𝑄
𝑇𝐷 (𝜇) = 2𝜇(𝑒+𝑙)

(4.9)

Earliness and lateness are defined as the time gap between actual and wished delivery
of users to their destinations. So, if a request delivers a user to his/her destination before
or after the wished time, an early or late schedule penalty will be included as part of the
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user cost. The total earliness for all users is approximated by the area between 𝑆(𝑡) and
𝑊(𝑡) from 𝑡𝐴 to 𝑡̃, and the total lateness is approximated by the area between 𝑆(𝑡) and
𝑊(𝑡) from 𝑡̃ to 𝑡𝐹 as shown in Figure 4.1. In the simplified case that the wished curve has
an inverse Z-shape with slope 𝜔, as depicted in Figure 4.2, the total earliness and lateness
that users experience can be approximated as below:

1

𝑙

2

1

𝑒

2

1

1

1

1

𝑇𝐸 (𝜇) = 2 𝑁𝑄2 (𝑒+𝑙) (𝜇 − 𝜔)

𝑇𝐿 (𝜇) = 2 𝑁𝑄2 (𝑒+𝑙) (𝜇 − 𝜔)

Figure 4.2. User equilibrium queueing diagram for the Z-shaped wished curve
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(4.10)

(4.11)

Daganzo’s (1978) analytical model can be generally employed to approximate the total
time that users spend in service for each of the three operating strategies as below:

𝑁𝑄
𝑇𝑆,𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) =

𝑁𝑄
{𝑁𝑄

𝑛𝑤 𝑀
𝜇
𝑛𝑣 𝑀

2𝜇
𝑀(𝑛𝑣 −0.5)
𝜇

𝑖=1
𝑖=2

(4.12)

𝑖=3

Note that the components of the total cost for users are decreasing functions of the
operating capacity of the DRT service, 𝜇. In other words, any increase in the operating
capacity improves the quality of the service for the users by reducing their costs. The
distribution of the requests over time is another key factor that affects the total cost for the
users, because increases in 𝑁𝑄 or 𝜔 lead to increased user cost. The next section addresses
the problem of minimizing the total cost for the agency and users in order to obtain an
optimal balance between the expense of operation and quality of the DRT service.

4.2 System Optimum
The inherent tradeoff between the cost and quality of the DRT service necessitates holding
a balance between the agency and user costs. The optimal balance between the operation
cost and quality of the service can be determined by minimizing the total cost for the
agency and users. In this respect, the operating capacity of the service can be considered
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as the decision variable of the system because it implies both the operating cost and the
user cost. Moreover, the efficiency of the system can be further improved by having a
uniform distribution of requests with an optimal number of requests awaiting service. To
this end, we first optimize the operating capacity of the system to minimize the total costs
for the users and the agency in the equilibrium condition. Next, we show how a uniform
distribution of demand with the optimal number of waiting requests can further reduce the
total cost. Lastly, we consider a special case in which the agency has no plan to change its
fleet size (a realistic constraint) and can improve the efficiency of the service only by
incentivizing an optimal demand pattern. Then, in Section 4.3, we present demand
management strategies that can be implemented to achieve the optimal distribution of
demand over time.

4.2.1 Scenario I: Optimal Operating Capacity
In the equilibrium condition illustrated in Figure 4.1, increasing the operating capacity of
the service can reduce the total delay, earliness, and lateness of the users. Equation (4.6)
shows that the user cost is a decreasing function of 𝜇, and equation (4.5) shows that the
agency cost is an increasing function of 𝜇. As a result, the efficiency of the system can be
enhanced by optimizing the capacity of the service in order to keep the sum of the agency
and user cost minimized:
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(4.13)

𝜇𝑖∗ = arg min 𝑇𝐶𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛̅𝑤 ) = arg min(𝐴𝐶𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛̅𝑤 ) + 𝑈𝐶𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛̅𝑤 ))
𝜇

𝜇

where 𝑇𝐶𝑖 denotes the total cost of the system in different strategies, which can be
approximated by substituting the values of agency cost from (4.5) and user cost from (4.6).
The fare that users pay and that the agency collects is cancelled out of (4.13) because this
is a transfer from users to the agency and does not affect the total combined cost to both.
Here, 𝑛̅𝑤 is the average number of requests awaiting service over time. In the equilibrium
condition, the number of waiting requests varies over time. Since both the agency and user
costs are functions of 𝑛𝑤 , the exact number of waiting requests is replaced with its average
value in equation (4.13) to simplify the problem. It will later be shown that for the optimal
control 𝑛𝑤 should be held constant. The average number of requests awaiting service can
be approximated using Little’s (1961) formula to multiply the average waiting time by the
rate that requests are picked up:
𝑛̅𝑤 =

𝜏𝑐
2

𝑁 𝑒𝑙

𝑄
𝜇 = 2(𝑒+𝑙)

(4.14)

This problem has a closed-form solution when the wished curve has a specific shape
like an inverse Z-shape as illustrated in Figure 4.2. In this case, the components of the
agency cost, (4.1), (4.3), and (4.4), and components of the users cost, (4.9), (4.10), and
(4.11), can be substituted into the objective function of problem (4.13). As a result, the
optimization problem can be expressed as below:
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𝜇𝑖∗ = arg min (𝐶𝑖,1 𝜇 +
𝜇

𝐶𝑖,2
𝜇

+ 𝐶𝑖,3 )

(4.15)

where 𝐶𝑖,1 and 𝐶𝑖,2 represent the combined coefficients of 𝜇 and 1/𝜇, respectively, in the
objective function for strategy 𝑖 after combining terms. 𝐶𝑖,3 denotes the terms in the
objective function that are independent of 𝜇. The objective function is a convex function
of the operating capacity of the service, 𝜇. According to the first order condition, the
optimal operating capacity in each scenario, 𝜇𝑖∗ , can be approximated as follows:

𝐶

𝜇𝑖∗ = √𝐶𝑖,2
𝑖,1

(4.16)

By substituting the optimal capacity back into the objective function of the problem, the
minimum total cost of the system in each strategy, 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 , can be approximated as below.

𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑇𝐶𝑖 (𝜇𝑖∗ , 𝑛̅𝑤 ) = 2√𝐶𝑖,1 𝐶𝑖,2 + 𝐶𝑖,3

(4.17)

From a practical point of view, the optimal operating capacity can be used to approximate
the optimal fleet size for running the system efficiently in each strategy.

𝑀𝑖∗ = 𝑀𝑖 (𝜇𝑖∗ , 𝑛̅𝑤 )
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(4.18)

Optimizing the operating capacity of the system can improve the efficiency of the system
by minimizing its total cost. However, the efficiency of the system can be further improved
by optimizing the distribution of the requests as well as number of requests awaiting
service.

4.2.2 Scenario II: Optimal Operating Capacity and Number of Waiting Requests
In the oversaturated condition, the operating capacity of the service is insufficient to cover
the demand in the peak period, so users may adjust their request times to reduce the cost
of their trip. The cumulative result of individual decisions leads to an equilibrium condition
in which no one has an incentive to change his/her request time. According to condition
(4.8), in the equilibrium condition the rate of requested trips will have a stepwise
distribution in the peak period. As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the slope of the first part
of the equilibrium request curve exceeds the capacity of the system (𝜇/(1 − 𝑒) > 𝜇), while
in the second part of this slope drops below the operating capacity of the system (𝜇/(1 +
𝑙) < 𝜇). Although the average demand rate through the congested period is equal to the
average service rate, the uneven distribution of request times causes avoidable delay. The
same number of travelers could be served without excess delay if 𝑅(𝑡) were linear with
constant slope 𝜇. We now consider the total cost for the agency and users by assuming that
it is possible to make the distribution of demand uniform over time. In the next section,
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demand management strategies that achieve this constant distribution of requested times
through the rush will be presented.
Consider the same case of a general S-shaped cumulative curve of wished pick-up
times, 𝑊(𝑡), with maximum demand rate exceeding 𝜇, as shown in Figure 4.3. If the
distribution of actual requests is forced to follow a constant rate 𝜆, the cumulative request
curve, 𝑅(𝑡), is linear. If 𝑅(𝑡) has slope 𝜆 = 𝜇, as shown by the dashed line in Figure 4.3,
then the system will operate at capacity throughout the rush while maintaining a steady
number of waiting requests. The resulting performance of the DRT system is depicted by
𝑆(𝑡) (the solid line in Figure 4.3), which allows the number of requests to accumulate up
to 𝑛𝑤 , and then starts to serve trips at the capacity 𝜇.

Figure 4.3. Queueing diagram for a uniform distribution of demand
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In this system, all of the users experience the same delay, 𝜏, in the peak period. So, the
total delay of the users in this condition is the area between the request and service curves,
and can be approximated as follows:

𝑇𝐷 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) = 𝑁𝑄

𝑛𝑤
𝜇

(4.19)

The total delay is a decreasing function of 𝜇 and an increasing function of 𝑛𝑤 . The total
earliness of the system is still represented by the area between the service curve and the
wished curve from 𝑡𝐴 to 𝑡̃, and the total lateness by the area between the curves from 𝑡̃ to
𝑡𝐹 in Figure 4.3. Note as well that total earliness and lateness are decreasing functions of
the operating capacity of the system, just as they are for the user equilibrium. For a system
with fixed capacity, the total earliness and lateness in system optimum is the same as in the
user equilibrium (Daganzo, 1985). The earliness and lateness for the DRT system are
independent of the number of the waiting requests, and the total in-service time is still
approximated by (4.12).
A uniform distribution of demand with a request rate equal to the capacity of the system
makes it possible to limit the number of users awaiting service. The goal is not to drive 𝑛𝑤
to 0, however, because low values of 𝑛𝑤 are associated with high agency costs, based on
(4.5), and high in-service times for Strategy 1, based on (4.12). This is phenomenon is due
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to the fact that having a high number of waiting requests, 𝑛𝑤 , allows flexibility for each
vehicle to travel a shorter distance and spend less time to make its next pick-up. Passengers
on-board experience less in-service time because there is less distance traveled out of the
way to pick up other passengers in the DRT vehicle. In selecting the optimal value of 𝑛𝑤 ,
an inherent tradeoff exists with total delay balanced against the operating cost for the
agency and the in-service time for the users.
A tradeoff also exists between the costs for the agency and users. This should be taken
into account to determine the optimal operating capacity of the service. The fleet expenses
and operating cost of the agency is an increasing function of operating capacity of the
service, while the total delay, earliness, and lateness of the system decrease with a rise in
the operating capacity of the service. Accordingly, the total costs for the agency and the
users in each strategy can be minimized by optimizing the operating capacity of the service
and number of waiting requests as below:

∗

𝑖
(𝜇𝑖∗ , 𝑛𝑤
) = arg min 𝑇𝐶𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) = arg min(𝐴𝐶𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) + 𝑈𝐶𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ))
𝜇,𝑛𝑤

𝜇,𝑛𝑤

(4.20)

where the costs for the agency and users can be approximated according to the equations
(4.5) and (4.6), respectively. As before, the components of the agency cost can be
approximated using equations (4.1), (4.3), and (4.4). In this scenario, the total delay for the
users can be approximated by substituting (4.19) into (4.6). When the wished curve has a
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specific inverse Z-shape with slope 𝜔, the total cost of the system in the problem (4.20)
can be formulated as a function of 𝜇 and 𝑛𝑤 . The total earliness and lateness of the system
also can be approximated according to equations (4.10) and (4.11), respectively.
To solve this problem, we start by treating 𝑛𝑤 as a parameter in the objective function
to derive the optimal 𝜇 as a function of 𝑛𝑤 .

𝜇𝑖∗ = arg min 𝑇𝐶𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) = (𝐷𝑖,1 (𝑛𝑤 )𝜇 +

𝐷𝑖,2 (𝑛𝑤 )
𝜇

𝜇

+ 𝐷𝑖,3 (𝑛𝑤 ))

(4.21)

where 𝐷𝑖,1 (𝑛𝑤 ) and 𝐷𝑖,2 (𝑛𝑤 ) denote the coefficients of 𝜇 and 1/𝜇 in the total cost of the
system as functions of 𝑛𝑤 using strategy 𝑖. 𝐷𝑖,3 (𝑛𝑤 ) represents the part of this cost that is
a function of 𝑛𝑤 but independent of 𝜇.
Since the total cost of the system is a convex function of the operating capacity of the
service, the optimal value of 𝜇 can be approximated according to the first order condition
as below:
𝐷

(𝑛 )

𝜇𝑖∗ = √𝐷𝑖,2 (𝑛𝑤 )
𝑖,1

𝑤

(4.22)

By substituting the optimal operating capacity of the service from (4.22) into (4.20), the
total cost of the system can be formulated solely as a function 𝑛𝑤 . Accordingly, the
optimization problem can be reformulated as follows:
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∗

𝑖
𝑛𝑤
= arg min 𝑇𝐶𝑖 (𝜇𝑖∗ , 𝑛𝑤 ) =
𝑛𝑤

𝐷

𝐷

arg min 2√𝐷𝑖,4 𝑛𝑤 + 𝐷𝑖,5 √𝑛𝑤 + 𝑛𝑖,6 + 𝐷𝑖,7 + 𝐷𝑖,8 𝑛𝑤 + 𝐷𝑖,9 √𝑛𝑤 + 𝑖,10
+ 𝐷𝑖,11 (4.23)
√
√𝑛
𝑛𝑤

𝑤

𝑤

where terms 𝐷𝑖,4 through 𝐷𝑖,11 denote the parameters of the objective function of the
problem for each strategy 𝑖.
The total cost of the system is a convex function of the number of waiting requests. As
a result, the objective function can be minimized by finding the optimal number of requests
awaiting service. Since the objective function of this problem is both continuous and
differentiable over 𝑛𝑤 , the global optimum solution of this problem can be calculated
quickly and precisely with the help of simple numerical methods like Newton’s method.
Since the number of the requests awaiting service remains fixed over time, the average time
that users spend in the vehicles, as calculated by (4.12), remains constant over time as well.
It is worth pointing out that this conclusion is consistent with our initial assumption that
the in-service time is fixed over time.
The minimum total cost of the system in each strategy can be estimated by plugging in
∗

𝑖
𝜇𝑖∗ and 𝑛𝑤
back into (4.20):
∗

𝑖
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑇𝐶𝑖 (𝜇𝑖∗ , 𝑛𝑤
)
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(4.24)

∗

𝑖
The optimal fleet size of the operator also be approximated by plugging 𝜇𝑖∗ and 𝑛𝑤
into

(4.1):

∗

𝑖
𝑀𝑖∗ = 𝑀𝑖 (𝜇𝑖∗ , 𝑛𝑤
)

(4.25)

4.2.3 Scenario III: Optimal Number of Waiting Requests with a Fixed Fleet Size
Many agencies face constrained budgets and facilities that can make it difficult to change
the fleet size for the DRT service. Thus, it is useful to consider the efficiency improvement
that can be achieved if the distribution of demand and operation of the service are optimized
while holding the fleet size fixed. In this case, the fleet size (𝑀) and its associated cost
remains fixed, and the operating capacity of the system in each strategy, 𝜇𝑖 , becomes a
function of the number of waiting requests. This function can be approximated by solving
equation (4.1) for 𝜇.

1

𝜇𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 ) = 𝑀 (𝑏 + 2𝑣 𝑘𝑖 𝑟√𝐴)

−1

(4.26)

The total delay that users experience in this scenario can be approximated by substituting
(4.26) into (4.19):
𝑇𝐷 (𝑛𝑤 ) = 𝑁𝑄

𝑛𝑤
𝑀

1

(𝑏 + 2𝑣 𝑘𝑖 𝑟√𝐴)
122

(4.27)

Like the first and second scenarios, the total earliness and lateness can be approximated as
the area between 𝑅(𝑡) and 𝑆(𝑡). As before, the total in-service time for the users can also
be approximated using (4.12), and the total cost for the users can be approximated by
substituting these components into (4.6). The operating cost for the agency expressed by
equation (4.5), with the components of this cost are approximated by equations (4.1), (4.3),
and (4.4).
As a result, the number of requests awaiting service can be optimized to improve the
efficiency of the service by minimizing the total costs of the agency and the users as below:

∗

𝑖
𝑛𝑤
= arg min 𝑇𝐶𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 ) = arg min(𝐴𝐶𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 ) + 𝑈𝐶𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 ))
𝑛𝑤

𝑛𝑤

(4.28)

Under the simplifying assumption that the wished curve has an inverse Z-shape with
slope 𝜔, the total earliness and lateness of the system can be approximated by substituting
(4.26) into (4.10) and (4.11), respectively.

1

𝑙

2

1

𝑒

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

𝑇𝐸 (𝜇) = 2 𝑁𝑄2 (𝑒+𝑙) (𝑀 (𝑏 + 2𝑣 𝑘𝑖 𝑟√𝐴) − 𝜔)
𝑇𝐿 (𝜇) = 2 𝑁𝑄2 (𝑒+𝑙) (𝑀 (𝑏 + 2𝑣 𝑘𝑖 𝑟√𝐴) − 𝜔)
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(4.29)
(4.30)

In this case, the problem expressed in (4.28) can be simplified by substituting the
components of the agency and users’ costs into its objective function as follows:

𝐸3,𝑖

∗

𝑖
𝑛𝑤
= arg min 𝑇𝐶𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 ) = (𝐸1,𝑖 𝑛𝑤 + 𝐸2,𝑖 √𝑛𝑤 +
𝑛𝑤

√𝑛𝑤

+ 𝐸4,𝑖 )

(4.31)

where 𝐸1,𝑖 , 𝐸2,𝑖 , and 𝐸3,𝑖 represent the coefficients of 𝑛𝑤 , √𝑛𝑤 , and 1/√𝑛𝑤 in the
objective function, respectively. 𝐸4,𝑖 denotes the part of the objective function that is
independent of 𝑛𝑤 . The total cost of the system is a convex function of the number of
∗

𝑖
waiting requests, so the first order condition can be used to identify the value of 𝑛𝑤
that

minimizes the total cost in (4.31).

𝑑𝑇𝐶𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 )
𝑑𝑛𝑤

= 2𝐸1,𝑖 +

𝐸2,𝑖
𝑖∗
2√𝑛𝑤

−

𝐸3,𝑖
𝑖∗
2√𝑛𝑤

3

=0

(4.32)

∗3

𝑖 , it can be expressed as a cubic function of 𝑛
By multiplying this equation by √𝑛𝑤
√ 𝑤

that can be solved analytically using Carano’s Method. The function can also be solved
quickly and precisely with numerical methods.
Like the second scenario, the number of waiting requests and the average in-service
time for the users remains constant over the peak period, which is consistent with our initial
assumption regarding the average in-service times. As a result, the optimal operating
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∗

𝑖
capacity of the service can be approximated by substituting 𝑛𝑤
into (4.26). The minimum

total cost of the system can be estimated by substituting the optimum number of waiting
requests into the objective function in (4.28).

∗

𝑖
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑇𝐶𝑖 (𝑛𝑤
)

(4.33)

Up to this point, it has been assumed that it is possible to have a uniform distribution
of demand instead of an equilibrium stepwise distribution. However, this cannot happen
without implementing an effective demand management strategy. In the following section,
two different strategies are presented that can be implemented to make the demand uniform
over time.

4.3 Demand Management Strategies
As explained in the previous section, the underlying assumption in optimizing the number
of requests awaiting service in the peak period is that demand can be distributed uniformly
across the period. However, the distribution of the demand in the equilibrium condition
will naturally tend to be stepwise in the peak period, which is the cumulative result of the
rational behavior of the individual users minimizing their own costs. Accordingly, demand
management strategies that can make the demand uniform over time can fulfill the key role
in enhancing the efficiency of the DRT system.
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4.3.1 Schedule Management Strategy
A simple strategy to make the schedule of requests uniform over time is to simply stop
accepting requests once the capacity has been reached. This strategy has been widely used
in DRT systems such as ADA paratransit services to form a uniform demand. In this
strategy, the operator accepts requests in a first-in, first-served order, and puts them in a
reservation list. To keep the distribution of requests uniform over time, the number of
requests per time added to the reservation list should not exceed the operating capacity of
the service. If a user’s requested time is not available they will have to book travel at an
earlier or later time. The problem is that this strategy incurs schedule penalties on users
who are not able to book their trips well in advance. Furthermore, regulations require that
rescheduling not exceed one hour difference from the initial request, so the operator can
still be stuck having to invest in additional resources to serve the peak demand.
Alternatively, it is possible to implement a dynamic pricing strategy to make the
distribution of demand uniform over the peak period, while users maintain freedom in
choosing their own requested times.

4.3.2

Dynamic Pricing Strategy

Dynamic pricing is another strategy that can be implemented to achieve a uniform
distribution of requests by incentivizing the users to adjust their request times. In general,
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pricing is known to be an effective strategy for managing the demand for optimized systems
although technical issues have often limited its implementation. However, this may not be
the case for DRT systems where the technical infrastructure already exists, but agencies
are choosing to charge flat fares. Alternatively, a dynamic fare pattern can be charged to
make the distribution of the requests uniform over time.
In the equilibrium condition, demand has a stepwise distribution over the peak period.
As illustrated in the Figures 2 and 3, the equilibrium demand rate of the first part of the
peak period is higher than the operating capacity of the service. On the contrary, this rate
drops below the capacity of the system in the second part, while the average weighted
demand rate of the whole peak period equals the operating capacity of the system.
Accordingly, a dynamic pricing strategy that decreases the demand rate of the first part of
the peak period and increases that of the second part to fill the gap between these demand
rates and make the distribution of the requests uniform over the peak period. Dynamic
pricing strategies have been widely studied as an effective tool for optimizing traffic flow
at bottlenecks in transportation networks. Here, we adapt the theory to draw similar
conclusions for pricing DRT systems during the peak period.

4.3.2.1

Optimum Pricing Strategy

In Vickrey’s (1969) congestion theory, the delay that users experience during their travels
is an unnecessary consequence of the congestion at a bottleneck that can be avoided. A
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dynamic price that charges users the equivalent monetary cost of the delay that users
tolerate in the equilibrium condition (see Figure 4.1) can eliminate the delay by making the
distribution of the demand uniform over the peak period. The optimum price for using the
bottleneck should first arise from the minimum off-peak price, 𝑝𝑜 , at time 𝑡𝐴 with rate 𝑒
up to the maximum value, 𝑇𝑐 , at time 𝑡̃. Then the price should fall with slope – 𝑙 to the same
minimum value in the end of peak period, at time 𝑡𝐵 . Gonzales and Daganzo (2012) show
that such a pricing strategy is optimal even when the capacity of the bottleneck is not fixed.
In transportation networks, tolls can be charged at bottleneck locations, when users are
served, so the theory of the dynamic pricing of bottlenecks has been developed under the
assumption that users are charged at bottlenecks. In contrast, users in DRT systems are
typically charged a fare when they are picked up. This difference makes it necessary to
adapt the theory of dynamic pricing for the DRT system. As a result, it can be shown that
a dynamic pricing pattern, as described above can make the distribution of demand of the
DRT system uniform over the peak period.
The dynamic prices for the DRT service must be set so that no user has any incentive
to change their requested time to be earlier or later. It is useful to consider a single request
and the effect of changing the request time on the delay and earliness. An example of a
user who makes a request at time 𝑡, which is earlier than their wished time 𝑡𝑤 , is illustrated
in Figure 4.4. This user pays a price 𝑝(𝑡) based on when they request service, then they
spend some time waiting to be picked up and transported to their destination. The effect of
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a small shift in requested time by ∆𝑡 earlier will result in being served 𝑅̇𝑒 (𝑡)∆𝑡/𝜇 earlier
in time, where 𝑅̇𝑒 (𝑡) denotes the slope of the request curve for all 𝑡 ∈ (𝑡𝐴 , 𝑡̃). The resulting
changes in the individual’s experienced delay (𝜏𝐷 ) and earliness (𝜏𝐸 ) can be calculated as
follows:
∆𝜏𝐷 = 𝜏𝐷,2 − 𝜏𝐷,1 = +∆𝑡 −
∆𝜏𝐸 = 𝜏𝐸,2 − 𝜏𝐸,1 = +𝑒

𝑅̇𝑒 (𝑡)∆𝑡
𝜇

𝑅̇𝑒 (𝑡)∆𝑡
𝜇

(4.34)
(4.35)

Figure 4.4. Variation of delay and earliness for a user resulting from a shift of ∆𝑡 in the request time

There will be also a change in the price of the service (𝑝) associated with this shift in
request time. Assuming that price of the service varies smoothly over time, this change can
be expressed as:
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∆𝑝 = 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 = −𝑝̇𝑒 (𝑡)∆𝑡

(4.36)

where 𝑝̇𝑒 (𝑡) is the rate of price increase per unit time at time 𝑡 for the 𝑁𝑒 requests that are
earlier than wished.
In the equilibrium condition, a marginal shift in request time by should not affect the
generalized cost for the user, so the following condition must hold:

∆𝑈𝐶 = ∆𝜏𝐷 + ∆𝜏𝐸 + ∆𝑝 = 0

(4.37)

otherwise the user can achieve a lower cost by changing his/her request. By substituting
(4.34), (4.35), and (4.36) into (4.37), 𝑅̇𝑒 (𝑡) can be solved in terms of 𝑝̇𝑒 (𝑡):

(1−𝑝̇ 𝑒 (𝑡))𝜇
𝑅̇𝑒 (𝑡) =
1−𝑒

(4.38)

A similar line of reasoning can be used to show that that the slope of the second part of
the request curve, 𝑅̇𝑙 (𝑡) is:
(1−𝑝̇ 𝑙 (𝑡))𝜇
𝑅̇𝑙 (𝑡) = 1+𝑙

(4.39)

where 𝑝̇ 𝑙 (𝑡) denotes the rate of price increase per unit time at time 𝑡 for the 𝑁𝑙 requests that
are later than wished. Note that (4.38) and (4.39) are not the same as the equilibrium arrival
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curve in bottleneck model, because prices are charged at the requested time instead of the
service time.
Following from (4.38) and (4.39), the dynamic price that increases from the base offpeak price, 𝑝𝑜 , with rate 𝑒 from time 𝑡𝐴′ to 𝑡̃ ′ , and then decreases with slope – 𝑙 back to 𝑝𝑜
at time 𝑡𝐹′ can make the distribution of the requests uniform and equal to the operating
capacity of the service.
𝑝̇𝑒 (𝑡) = 𝑒

for

𝑡 ∈ (𝑡𝐴′ , 𝑡̃ ′ )

(4.40)

𝑝̇𝑙 (𝑡) = −𝑙

for

𝑡 ∈ (𝑡̃ ′ , 𝑡𝐹′ )

(4.41)

These prices are illustrated in Figure 4.5(a). Although 𝑅̇𝑒 (𝑡) and 𝑅̇𝑙 (𝑡) differ from the
conventional bottleneck model, the effective dynamic prices follow the same pattern just
shifted from the service times to the request times. In general, the total price that users pay
to the agency to use the service in each scenario can also be approximated as a function of
the area under its pricing graph (Φ𝑖 ):

𝑃𝑖 = 𝑉𝑂𝑇 ∙ Φ𝑖 𝜇𝑖∗

(4.42)

Implementing an effective dynamic pricing strategy motivates users to distribute their
requests uniformly over the peak period, which helps the agency reduce the cost of
operating the system and reduces the waiting time for users of the system. To keep the
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∗

𝑖
optimum number of requests awaiting service at 𝑛𝑤
, the agency needs to operate by waiting

for the optimum number of requests to accumulate and then serve the requests at its
optimum capacity.

(a) Optimum Pricing Strategy

(b) Constrained Pricing Strategy

Figure 4.5. Comparison of dynamic pricing strategies over the peak period

4.3.2.2

Constrained Pricing Strategy

In practice, an operator may have not have complete flexibility to charge any prices they
want. For example, regulations may restrict the price by an upper bound. ADA paratransit
services are intended to provide comparable transit service for people with disabilities, so
charging fares that exceed fares on conventional public transit would undermine the role
of the service. There is usually no lower limit on the price that can be charged, so prices
may still be varied within the bounds to improve the efficiency of the system. An external
constraint can be included in the optimization problem to keep the optimal price within the
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allowable range, and the result would be the most effective dynamic pricing strategy that
is feasible.
As depicted in Figure 4.5(b), the constrained pricing strategy can be derived by
restricting the most effective pricing pattern to the upper limit. Accordingly, the dynamic
price rises from time 𝑡 = 0 to 𝑡𝐴′ with constant rate 𝑒 up to the maximum allowable limit,
𝑝𝑚 . Then, it stays fixed until it can decrease with rate – 𝑙, such that the price returns to zero
at time 𝑡𝐹′ . Adding a new constraint to an optimization problem can never lead to an
improvement in the objective function. In view of that, although implementing such a
pricing strategy can help enhance the efficiency of the system, it will not achieve a uniform
distribution of the requests. As a result having a non-uniform distribution of the requests
causes at least some users to experience more delay in comparison to a system with a
uniform distribution of the demand.

4.4

Numerical Example

To provide a numerical illustration of this problem, in this section we employ the proposed
analytical model to optimize different operating strategies for a DRT service in different
optimization scenarios. This DRT system is assumed to provide a curb-to-curb service for
its users in an area of 𝐴 = 500 mi2 with a network travel parameter of 𝑟 = 1, and a fixed
peak demand of 𝑁𝑄 = 150 requests. It is assumed that the fixed demand is uniformly
distributed over 3 hours of the peak period with a fixed demand rate of 𝜔 = 50 requests
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per hour. The value of time of the users is assumed to be $20 per hour with an earliness
penalty factor of 𝑒 = 0.5, and a lateness penalty factor of 𝑙 = 1.5. Here, the total boarding
and alighting time is 𝑏 = 15 minutes per request, and the average moving speed of the
vehicles in the network is assumed be to 𝑣 = 40 mph, while each vehicle has 𝑛𝑣 = 4
requests onboard on average in each point in time.
In this case, the agency and users’ cost of the DRT system for different strategies can
be approximated following from the equations (4.5) and (4.6), as below:

𝐴𝐶𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) = 1000 + 500𝑀𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) + 1.5𝑉𝐻𝑇𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 ) + 0.5𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑖 (𝑛𝑤 ) − 𝑃𝑖
𝑈𝐶𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) = 20 (𝑇𝐷 (𝜇)+𝑇𝑆,𝑖 (𝜇, 𝑛𝑤 ) + 0.5𝑇𝐸 (𝜇) + 1.5𝑇𝐿 (𝜇)) + 𝑃𝑖

(4.43)
(4.44)

On this basis, we first optimize this DRT system under different scenarios, then we propose
an optimal pricing strategy to keep the system optimized over peak period, according to
Section 5.2.1. Next, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the results of different operating
strategies under different scenarios to show how these results may change with the
variations in the level of demand, value of time for the users, and the fleet size (in Scenario
III).
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4.4.1

System Optimum and Dynamic Pricing Strategy

As explained in the Section 4.3.2, the total cost for the agency and users of a DRT
service in different operating strategies can be minimized by optimizing the capacity of
system as well as number of awaiting requests. In Scenario I, we optimize the operating
capacity of the system by solving problem (4.15) for this numerical example. The optimal
values of the operating capacity and waiting requests in Scenario II can also be
approximated by solving problems (4.21) and (4.23). Finally, in Scenario III, we assume
that the agency only has 𝑀 = 5 vehicles available for running the DRT service, so we
optimize the number of waiting requests by solving problem (4.31). Given the optimal vales
of these decision variables, it becomes possible to approximate the optimal fleet size, the
agency and users’ costs, and the minimum total costs in each of the different strategies.
Table 4.1 summarizes the results for the different DRT operating strategies under the three
different optimization scenarios.
In Scenario I, with optimal operating capacity but variable number of awaiting requests,
the second operating strategy with the largest fleet size, highest agency cost, and the lowest
users’ cost (excluding the price) has the lowest total cost among the operating strategies
under the first optimization scenario. Since Scenario I optimizes the operating capacity
while allowing users to make requests in an unrestricted user equilibrium, the number of
awaiting request varies over the peak period. As explained in Section 4.2.1, we approximate
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the number of waiting requests in the first scenario with its average value using equation
(4.14).
To further simplify the problem, we can set a flat price to zero, which indeed has no
effect on the optimized solution or the total cost of the DRT system. In fact, the price,
whether it is flat or dynamic, is a portion of the cost that will be canceled out in summing
up the agency and users’ costs in the total cost function. A pricing strategy will be effective
in changing the system performance only if it can make the distribution of the demand more
uniform over the peak period by incentivizing the users to adjust their request times.
Otherwise, a flat price is an endogenous component of the costs that is transferred from the
users to the agency.
It is also worth pointing out that the users’ cost and the total cost of Strategy 1 in
Scenario I is significantly higher than those of all other strategies in these three scenarios.
The reason for this surprisingly high users’ cost in this case is the inefficiency of the
operations. In Strategy 1, vehicles always choose the nearest point as their next stop,
regardless whether it is an origin or destination. Without an effective demand management
strategy, this causes a rise in number of requests waiting for the service during the peak
period. Such an accumulation of requests simply increases the chance of pickups relative
to drop-offs, and consequently the in-service time is elongated. It can be generally
concluded that Strategy 1 is not very efficient in Scenario I, although its agency cost might
be relatively low.
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In Scenario II, both the operating capacity and the number of waiting requests are
optimized, and the total cost of each operating strategy is reduced to its lowest possible
value. Interestingly, Strategy 1, which has the highest total cost in Scenario I, has the lowest
total costs among all of the scenarios and strategies in this scenario. This strategy provides
the most optimal service quality with the lowest delay, in-service time, and the cost for the
users (excluding the price) using the smallest fleet size and the lowest number of waiting
requests among all of the other cases, which explicitly demonstrates the concept system
optimization.
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Table 4.1. System optimization results of the numerical example
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SO

Scenario III

In Scenario III, the objective is to reduce the total cost of the DRT system by
optimizing the number of waiting requests for a given fleet size. In this example, we assume
that the agency possesses 5 vehicles to serve the demand. In this case, Strategy 1 is the
most efficient, with the lowest agency and users’ costs (excluding the price). Notice as well
that all of the components of the agency and users’ cost for Strategy 1 are at their minimum
possible values, which emphasizes the dominance of Strategy 1 for this scenario.
As explained in Section 4.3, implementation of Scenarios II and III inevitably requires
an effective demand management strategy that can make the distribution of requests
uniform over the peak period. To this end we propose a dynamic pricing strategy that can
keep the number of waiting requests in Scenarios II and III optimized over time. Such
optimal pricing strategies can be designed by charging each of the users a price equal to
the cost of the delay they experience in the user equilibrium condition, according to criteria
(4.40) and (4.41).
With the absence of a dynamic pricing strategy in Scenario I, there will be a timevariant delay associated with service as illustrated for different operating strategies in
Figure 4.6(a). As indicated in this figure, the length of the peak period varies among the
different strategies based on their optimal operating capacities. In view of that, Strategy 1
has the highest operating capacity and the shortest peak period, while the Strategy 2 has
the lowest operating capacity and the longest peak period in Scenario 1. However, in all
strategies, this delay first rises with slope 𝑒 = 0.5 at start of the peak period at time 𝑡′𝐴𝑖 , up
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to its maximum value, 𝜏𝑐 , at time 𝑡̃′. Then it falls with a negative slope of 𝑙 = −1.5 until
the end of the peak period at time 𝑡′𝐹𝑖 .

(a) Scenario I

(b) Scenario II

(c) Scenario III

Figure 4.6. Time-variant delay (a) and optimal pricing (b and c) for different operating strategies

Like Scenario I, the lengths of the peak periods in Scenarios II and III directly depend
on the operating capacity of the strategies. On this basis, Strategies 1 and 3 of Scenario II
turn out to have the shortest and longest peak periods in Figure 4.6(b), although the lengths
of these peak periods are relatively close across the different strategies. In Scenario III, as
illustrated in Figure 4.6(c), Strategy 1 still has the longest peak period due to its lowest
operation capacity, while Strategy 2 has the shortest peak period. In all of these pricing
strategies, the optimal price in the first part of the peak period linearly increases from zero,
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at time 𝑡′𝐴𝑖 , with slope 𝑒 = 0.5 up its maximum value, 𝜏𝑐 , at time 𝑡̃′ . Then it linearly
decreases back to zero with a negative slope of 𝑙 = −1.5, at time 𝑡′𝐹𝑖 .

4.4.2

Sensitivity Analysis

In the previous section, we minimized the total cost of the DRT system for the numerical
example by optimizing the decision variables of different operating strategies under
different optimization scenarios. However, it is useful to see how the minimum total cost
of the service changes with variations in the demand and the value of time of its users. We
summarize here the results of the sensitivity analysis on the numerical example optimized
in the previous section.
Thanks to the analytical solution of the problem, variations in the total cost of the
system can be accurately approximated for wide ranges of input parameters, as plotted in
Figure 4.7. Figure 4.7(a) depicts the total cost with variations in the total number of the
waiting requests during the peak period. It can be inferred from this Figure 4.that the total
costs of the different strategies in the different scenarios are relatively close when demand
is low. However, as the demand starts growing, the total costs of the some of the cases, in
particular I.1, rises relatively faster than the others. This rise is relatively slow for some
other cases, in particular II.1.
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(a) Demand

(b) Value of time

(c) Fleet size

Figure 4.7. Variations of the total cost with (a) demand (b) value of time, and (c) fleet size

A similar pattern appears for the variation of the total cost with users’ value of time. As
shown in Figure 4.7(b), the total costs of all cases are relatively close for the lower values
of VOT. However, some of them rise faster, such as I.1, while some others rise slower, such
as II.1. Finally, Figure 4.7(c) plots the total costs of different strategies with variations in
the fleet size in the Scenario III, in which the agency is assumed to possess a fixed number
of vehicles. In this case, the total cost of Strategy 1 (III.1) always remains lower than that
of the other strategies.
Figure 4.7(c) also reveals the importance of the fleet size optimization by indicating
that, even for a given number of waiting requests, the total cost of all operating strategies
can be minimized by choosing the optimal fleet size.
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4.5

DRT System with a Heterogamous Demand
In this chapter, we proposed a model and an optimization method for the operation of

the DRT systems. In this respect, the generalized cost of the users and the operation cost of
the agency are approximated using analytical models. On this basis, the operation of the
DRT system is optimized by minimizing the total cost of the users and agency using the
proposed schedule management strategies. To approximate the agency cost, we employed
an analytical model to formulate the operation cost of the DRT system. To approximate the
users’ cost, we first showed that a DRT system with a state-dependent capacity and a timedependent demand can be modeled as queueing system. In the sense of that, we adapted
the Vickrey’s (1969) congestion theory to approximate the components of the cost that
users experience in the system. For the purpose of simplicity, we assumed that the relative
importance of schedule deviation remains constant among the homogenous users.
However, the reality is that the preferences of the users varies among the heterogeneous
users. To relax such simplifying assumption, we may account for the heterogeneity in
preferences of the users by adapting the concept of the efficient frontier for modeling such
queueing system.
On this basis, the approximation of the components of the users’ cost can be generalized
by plugging the analytical solution of the morning commute problem proposed in Section
3.1.2.2 into the user cost model presented in Section 4.1.2 to account for the heterogeneity
in schedule penalty preferences of the users. Subsequently, the solution of the optimization
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problems of Scenarios I, II, and III will be updated as well, although the general
formulations of optimization problems (equations (4.13), (4.20), and (4.28)) remain
untouched. Having the analytical solution of the morning commute problem with
heterogeneous user preferences, it becomes possible to generalize the variation of the
waiting time that users experience over time in the equilibrium condition, according to
Figure 3.4. In this respect, the effeteness of dynamic pricing strategies of Figure 4.5a, b
will be improved by considering the heterogeneity in schedule penalty preferences of the
user according to the Figure 3.8. In this respect, the proposed optimal and constrained
pricing strategies for the DRT system can be generalized as illustrated in Figure 4.8a, b.

(a) Optimum Pricing Strategy

(b) Constrained Pricing Strategy

Figure 4.8. Dynamic pricing strategies with heterogeneous user preferences.
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4.6

Summary

The inherent trade-off between the operating cost and the quality of service of a DRT
system necessitates optimizing the operations to balance them. In this part of the research,
an analytical model based on Daganzo (1978) is employed to approximate fleet size, VHT,
and VMT of the DRT system. Accordingly, the operating cost for the agency is estimated
as a linear combination of these components. The users are also subjected to costs of using
the service. When the operating capacity of the system is inadequate to cover the demand,
users of the system incur costs of delay, earliness, and lateness.
In response to the costs associated with excessive demand, rational users adjust their
request times to keep their own generalized cost minimized. The cumulative result of the
individual decisions of each user leads to an equilibrium condition in which no one has an
incentive to change his/her own requested time. In this respect, we adapt Vickrey’s (1969)
congestion theory to model the DRT system, and approximate the delay, earliness, and
lateness of the users in the equilibrium condition. In addition, the total time that users spend
in service can be approximated using the analytical model from Daganzo (1978). As a
result, the efficiency of the DRT system can be optimized by minimizing the total cost for
the agency and users, where the operating capacity of the system or the number of waiting
requests or both can be considered as the decision variable(s) of the problem. This part of
the research presents optimizations for three scenarios: allowing only the operating
capacity to change, allowing both to change, or holding the fleet size fixed. In each
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scenario, the general problem with an S-shaped wished curve is formulated mathematically.
The analytical solution is presented for the simplified case with an inverse Z-shaped wished
curve.
In order to achieve optimal efficient operations of the DRT system, the demand should
be spread as uniformly as possible over the rush period. Two demand management
strategies are presented to spread the requests uniformly over the peak period in order to
maintain an optimal number of waiting requests. In the schedule management strategy, the
operator keeps the demand within the operating capacity of the service by only allowing a
limited number of requests to be scheduled per time. A dynamic pricing strategy is
proposed that incentivizes users to change their requested travel times without other
restrictions from the operator. The most effective pricing strategy can make the distribution
of the requests uniform over the peak period when the price is unbounded. A constrained
dynamic pricing strategy is also proposed, which distributes the demand as uniformly as
possible by changing the prices only within an allowable range. DRT systems that serve
peaked demand can be optimized to balance the costs for the agency and users.
Although these models have been developed based on the operation of demand
responsive transit systems, the principles can apply to other demand responsive systems
(such as movement of goods) in which the cost of operations must be balanced against the
quality of service for customers. The key to addressing dynamics of demand is to use
management strategies that are also dynamic. Prices that vary by the time of day can play
a key role in achieving efficient system performance.
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CHAPTER 5
ROUTE CHOICE PROBLEM UNDER TRAVEL TIME VARIABILITY WITH
HETEROGENEOUS USER PREFERENCES

Route choice is another important decision that users make for their trips in a network.
Rational users tend to reduce the costs of their trips by choosing the routes with the
minimum travel cost. Thus, the cumulative result of the individual decisions is the user
equilibrium condition in which no one can reduce his/her cost by switching to another
route. The duration of the trip is one of the important components of the travel cost, which
is also correlated with number of other components of the cost like fuel consumption.
Conventional traffic assignment models simplify the route choice problem by making the
assumption that travel time is the only influential factor in route choice behavior of the
users, which can be precisely predicted by travelers in the network. However, research
shows that travelers can estimate the average travel time as well as its variations for
different routes based on their previous experiences in the network. In this part of the
research, we study the route choice behavior of the users in the network under travel time
variability, while there is a heterogeneity associated with risk sensitivity of the users. The
concept of the efficient frontier is used to represent the equilibrium solution of the route
choice problem. On the basis of the specific properties of the efficient frontier, we propose
a mathematical formulation of the route choice problem under travel time variability. A
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solution algorithm is also designed that uses the primary characteristics of the equilibrium
condition to assign the heterogeneous demand to the network. The efficiency of the
proposed solution method is also comparted with a classic smoothing assignment method
in a numerical example. The proposed model can also have broader applications in
modeling decision making procedure of the travelers in the transportation network.

5.1 Generalized Cost Function
Route choice is a multi-criterion decision-making process by nature in which individuals
tend to minimize their costs or maximize their benefits according to their own preferences.
However, it is the heterogeneity of preferences among users that makes the equilibrium
problem complicated. The generalized cost associated with the trip encompasses different
components of the cost that users experience to get to the destination. In addition, a risk
always comes along with this cost, which should be taken into account as well. Beckmann
et al. (1956) describes how the uncertainty in the travel cost gives rise to the risk that should
be taken into account in travel cost estimation:

“…the cost of transportation on a road includes not only the operating cost of a vehicle
over the length of the road, but also such things as the travel time and the risks incurred. …
Under Risk Cost we shall include the losses from accidents in terms of life, health, and
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property, as well as the irritation from the threat of such accidents, which is particularly
manifest under conditions of road congestion.” (Beckmann et al., 1956).

However, the uncertainty in cost estimation is not restricted to the monetary costs. As
explained in the previous section, the variation in the trip duration is another source of risk
involved in the decision making procedure. Travel time is a primary component of the
travel cost, and it is also correlated with fuel consumption and other costs that are incurred
as part of their travel. Nevertheless, it is not possible for users to predict the exact route
travel times that they will experience, because they can only estimate average trip durations
according to their previous experiences. Hence, the variation in the trip durations is another
unpleasant factor that travelers consider in route choice (Abdel-Aty et al., 1995; Noland,
1999). The variation in travel time poses a risk of schedule delay to the users who desire to
arrive to their destinations punctually and can freely choose when to start their trips and
their route. Based on Vickery (1969), these users account for the earliness or lateness
penalty cost that they may experience due to arrival at their destinations ahead of or behind
schedule. From a statistical perspective, the variation of route travel time can be measured
by its standard deviation, regardless of the shape of the distribution (Fosgerau and
Engelson, 2011). However, the cost of deviation from the schedule is not always
symmetric, since it may change with the purpose of the trip and vary among the people.
The value of travel time reliability represents the level of sensitivity of the user to risk.
In this regard, more conservative users place higher importance on the travel time variation;
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in contrast, risk takers show less consideration of it. The variation in the trip duration
determines the reliability of the route choice, so it should be included in the generalized
cost function. As a result, the linear combination of the expected travel time and its standard
deviation is employed as the generalized cost function to measure the disutility of a chosen
route, based on Small’s (1982) scheduling model, regardless of the form of the travel time
distribution (Fosgerau and Karlström, 2010; Shahabi et al., 2013). The disutility
experienced by a member of risk group 𝑝 traveling on route 𝑖 is given by:

𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑝 = 𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾𝑝 𝑠𝑖

(5.1)

where, 𝑡𝑖 represents the expected travel time on route 𝑖 , and its standard deviation is
denoted by 𝑠𝑖 . Here, we keep the simplifying assumption that the travel time of the links
are independent of each other, so 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑠𝑖2 can be calculated as the summation of link
expected travel times and associated variances, respectively (Lo et al., 2006; Watling 2006;
Tan et al, 2014). Moreover, in this cost function, 𝛾𝑝 is the risk sensitivity parameter which
reflects the relative importance of the travel time variability for the users in group 𝑝 who
share the same risk sensitivity. In other words, the risk sensitivity can be interpreted as the
equivalent delay that the user is willing to tolerate to reduce one unit of time in the variation
of his/her trip duration.
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According to Fosgerau and Karlström (2010), the value of the risk sensitivity parameter
can be determined based on the marginal utilities of earliness and lateness for any given
distribution of the trip duration. However, this value does not apply equally to all travelers
due to the heterogeneity of user preferences. To include such heterogeneity, 𝛾 can have a
discrete or continuous probability distribution over the travel demand. Figure 5.1 illustrates
a hypothetical probability distribution of the risk sensitivity of users.

Figure 5.1. Probability distribution of the risk sensitivity parameter

Statistically speaking, the expectation and standard deviation of the route travel
time can be defined as a function of these variables in the constituting links. Of special
interest here is that the expected travel time and its standard deviation are not independent
of each other; in contrast, there appears to be a relationship between them, especially for
travel time in networks (Herman and Lam, 1974; Richardson and Taylor, 1978; Fosgerau,
2010; Mahmassani et al., 2013). Both of these variables can be defined as functions of the
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traffic flows (Noland et al., 1998). On this basis, in this part of the research we consider
the standard deviation of travel time as a function of the traffic flow. Therefore, we can use
a change of variables to express travel time as a function of the standard deviation based
on the relationship implied by the traffic flow. Here, we consider a general relationship
between these variables in which the expected travel time is an increasing function of the
standard deviation of the travel time, and standard deviation of travel time in an increasing
function of the flows in the network. By using the linear cost function (5.1) from the
literature, the EFRC can be shown to be decreasing convex function with a specific
geometric property as explained in the following section.

5.2 Representing Equilibrium with the Efficient Frontier of Route Choice
In this section, we first demonstrate the route choice problem under travel time variability
with heterogeneous user preferences to risk using a set of complementary conditions. Then,
we explain how the concept of the efficient frontier can be adapted from portfolio theory
(Markowitz, 1952) in finance to model the equilibrium of the route choice problem. For
that purpose, we first consider the simplified case of the continuous differentiable efficient
frontier to demonstrate the specific characteristics of the EFRC. Then, we extend the results
to the realistic case of the piecewise efficient frontier by relaxing the simplifying
assumptions. The identified properties of the EFRC are used in upcoming sections for
modeling and solving the route choice problem with heterogeneous user preferences.
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In the route choice decision making process, the rational user tends to minimize his/her
general travel cost by making choices to reduce both the average trip duration and reliability
of the routes according to his/her previous experiences. Due to variation of the taste among
people, different users may find that different routes best match with their preferences. The
aggregate results would be an equilibrium condition in which all users have specific route
choices in accordance with their sensitivity to the risk, which leave them no incentive to
switch to another route. In this section, we first present the equilibrium conditions for a set
of heterogeneous travelers choosing among diverse routes. Then the equilibrium conditions
are used to introduce the concept of the efficient frontier as the representation of
equilibrium route choices.
In the equilibrium condition, users who share the same value for the reliability
experience the same general travel costs, but this cost may vary over groups with different
preferences. The traffic assignment problem for a single origin-destination network can be
formulated as a set of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker complementary conditions, the solution of
which represents the equilibrium route flows.

𝑥𝑖𝑝 (𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑝 − 𝜆𝑝 ) = 0

∀𝑖, 𝑝

(5.2)

𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑝 − 𝜆𝑝 ≥ 0

∀𝑖, 𝑝

(5.3)

∀𝑝

(5.4)

∀𝑖, 𝑝

(5.5)

∑𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑝 = 𝑑𝑝
𝑥𝑖𝑝 ≥ 0
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In this formulation, 𝑥𝑖𝑝 denotes the flow of the sensitivity group 𝑝 in route 𝑖, while 𝑑𝑝 is
the number of travelers in group 𝑝. 𝜆𝑝 is the dual variable for the flow conservation
constraint for the group 𝑝 . In the equilibrium condition, 𝜆𝑝 represents the minimum
disutility associated with traveling in the network for group 𝑝, which is identical for the
people in the same demand group.
Heterogeneity of the user preferences regarding travel time reliability leads to
asymmetric route choice of the users. So, in a similar condition, different travelers with
different sensitivities to risk may choose different routes, which might be different from
the shortest path as defined by the expected travel time. In this regard, more conservative
users (higher 𝛾) prefer the routes with lower standard deviation in travel time and tolerate
higher expected travel time. In contrast, risk-takers (lower 𝛾) choose the routes with lower
expected travel time and accept a higher level of variation in their trip durations. However,
no one take routes with higher expected travel time and higher level of risk as long as there
exists at least one alternative route that dominates these routes by offering better expected
travel time, reliability, or both.

Definition (EFRC). The efficient frontier of route choices (EFRC) is the convex hull
of the equilibrium route choice set in the 𝑠 − 𝑡 plane that have the minimum generalized
cost according to (5.1) for the users with heterogeneous preferences regarding the relative
importance travel time variability.
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On the s-t plane (See Figure 5.2), each fixed point represents the expected travel time
and its standard deviation for a route, which in this illustration are independent of the route
flows. A line with slope −𝛾𝑝 represents a set of points in the s-t space with constant
disutility for a person in group p. Disutility increases moving away from the origin as travel
time and variability increase. At equilibrium, the travelers in group p will choose the
point(s) where the disutility is lowest, and this disutility is 𝜆𝑝 . No user in group p will
choose a route with greater disutility than 𝜆𝑝 , as constrainted by (5.2) and (5.3). The upper
envelope of the constant disutility lines across all p defines a convex curve called the
efficient frontier of route choices (EFRC), which is shown by the dashed curve. Only the
portfolio of dominant routes, which are along this frontier, will be used in the equilibrium
condition, and users will be distributed among these routes based on their preferences for
risk. Figure 5.2 illustrates the concept the EFRC for the single origin-destination problem.
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Figure 5. 2. Route choice efficient frontier concept shown by dashed line

In this framework, the conventional user equilibrium can be interpreted as a special
case of the EFRC when all users are absolutely risk seekers and seek the route with the
shortest expected travel time, regardless of the associated risk. In this case that travelers
have no sensitivity to the risk (𝛾𝑝 = 0), the EFRC turns out to be a horizontal line in the st plane. As the risk sensitivity of the users goes to infinity (𝛾𝑝 = ∞), the solution of the
problem tends to be a vertical line on the s-t plane. In realistic cases, there is heterogeneity
among users in their sensitivity to risk, which results in the general shape of the EFRC. The
EFRC is the solution of this bi-objective route choice problem, which not only provides
intuitions about the route choice behavior of the users in the equilibrium condition, but also
ranks the route choice of the users according to their sensitivity to risk. This information is
crucial for updating the traffic assignment of the users in case a change occurs in structure
or performance of the network, with no need to solve the whole problem again. The EFRC
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has specific properties that can shed light on the equilibrium route choice of the users. To
identify these properties, we can simplify the problem to a differentiable efficient frontier
by assuming infinitely many routes in the s-t plane and a continuous distribution for the
risk sensitivity of the users. These simplifying assumption can help demonstrating the
properties of the efficient frontier. Then, we relax the simplifying assumptions to extend
the results to the realistic case of the piecewise linear efficient frontier.

5.2.1 Differentiable Efficient Frontier of the Route Choice
For the first step, we consider a couple of simplifying assumptions to keep the EFRC
continuous and differentiable in order to demonstrate the specific properties of the EFRC.
For one thing, we assume that there is an infinite number of routes connecting the single
origin-destination pair in the network with known s-t relationships that cover the entire s-t
plane. For another, we assume that the risk sensitivity parameter γ has a continuous
probability distribution over the population of the heterogeneous users. In this case, the
EFRC turns to a differentiable curve as illustrated in Figure 5.3. In this figure, 𝑡 of the
routes are depicted as increasing leaner function of their 𝑠 just for the purpose of
simplifying the illustration. However, this is not a general assumption in this problem, and
the results remain general for any relationship for t as an increasing function of s for the
routes of the network.
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Figure 5. 3. Differentiable EFRC for infinite number of routes and continuous distribution of 𝛾

In Figure 5.3, straight dashed lines represent the performance of the routes and, in
general, characteristics of the network. The equilibrium travel time expectation and
standard deviation of the routes can be determined as the intersection of the route
performance curves with the EFRC which is depicted by continuous line. The shape and
the location of the EFRC in the s-t plane depends on the characteristics of the routes in the
network, the total demand, and the distribution of the risk sensitivity parameter.
Nonetheless, the EFRC always has certain properties that are general for all problems.
Furthermore, it can be shown that there is a relation between the shape of the EFRC and
the distribution of 𝛾, which can shed light on the solution of the equilibrium route choice
problem.
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Proposition 5.1 (monotonicity). The EFRC, 𝑡(𝑠), is a non-increasing function of 𝑠 (See
Proposition 2.1 for proof).

Proposition 5.2 (convexity). The EFRC, 𝑡(𝑠), is a convex function of 𝑠 (See Proposition
2.2 for proof).

Proposition 5.3 (geometric constraint). When there are an infinite number of routes and a
continuous distribution of 𝛾 , the slope of the EFRC at its intersection with route 𝑖 is
𝑚𝑖 = 𝜕𝑡(𝑠𝑖 )/ ∂si = −𝛾𝑝 for the users choosing this route as illustrated in Figure 5.3

Proof. In the equilibrium condition all the users choose the route with least disutility. If
there are an infinite number of routes so that the disutility is continuous and differentiable
across all 𝑠𝑖 , the first derivative of the disutility for demand group 𝑝 with respect to 𝑥𝑖𝑝
should be equal to zero.
𝑝

𝜕𝐷𝑈𝑖
𝑝
𝜕𝑥𝑖

𝑝

=

𝜕𝐷𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑠𝑖

𝜕𝑠

∙ 𝜕𝑥 𝑝𝑖 = 0

(5.6)

𝑖

By substituting the definition of the disutility (5.1) into the equation (5.6), we may rewrite
this equation as below:
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𝜕𝑠𝑖

𝑝

𝜕𝑥𝑖

𝜕𝑡(𝑠𝑖 )

(

𝜕𝑠𝑖

+ 𝛾𝑝 ) = 0

(5.7)

Knowing that 𝑠𝑖 strictly increases with 𝑥𝑖𝑝 , the slope of the EFRC at its intersection with
route 𝑖, 𝑚𝑖 , chosen by group 𝑝, can be determined as follows:

𝑚𝑖 =

𝜕𝑡(𝑠𝑖 )
𝜕𝑠𝑖

= −𝛾𝑝

(5.8)
∎

Corollary 5.1 (assignment order). If routes are labeled in an increasing order of their
equilibrium standard deviation of travel times, the demand fills the routes in a decreasing
order of the risk sensitivity. The decreasing monotonicity property (Proposition 5.1)
preserves the order of 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖 , so the expected travel time will be in decreasing order
because the slope is always non-positive. The convexity property (Proposition 5.2) ensures
that the negative slope is increasing (i.e., becoming less steep). Then, the geometric
constraint (Proposition 5.3) implies that the assignment starts with the greatest 𝛾, where
the negative slope is steepest, and progresses sequentially to the lowest 𝛾, where the slope
is flattest.
Now that the general properties of the EFRC is demonstrated using the differentiable
efficient frontier, we may relax the simplifying assumptions to extend the results to the
realistic case of the piecewise linear efficient frontier.
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5.2.2 Piecewise Linear Efficient Frontier of the Route Choice
In urban transportation networks, there are a finite number of routes, n, connecting the
origin-destination pairs for the travel demand with either a discrete or continuous
distribution of 𝛾 values. In this case, EFRC, as the convex hull of the equilibrium route
choice sets of the heterogeneous users in the 𝑠 − 𝑡 plane, becomes a piecewise linear curve
with similar properties to the differentiable case, as illustrated in the Figure 5.4, the
performance of the routes is plotted by the straight dashed lines, which are simplified for
the illustration, and the results hold for general relationships between 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑠𝑖 . The
piecewise linear EFRC is depicted by the continuous curve. Proposition 5.1 and
Proposition 5.2 still hold as stated in Section 5.2, while Proposition 5.3 must be adapted
for discrete and continuous distribution of 𝛾 in the following sections.
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Figure 5.4. Piecewise linear EFRC for finite number of routes and discrete distribution of 𝛾

Proposition 5.4 (geometric constraint). For 𝑛 routes that are labeled sequentially in order
of increasing order of standard deviation of equilibrium travel time 𝑠𝑖 , route 𝑖 has the
lowest disutility for the user with risk sensitivity 𝛾𝑝 if and only if −𝛾𝑝 falls between the
slopes of the EFRC at its intersection with route 𝑖. The first and the last routes are just
bounded from one side.

𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 ↔

𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 ≥ −𝛾𝑝
, 𝑖=1
{𝑚𝑖−1,𝑖 ≤ −𝛾𝑝 ≤ 𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 , 1 < 𝑖 < 𝑛
𝑚𝑖−1,𝑖 ≤ −𝛾𝑝
, 𝑖=𝑛

(5.9)

where, mi,j denotes the slope the piece of the equilibrium EFRC between routes 𝑖 and 𝑗, and
𝑃𝑖 denotes the set of sensitivity groups that choose route 𝑖.
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Proof. Since the piecewise EFRC is not differentiable, we make use the fundamental
concept of the minimum disutility in route choice. It follows from the complementary
conditions (5.2) and (5.3) that a traveler with risk sensitivity 𝛾𝑝 chooses route 𝑖, if and only
if, route 𝑖 offers a lower generalized cost than any other route 𝑗.

𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 ↔

𝑝

𝑝

𝐷𝑈𝑖 ≤ 𝐷𝑈𝑗

, 1≤𝑗≤𝑛

(5.10)

The disutility of route 𝑖 and route 𝑗 for users with the sensitivity 𝛾𝑝 can be substituted with
the definition from (5.1), to obtain the condition below:

𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 ↔

𝑡(𝑠𝑖 ) + 𝛾𝑝 𝑠𝑖 ≤ 𝑡(𝑠𝑗 ) + 𝛾𝑝 𝑠𝑗 ,

1<𝑗<𝑛

(5.11)

By the solving the inequality for 𝛾𝑝 , we get two cases, depending on whether 𝑗 is greater
than or less than 𝑖:
−𝛾𝑝 ≤
−𝛾𝑝 ≥

𝑡(𝑠𝑗 )−𝑡(𝑠𝑖 )
𝑠𝑗 −𝑠𝑖
𝑡(𝑠𝑖 )−𝑡(𝑠𝑗 )
𝑠𝑖 −𝑠𝑗
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,

𝑗>𝑖

(5.12)

,

𝑗<𝑖

(5.13)

The right side of (5.12) and (5.13) represent the slope connecting points 𝑖 and 𝑗. For the
route 𝑖 − 1 and route 𝑖 + 1, expression (5.11) can be rewritten using (5.12) and (5.13) as
follows:

𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 ↔

𝑡(𝑠𝑖 )−𝑡(𝑠𝑖−1 )
𝑠𝑖 −𝑠𝑖−1

≤ −𝛾𝑝 ≤

𝑡(𝑠𝑖+1 )− 𝑡(𝑠𝑖 )
𝑠𝑖+1 −𝑠𝑖

,

1<𝑖<𝑛

(5.14)

According to the definition of the slope of the piecewise EFRC, the following result can be
concluded.
𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 ↔

𝑚𝑖−1,𝑖 ≤ −𝛾𝑝 ≤ 𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 ,

1<𝑖<𝑛

(5.15)

For the first and the last route, condition (5.13) can be modified as below:

𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 ↔

{

𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 ≥ −𝛾𝑝 , 𝑖 = 1
𝑚𝑖−1,𝑖 ≤ −𝛾𝑝 , 𝑖 = 𝑛

(5.16)

because the slopes at the edge are bounded from only one side. ∎

Corollary 5.2 (general geometric constraint). Considering the convexity property of the
EFRC, condition (5.25) can be generalized as below:
𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 ↔

𝑚1,2 ≤ 𝑚2,3 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑚𝑖−1,𝑖 ≤ −𝛾𝑝 ≤ 𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑚𝑛−2,𝑛−1 ≤ 𝑚𝑛−1,𝑛
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(5.17)

Corollary 5.3 (assignment order). Similar to Corollary 5.1 for the differentiable EFRC, by
keeping the routes in order of increasing standard deviation at the equilibrium condition,
and combining Propositions 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4, demand groups should be assigned to the
routes in a decreasing order of their sensitivity to the risk at equilibrium.

Corollary 5.4a (dual geometric constraint discrete case). Constraint (5.9) holds for all the
groups choosing 2 consecutive routes, if the slope of the piece of the EFRC between these
routes will be higher than −γp of all groups choosing the first route and also lower than all
−γp of the of the groups choosing the second route, and vice versa. Accordingly, condition
(5.9) holds for all routes and groups if and only if the condition (5.18) holds for all the
routes.
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝜖𝑃𝑖 {−𝛾𝑝 } ≤ 𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 ≤ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑝𝜖𝑃𝑖+1 {−𝛾𝑝 }

(5.18)

In the case that the travel demand of the users is considered to have a continuous
distribution of 𝛾 values, the piecewise linear EFRC will hold the same characteristics
presented in Proposition 5.4 as well as Corollaries 2 and 3. Corollary 5.4a, however, can
be simplified owing to the continuous nature of the 𝛾 distribution.
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Corollary 5.4b (dual geometric constraint continuous case). Constraint (5.9) holds for the
𝛾-range of the travelers choosing 2 consecutive routes, if the slope of the piece of the EFRC
between these routes will be higher than −𝛾𝑝 of all users choosing the first route and also
lower than all −𝛾𝑝 of the of the users choosing the second route, and vice versa. As it is
illustrated in the Figure 5.5a for a hypothetical continuous distribution of the 𝛾 values, the
upper and lower bounds of 𝑚𝑖,i+1 in condition (5.18) will be equal to the same value, we
name −𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 . Accordingly, condition (5.9) holds for all routes and users if and only if
condition (5.19) holds for all the routes as illustrated in Figure 5.5b.
𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 = 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝜖𝑃𝑖 {−𝛾𝑝 } = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑝𝜖𝑃𝑖+1 {−𝛾𝑝 } = −𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1

(a) Route choice of a traffic demand with
continuous distribution of 𝛾

(5.19)

(b) Piecewise linear EFRC for the continuous
distribution of 𝛾

Figure 5.5. The EFRC of a continuous distribution of 𝛾
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In Figure 5.5a, the continuous curve illustrates a hypothetical probability distribution of 𝛾
values, and the vertical straight lines split this distribution between the routes in a
decreasing order of the risk sensitivity, according to the Corollary 5.3. As a result, the share
of each route from the total demand can be represented by the area bounded between these
lines, under the distribution curve. In the equilibrium condition, such assignment of
demand results in a monotonically decreasing and convex EFRC, with the segment slope
between each two consecutive routes i and i+1 equal to −𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 , as indicated in the Figure
5.5b.

Corollary 5.5. As a direct result of Corollary 5.4a, the demand of group 𝑝 splits between
two or more routes if and only if the slope of the EFRC between these routes is −𝛾𝑝 . It can
be equivalently interpreted as the same generalized cost for these users.
𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 = ⋯ = 𝑚𝑗−1,𝑗 = 𝑚𝑖,𝑗 = −𝛾𝑝 ↔
𝑗

⋂𝑘=𝑖 𝑃𝑘 = {𝑝} 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑝 ∉ (⋃ 𝑘<𝑖 𝑃𝑘 ) ⋃ (⋃𝑘>𝑗 𝑃𝑘 )

(5.20)

Corollary 5.6. Following from Corollary 5.5, each subset of routes can have at most one
group in common which splits between those routes such that condition (5.20) holds,
because the split group must have a 𝛾𝑝 = −𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 for each consecutive pair of routes.

167

The piecewise EFRC represents the equilibrium solution of the proposed traffic
assignment problem. Thus, its primary properties can be employed in a mathematical
formulation of the problem.

5.3 Mathematical Formulation
The traffic assignment model proposed in this part of the research considers the
heterogeneity of risk sensitivity among users while there is an inherent variation associated
with route travel times. The tendency of users to minimize their own general travel costs
eventually end in an equilibrium condition, which can be represented by the EFRC. The
EFRC has specific properties that can be employed to formulate the traffic assignment
problem, and the equilibrium solution of the problem can be derived as a feasible solution
that satisfies these properties. These properties can be included as a set of constraints in
the mathematical formulation. It is also worth noting that all of the properties of the EFRC
are directly derived from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker complementary conditions (5.2) and
(5.3). Accordingly, the existence and uniqueness of the solution of the proposed problem
can be verified.
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5.3.1 General Mathematical Problem
Keeping the assumption that demand groups are labeled in decreasing order of their
sensitivity to risk, the results of the Corollaries 3, 4a, and 5 can be adapted to formulate the
traffic assignment problem with a discrete distribution of demand as below:
𝑥𝑖𝑝 𝑥𝑗𝑝+1 (𝑚𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛾𝑝 ) ≥ 0

,

∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑝

(5.21)

𝑥𝑖𝑝 𝑥𝑗𝑝+1 (𝑚𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛾𝑝+1 ) ≤ 0

,

∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑝

(5.22)

𝑥𝑖𝑝 𝑥𝑗𝑝 (𝑚𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛾𝑝 ) = 0

,

∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑝

(5.23)

𝑥𝑖𝑝 𝑥𝑗𝑝+1 (𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗 ) ≤ 0

,

∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑝

(5.24)

∑𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑝 = 𝑑𝑝

,

∀𝑝

(5.25)

∑𝑝𝜖𝑃𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑝 = 𝑥𝑖

,

∀𝑖

(5.26)

,

∀𝑖, 𝑗

(5.27)

,

∀𝑖, 𝑝

(5.28)

𝑚𝑖,𝑗 =

𝑡(𝑠𝑖 )−𝑡(𝑠𝑗 )
𝑠𝑖 −𝑠𝑗

𝑥𝑖𝑝 ≥ 0

In this mathematical problem, constraints (5.21) and (5.22) restrict the slopes of each
segment of the EFRC to its upper and lower bounds in accordance with Corollary 5.4a.
These constraints allow 𝑥𝑖𝑝 , 𝑥𝑗𝑝+1 > 0 if and only if the slope of the slope of segment
(𝑖, 𝑗) of the EFRC falls between negative values of risk sensitivity of groups 𝑝 and +1,
−𝛾𝑝 ≤ 𝑚𝑖,𝑗 ≤ −𝛾𝑝+1 . Equation (5.23) also determines the slope of the EFRC when the
demand of one group splits between two or more routes, on the basis of Corollary 5.5.
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Corollary 5.3 is also included by the constraint (5.24) which ensures that demand groups
fill the routes in a decreasing order. The set of constraints (5.21) through (5.24) guarantees
the primary properties of the EFRC in the equilibrium condition (see Propositions 5.1, 5.2,
and 5.4). Moreover, equation (5.25) also assures the conservation of flow in the network.
In addition to these constraints, which reflect the properties of the solution, there are a
couple of definitions included in the model. Equation (5.26) defines the route flow as the
summation of flows of different groups in that route. The geometric slope of each segment
of the EFRC is also defined by equation (5.27). Lastly, a non-negativity constraint is
included by inequality (5.28).
For a continuous distribution of 𝛾 values, a similar traffic assignment problem can be
formulated by adapting Corollaries 3 and 4b to split the continuous distribution of the
demand between the routes as follows:
𝛿𝑖,𝑗 (𝑚𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖𝑈 ) = 0

,

∀𝑖, 𝑗

(5.29)

𝛿𝑖,𝑗 (𝛾𝑖𝑈 − 𝛾𝑗𝐿 ) = 0

,

∀𝑖, 𝑗

(5.30)

∑𝑖,𝑗 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑛 − 1

(5.31)

(𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗 )(𝛾𝑖𝑈 − 𝛾𝑗𝑈 ) ≤ 0

,

∀𝑖, 𝑗

(5.32)

∑𝑖(𝐹𝛾 (𝛾𝑖𝑈 ) − 𝐹𝛾 (𝛾𝑖𝐿 )) = 1

,

∀𝑖

(5.33)

(𝛾𝑖𝑈 − 𝛾𝑗𝑈 )(𝛾𝑖𝐿 − 𝛾𝑗𝐿 ) ≥ 0

,

∀𝑖, 𝑗

(5.34)

(𝐹𝛾 (𝛾𝑖𝑈 ) − 𝐹𝛾 (𝛾𝑖𝐿 )) 𝐷 = 𝑥𝑖

,

∀𝑖

(5.35)
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𝛿𝑖,𝑗 ∈ {0,1}

,

∀𝑖, 𝑗

(5.36)

𝛾𝑖𝑈 ≥ 𝛾𝑗𝐿 ≥ 0

,

∀𝑖

(5.37)

In this formulation of the problem, constraints (5.29), (5.30), and (5.31) determine the
slopes of the EFRC segments according to the Corollary 5.4b, where 𝛾𝑖𝐿 and 𝛾𝑖𝑈 are the
decision variables of the problem and respectively represent the lower and upper bounds
of the share of route i from the continuous distribution of 𝛾. In this set of constraints,
equation (5.29) makes sure that if routes i and j are next to each other in the s-t plane, the
slope of the EFRC segment between them, mi,j, is exactly equal to the upper and lower
bounds of the shares for routes i and j, which are equal in the equilibrium condition as
illustrated in the Figure 5.5a. Constraints (5.30) and (5.31) also define the value of the
dummy variable 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 by setting its value equal to 1 if routes i and j are right next to each
other such that 𝛾𝑖𝑈 = 𝛾𝑗𝐿 = 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ; otherwise, 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 remains zero (See condition (5.19)).
Constraint (5.32) also assures that the travel demand of the heterogeneous users fill the
routes in a decreasing order of 𝛾 to reflect the Corollary 5.3. As a result, the primary
characteristics of the EFRC in the equilibrium condition (See Propositions (5.1), (5.2), and
(5.4)) are covered by constraints (5.29) through (5.32). In addition, constraint (5.33)
guarantees the flow conservation of the demand by restricting the summation of route
shares to 1, while constraint (5.34) makes sure that their shares will not overlap (See Fig 6
where, 𝐹𝛾 (∙) denotes the cumulative distribution function of 𝛾. Equation (5.35) also defines
171

the route flows, in which D is the tot

al travel demand of the users. Finally, 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 is defined

as dummy variable in the constraint (5.36), while the non-negativity constraint (5.37) sets
the upper bound of the share of each route higher than its lower bound. In this problem,
definition of the slopes of the EFRC segments is the same as the equation (5.27).

5.3.2 Two-Stage Formulation
The mathematical formulation of the problem presented in Section 5.3.1 can be simplified
in the case that the order of the routes is known. Accordingly, the problem can be
formulated as a two-stage model for which the upper stage problem is to put the routes in
an increasing order of their standard deviation of the travel times, in a
ccordance with the Corollary 5.3. Given the order of the routes for a discrete distribution
of 𝛾, the lower stage problem splits the distribution of the demand between the routes such
that the equilibrium solution meets the primary properties of the EFRC as below.

𝑥𝑖𝑝 (𝑚𝑖−1,𝑖 + 𝛾𝑝 ) ≤ 0

,

∀𝑖, 𝑝

(5.38)

𝑥𝑖𝑝 (𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 + 𝛾𝑝 ) ≥ 0

,

∀𝑖, 𝑝

(5.39)

𝑚𝑖−1,𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1

,

∀𝑖

(5.40)

∑𝑝𝜖𝑃𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑝 = 𝑥𝑖

,

∀𝑖

(5.41)

∑𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑝 = 𝑑𝑝

,

∀𝑝

(5.42)

𝑥𝑖𝑝 ≥ 0

,

∀𝑖, 𝑝

(5.43)
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Constraints (5.38) and (5.39) again determine the boundaries of the slope of each
segment of the EFRC on the basis of Corollary 5.4a. It is worth pointing out that there is
no need to add a separate constraint to include Corollary 5.5 in this formulation of the
problem, because it is redundant to the first two constraints. Constraint (5.24) also can be
replaced by constraint (5.40) which directly represents the Proposition 5.2. The
conservation of demand constraint is guaranteed by the equation (5.41). Constraint (5.42)
also defines the route flows. Finally, inequality (5.43) represents the non-negativity
constraint. In this problem, the slope of the segments of the EFRC, 𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 , is defined
according to equation (5.26), where j=i+1.
The lower stage problem can be significantly simplified by considering a continuous
distribution for 𝛾 values over the travel demand of the users as follows:

𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 = 0

,

∀𝑖

(5.44)

𝛾𝑖−1,𝑖 ≥ 𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 ≥ 0

,

∀𝑖

(5.45)

(𝐹𝛾 (𝛾𝑖−1,𝑖 ) − 𝐹𝛾 (𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 )) 𝐷 = 𝑥𝑖 ,

∀𝑖

(5.46)

Here, constraint (5.44) reflects Corollary 5.4b by determining the slopes of the EFRC
segments according to condition (5.19) as illustrated in Fig 6. Here, routes are presumed to
be labeled in an increasing order of their travel time standard deviations, so the nonnegativity constraint (5.45) assures that the continuous distribution of demand fills these
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routes in a decreasing order of 𝛾 according to the Corollary 5.3. As a result, we may
𝑈
substitute 𝛾𝑖+1
and 𝛾𝑖𝐿 with their equivalent value 𝛾𝑖−1,𝑖 as the decision variable of the
𝑈
problem, according to the condition (5.19), where 𝛾𝑖+1
= 𝛾𝑖𝐿 = 𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 . In this formulation

of the problem, constraints (5.44) and (5.45) fulfill all the primary properties of the
piecewise linear EFRC demonstrated in Propositions (5.1), (5.2), and (5.4). Additionally,
equation (5.46) assigns the routes their shares of the total demand (See Fig 6).
This formulation of the problem is of great importance for proposing a solution
algorithm for this problem, since there exists a variety of different algorithms that can
efficiently relabel the routes in an increasing order of the standard deviation of their travel
times. In practice, we just need to solve this simplified version of the problem. On this
basis, the next section proposes an efficient solution algorithm for this bi-objective route
choice problem.

5.4 Solution Algorithm
The convex combination method that can be used for solving the multi-objective problems
typically involves finding the best “movement directions” and optimizing the “movement
steps” in each iteration, for each demand group separately (Dial, 1996). Consequently, the
efficiency of the method clearly declines as the number of the sensitivity groups increases
up to the point the distribution of 𝛾 can be considered continuous over the population of
the travelers. However, the specific properties of the EFRC can be employed to design a
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more efficient solution algorithm to solve this bi-objective traffic assignment problem
when γ is continuously distributed.
We now propose a bi-stage algorithm which can solve the route choice problem by
building the EFRC for both continuous and discrete distribution of demand. The upper
stage algorithm labels the routes in increasing order of the standard deviations of their travel
times, while the lower stage algorithm iterates to build the EFRC using its known
characteristics, given the order of the routes. Whenever building the EFRC requires an
alteration in the order of the routes, the algorithm returns back to the upper stage algorithm
for label rearrangement, then the lower stage algorithm starts constructing the EFRC for
the updated order of the routes. In this way, the proposed algorithm simply iterates over
the paths to modify the assignment of the heterogeneous demand according to the insights
from the properties of the EFRC until all of the equilibrium conditions are met.
Consequently, more extensive heterogeneity of the demand may require a higher number
of iterations over the paths before equilibrium is achieved. However, the heterogeneity of
the demand does not complicate the assignment modification procedure of the algorithm
as its steps remain the same for any number of demand sensitivity groups. This property of
the proposed algorithm can be viewed as an advantage over other solution methods, like
convex combination, that require finding the best directions and optimal movement step
sizes for all the demand sensitivity groups one by one. Notice as well that there exists only
one feasible order of the routes in which the unique EFRC can be rebuilt by the solution
algorithm, so the equilibrium is identified when conditions (5.38) through (5.43) or (5.44)
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through (5.46) are met for discrete or continuous distribution of 𝛾, respectively. It is also
worth pointing out here that whether the 𝛾 values follow a discrete or continuous
distribution does not change the general procedure of the solution algorithm; however, the
steps of the lower stage algorithm should be adapted accordingly. The main steps of this
solution algorithm for both discrete and continuous distributions of 𝛾 are summarized in
the flowchart of Figure 5.6.
This method starts with a feasible initial solution for the problem. Then it alternates
between the upper stage and lower stage algorithms until the convergence criterion is met.

5.4.1 Initialization
The initial solution to the route choice can be any feasible distribution of the demand
between the routes. However, the properties of the EFRC shed light on the general form of
the solution which can be used to define an appropriate initial condition to reduce the
number of iterations needed to converge. In this case, the algorithm starts with a
monotonically decreasing and convex EFRC in which the groups are assigned to the routes
in a decreasing order of their risk sensitivity. In this respect, the steps of the proposed
initialization method are listed as below:

Step 0. For a discrete distribution of 𝛾, label the demand groups in decreasing order by
their sensitivity to risk. For a continuous distribution of 𝛾 demand is in decreasing order by
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definition. In addition, label the routes in an increasing order of standard deviations of their
travel times when there is no flow in the routes.

Step 1. Assign an initial feasible assignment of demand to each route. Although any
feasible assignment of traffic flows may be used, a good starting point is to identify the
equilibrium for a homogeneous population in which all users’ risk sensitivity is equal to
the population average ( 𝛾𝑎𝑣𝑔 ). By making the population homogeneous, the traffic
assignment problem becomes a conventional user equilibrium problem, which can be
solved using any available method. As a result, the initial EFRC can be depicted as a
straight line with a negative slope in the s-t plane which meets both monotonicity and
convexity constraints (see the Propositions 5.1 and 5.2).

Step 2. Split the demand between the routes in a decreasing order, as explained in Corollary
5.3, such that the aggregate flows become equal to the initial flows derived in Step 1.

The result can be used as an initial condition for the upper stage problem.
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5.4.2 The Upper Stage Algorithm
The upper stage algorithm is designed to heuristically label the routes according to the reordering of the routes by increasing standard deviation of travel time after updates in route
flows. The algorithm steps are summarized as follows:

Step 0. Label the routes in an increasing order of their updated standard deviations. To
keep the new labels in order, it is necessary that the total flow on each route remains
constant. So, the demand should be reassigned to the routes in accordance with the
Corollary 5.3 such that the new assignment results in same total flows on each route but
with the new order of the routes.

Step 1. Update the expected travel time and the standard deviation of the routes.

As a result of the upper stage algorithm, the monotonicity condition is met (Proposition
5.1), while the demand groups are assigned in a decreasing order (Corollary 5.3). Since
routes are labeled based on a new order, their travel time expectations and standard
deviations should be updated accordingly. The lower stage algorithm also uses this travel
time information to check and analytically modify the assignment to satisfy the geometric
constraint (Corollary 5.4a or 4b).
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Start

Initialization
Upper stage algorithm
Step 0

Label the routes
Step 1

Update s , t(s )

Lower stage algorithm
Step 0

Update the queue of the routes
i : Next route in the queue

Step 1

Compare the m i,i+1 with:
(D) its UB and LB
(C)
-γ i,i+1
Case I
(D) LB ≤m i,i+1 ≤ UB
(C) m i,i+1 = -γ i-1,i

(D)
(C)

Case II
m i,i+1 > UB
m i,i+1 > -γ i,i+1

(D)
(C)

Case III
m i,i+1 < LB
m i,i+1 < -γ i,i+1

Step 2

Modify the traffic assigmnet (See Fig. 8)

Does

Yes

order of routes
change?
No
Case I

No

OR x i+1 = 0
OR x i = 0

Yes
Update s , t(s )

Step 3

Move route i to the end of the queue

No
Converge ?

Yes
End

Figure 5.6. Flowchart representation of the heuristic algorithm for discrete (D) and continuous (C)
distributions of 𝛾
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5.4.3 The Lower Stage Algorithm
The lower stage problem first checks that the current traffic assignment satisfies the
geometric condition, route by route. If not, it iterates to analytically modify the assignment
by systematically shifting the splits of the demand between the routes according to the
properties of the EFRC. If such a change causes a swap in the route orders because
standard deviation of two routes swap order, the algorithm diverts the iteration to the upper
stage algorithm. The fundamental procedure of the lower stage algorithm is similar for
both discrete and continuous distributions of the 𝛾 values; however, some minor
adaptations on the details of the algorithm should be made accordingly. The steps of the
lower stage algorithm for both discrete (D) and continuous (C) distributions are listed
below:

Step 0. Put the routes in a queue in order of their current labels, then select the first route
in the queue to evaluate the slope of the corresponding segment of the EFRC.

Step 1. Compare the slope of the selected segment of the EFRC with:
(D) the lower and upper bounds defined by condition (5.18).
(C) the split point that routes 𝑖 and 𝑖 + 1 share on a continuous 𝛾 distribution, 𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 ,
defined by condition (5.19).
Three cases are possible:
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Case I.
(D) The selected slope falls between its lower and upper bounds,
(C) The selected slope equals to 𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 ,
which means the current assignment in this route needs no further modification in this
iteration. Go to Step 3.

It is also worth pointing out that Case I also includes the condition route 𝑖 + 1 drops
exactly on top of point 𝑖 in the 𝑠 − 𝑡 plane, which indeed cause the segment (𝑖, 𝑖 + 1) get
eliminated from EFRC , and obviously 𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 becomes indeterminate.

Case II.
(D) The slope is higher than the upper bound.
(C) The slope is higher than 𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 .
In this case, the assignment should be modified to reduce the slope up to the point that it
comes to the Case I. Go to Step 2.

Case III.
(D) The slope is less than the lower bound.
(C) The slope is less than 𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 .
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So the slope should be increased by modifying the assignment such that the Case I occurs.
Go to Step 2.

Step 2. Start with modifying the assignment of the demand in Cases II and III as below:
(D) In Case II (Case III), shift the entire demand of the group with highest (lowest)
sensitivity to risk in route i+1 (route i) from this route to route i (route i+1) to decrease
(increase) the slope of the segment. Next, check if the slope of the segment exceeds its
new upper bound (drops below its new lower bound) and goes to the Case III (Case II).
In this condition, the demand of the last shifted group, q, should split between routes i and
i+1 such that 𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 = 𝛾𝑞 , and then check the order of the routes. Otherwise, just check
the order of the routes. The mechanism of shifting demand insightfully with the help of
the identified properties of the EFRC and with no need to incremental adjustments can
significantly improve the efficiency of the method in comparison to convex combination
methods that need to make the adjustments incrementally. Details of procedure of
modifying the assignment of the discrete demand are summarized in the flowchart of the
Figure 5.7a.

(C) In Case II (Case III), decrease (increase) 𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 up to the point that one of the following
conditions occurs: (5.1) 𝑚𝑖,𝑖+1 = −𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 ; (5.2) 𝛾𝑖+1,𝑖+2 = 𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 (𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 = 𝛾𝑖−1,𝑖 ), which
means that there is no flow left in the route i+1 (i) to transfer to route i (i+1). Given the
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cumulative distribution of 𝛾, 𝛾𝑖,𝑖+1 can be approximated for each couple of consecutive
routes in Case III by solving equation (5.19) for this sub-problem using available
analytical or numerical methods. Figure 5.7b graphically demonstrates the procedure of
modifying the assignment for a continuous distribution of demand.

The adjustment procedure for both discrete and continuous distributions of 𝛾 will be
terminated whenever the order of routes changes, in which case the algorithm returns to
the upper stage algorithm. However, if the adjustment procedure is accomplished with no
need to change in the order of the routes, check that one of the following conditions is met:
i) Condition of the Case I (See Step 1 of the lower stage algorithm).
ii) 𝑥𝑖+1 = 0 (𝑥𝑖 = 0) in the Case II (Case III).

If at least one of these conditions is met, the algorithm continues to the next step by
updating the expected travel times and standard deviations. Otherwise, it repeats the Step
2 again.
Step 3. Move the selected route to the end of the queue.

183

Modify the traffic assigmnet (D)
Case II

Case III

Shift demand of the group with
the highest γ in route i+1
from i+1 to i.

Shift demand of the group with
the lowest γ in route I
from i to i+1.

Case III:
m i,i+1 < LB

Last group should
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m i,i+1 = -γ q

Yes

No

Case II:
m i,i+1 > UB

No

(a)

Modify the traffic assigmnet (C)
Case II

Case III

Increase γ i,i+1 such that
m i,i+1 = -γ q

Decrease γ i,i+1 such that
m i,i+1 = -γ q

(b)
Figure 5.7. Flowchart representation of procedure of modifying the traffic assignment for a (a) discrete (b)
continuous distributions of 𝛾
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5.4.4 Convergence
In the equilibrium condition, no one will be able to reduce the generalized cost of the
trip by switching his/her route. In case of homogeneity in preferences of the users, all the
used routes should have the same generalized cost, while the more expensive routes remain
unused. Nonetheless, when there is a heterogeneity associated with preferences of the
users, different routes will have different cost for different users even in the equilibrium
condition, which makes it impossible to use this criterion for measuring the convergence
of the algorithm. Instead, we may consider the summation of the relative differences in the
generalized cost for users in different groups between two consecutive iterations as the
convergence measure of the algorithm. This procedure can be summarized in the following
steps:

Step 0. Calculate the total generalized cost for the distribution of demand.

Step 1. If the relative change in the total generalized cost of the last iteration in comparison
to the previous one meets the convergence criterion, then the equilibrium solution is
considered to be achieved. Otherwise, the next iteration will start from the lower stage
algorithm.
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5.5 Numerical Example
To provide a numerical example of the proposed solution method, we employ this
algorithm to solve a sample problem and compare its results with that of the convex
combination method. In this problem, the single origin-destination network is assumed to
be connected with 4 routes that have different travel time characteristics. The travel
demand is also classified into 4 sensitivity groups. Thus, both the high stage and low stage
algorithms are employed to estimate the equilibrium solution of the traffic assignment
problem for this single origin-destination network.
The communicating routes are assumed to provide a variety of different choices for the
users. For simplicity of presentation, we assume a linear relationship between the expected
travel time and its standard deviation for all the routes. We also assume that the standard
deviation of travel time increases linearly with the average flow (𝑥̅𝑖 ) in the route. Although
these linear relationships help simplify the presentation of this example, the proposed
algorithm is applicable for any increasing function. The following equations represent
these relationships for route i in this sample problem:
𝑡(𝑠𝑖 ) = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 . 𝑠𝑖

, 1<𝑖<4

(5.47)

𝑠𝑖 (𝑥̅𝑖 ) = 𝑐𝑖 . 𝑥̅𝑖

, 1<𝑖<4

(5.48)
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where the values of the parameters of these relations for this numerical example are
provided in Table 5.1. Travel demand is also assumed to have a discrete distribution of the
risk sensitivity parameter (𝛾) as presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.1. Parameters of the route travel time functions
Routes, 𝑖

Parameters
𝑎𝑖

𝑏𝑖

𝑐𝑖

1

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

3

4

3

1

4

3

4

1

Table 5.2. Distribution of demand
Group, 𝑝

Demand, 𝑥𝑝

𝛾𝑝

1

3

7

2

2

5

3

2

3

4

3.5

1

The proposed solution algorithm can solve the sample problem very fast. To initialize
the problem, it would be more efficient to use the solution of the equivalent user
equilibrium problem as the initial condition of the algorithm as explained in the Section
5.4.1. Nonetheless, in this example, we skip this optional step to show the efficiency of the
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method in solving such problems. So, here we start with the initial condition of demand
groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 each using the routes 1, 2, 4, and 3, respectively. The initial solution
can be wisely chosen based on the general properties of the equilibrium solution instead of
a random solution. Then, the proposed algorithm modifies the assignment iteratively using
the insights directly derived from general properties of the EFRC, and with no need to find
the cheapest paths for each sensitivity group. As a result, the proposed method can
approach to the convergence measure of 0.003% and estimate the equilibrium flows with
precision of 0.01 in just 24 iterations, while the comparable solution with the same level of
precision requires at least 2636 iterations of an iterative assignment method with variable
smoothing factor (See Fisk, 1980; Patriksson, 1994). Figure 5.8a, b compares variations of
the route flows in the first 24 iterations of these algorithms to indicate the efficiency of the
proposed method in solving this traffic assignment problem.
The route choice equilibrium for the numerical example is illustrated by the EFRC in
Figure 5.9. The increasing straight dashed lines represent the performance of the routes in
the sample network. The equilibrium expected travel times and the standard deviations are
also provided in Figure 5.9. The monotone decreasing and convex EFRC is depicted by the
continuous line segments which have slopes as labeled in the legend. The equilibrium route
flows and the associated generalized cost for different groups are presented in Tables 5.3
and 5.4, respectively.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 5.8. Variations of route flows in the first 24 iterations of (a) the proposed solution algorithm (b)
iterative method with variable smoothing factor
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Figure 5.9 . The EFRC of the sample problem

𝑝

Table 5.3. Equilibrium route flows, 𝑥𝑖 , of different groups in the sample network
Group, 𝑝

Route, 𝑖
1

2

1
2

0.86

3

2.00

4
Total, 𝑥𝑖

Total, 𝑥𝑝
3

4

0.98

2.02

1.14

2.00
2.00

3.50
2.86

3.00

3.50

3.50

2.12
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2.02

10.50

𝑝

Table 5.4. Equilibrium route disutilities for different groups, 𝐷𝑈𝑖 , in the sample network
Group, 𝑝

Route, 𝑖

Minimum,

1

2

3

4

𝜆𝑝

1

26.7

30.0

25.2

25.2

25.2

2

21.0

23.0

21.0

21.2

21.0

3

15.3

16.0

16.7

17.1

15.3

4

9.6

9.0

12.5

13.1

9.0

In this example, route 4 is the least risky route in the equilibrium condition. Routes 4
and 3 both offers the same lowest travel cost to the users in group 1, who are the most
conservative demand group with risk sensitivity of 𝛾1 = 7. Consequently, the demand of
group 1 splits between routes 4 and 3, and the slope of this segment of the EFRC is 𝑚4,3 =
−7. Indeed, this slope coincides with the result of Corollary 5.5. Similarly, routes 3 and 1
have the lowest generalized cost for the users in the group 2 with 𝛾2 = 5, so the demand of
this group is split between routes 3 and 1 resulting in slope 𝑚3,1 = −5 for this segment of
the EFRC. However, more risk seeking users of groups 3 and 4 choose routes 1 and 2 with
lower expected travel times, in spite of higher associated variability. Thus, the slope of
EFRC between routes 1 and 2, meets the lower bound of −3 and the upper bound of −1,
in accordance with constraint (5.18). It is worth pointing out that in the equilibrium
condition, the demand groups fill the routes in a decreasing order of their risk sensitivity
as explained in Corollary 5.3, while no subset of routes shares more than one group, as
claimed in Corollary 5.6.
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5.6 Extensions
5.6.1 Network with Multiple Origin-Destination Pairs
The solution method proposed in this research is designed to solve the route choice problem
for a single origin-destination network. Nonetheless, it can be adapted to solve the multiple
origin-destination network as well. Nagurney (2013) presents two general equilibration
algorithms which employ single origin-destination algorithms to solve multiple origindestination problems. The equilibration algorithms are developed based on the relaxation
method by reformulating the multiple origin-destination network into the series of single
origin-destination pairs. Accordingly, these equilibration algorithms can be modified to use
the proposed solution method to solve its single origin-destination sub-problems. In this
framework, the equilibration algorithms iterate over the origin-destination pairs one by one
to achieve the equilibrium. The first equilibration algorithm proceeds to the next origindestination pair by accomplishing a single iteration of the proposed method, and so on,
until the equilibration algorithm converges. In each iteration of this equilibration algorithm,
it considers one of the single origin-destination pairs as a sub-problem and executes just a
single iteration of the proposed solution method for this sub-problem. Although the
equilibrium may not be achieved yet for this origin-destination pair, it will pick the next
pairs over and over again until the convergence criteria are met for the origin-destination
pairs. In this case, the EFRCs of the origin-destination pairs will be convex and
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decreasingly monotone, while the geometric constraints are also met. In contrast, the
second equilibration algorithm continues the iterations on the same origin-destination pair
until the sub-problem equilibrium is achieved before proceeding to the next origindestination pair. After the convergence criterion of the sub-problem is met, it will pick the
next origin-destination pair to reassign its demand, and this procedure repeats for all the
origin-destination pairs, until the equilibrium is achieved for all of them. In spite of the
capability of both the equilibration algorithms in solving the multiple origin-destination
problem, the first algorithm may solve the multiple origin-destination problem faster using
the proposed method, since it recognizes the dependency of the solution of the origindestination pairs to each other.

5.6.2 Mode Choice Problem
In addition to route choice, users may also be able to travel by another mode of transport.
Travelers may consider the same aspects of the travel costs in comparing modes. In this
respect, using a transit system is associated with an expected travel time and some variation
of waiting time or in-vehicle travel time. Users with heterogeneous preferences regarding
travel time risk assess the available modes and routes together in their decision making
process. As a result, the share of demand that select alternative modes can be determined
by including the mode choice in the proposed traffic assignment model. Figure 5.10
provides an illustration of a transit mode that operates independently of the traffic network
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and is represented by a fixed point in the in the s-t plane. Alternatively, the proposed model
and solution method remain applicable for any given relationship representing the transit
mode.
In the Figure 5.10, the transit mode is assumed to have a fixed expected travel time
while there is risk associated with the waiting time. Therefore, the transit mode will remain
unused if it can be dominated by alternative routes. Otherwise, the efficient frontier of the
mode and route choices will include the transit mode, which determines its share from the
travel demand in the equilibrium condition.

Figure 5.10. The efficient frontier of the mode and route choices
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5.6.3 General Efficient Frontier of Choices
The concept of the efficient frontier can be extended to include multiple factors in the
disutility function in modeling the general decision making process for heterogeneous
users. Considering the relationships between the properties of each known choice, the
general efficient frontier, as the equilibrium solution of the choice problem, can be defined
as the set of dominant choices in a multidimensional coordinate system. The general
efficient frontier is expected to have the equivalent properties which can be used in
modeling

and

solving

the

multi-objective

optimization

problems.

However,

multidimensionality of the problem naturally complicates the problem as well.

5.7 Summary
In a transportation network, users seek the route with the lowest generalized cost for their
travel. In this respect, the route disutility can be presumed to be a linear combination of the
expected travel time and its standard deviation, which can be estimated by users based on
their previous experiences. The importance of the travel time variability for users can be
described by how much they value travel time reliability relative to expected travel time.
To include the effect of heterogeneity of user preferences, the risk sensitivity can be
considered to have a probability distribution over the traveling population.
In this part of the research, our objective is to employ the concept of the efficient frontier
as a tool for solving a bi-objective route choice problem with heterogeneous user
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preferences. The analogy between the decision making procedures in a free market and a
transportation network makes it possible to borrow this concept from portfolio theory in
finance and adapt it for modeling the bi-objective traffic assignment problem in
transportation. In this framework, the equilibrium solution of the traffic assignment
problem is presented by the concept of the efficient frontier of route choice (EFRC).
The EFRC also demonstrates the route choice rank of the users with different sensitivities
to risk, which can be critical for predicting the effect of any prospective changes in network
on route choice behavior of the travelers. The specific properties of the EFRC can provide
intuitions regarding the characteristics of the equilibrium solution of the traffic assignment
problem. For one thing, it is shown that the EFRC is always monotonically decreasing and
convex. For another, there is a relationship between the distribution of the risk sensitivity
and shape of the EFRC. As a result, these properties are used to propose a mathematical
formulation of the route choice problem. On this basis, a two-stage solution algorithm is
also designed to solve the traffic assignment problem under travel time variability. The
proposed solution algorithm modifies the traffic assignment of the heterogeneous users
using the insights from the general characteristics of the EFRC with no need to incremental
modification of the traffic assignment. Thus, with a large number of sensitivity groups or
even a continuous distribution of sensitivity to travel time reliability among users does not
complicate the assignment modification procedure of the algorithm. As a result, the
proposed algorithm can efficiently solve the route choice problem under travel time
variability with heterogeneous demand.
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The result of a numerical example shows that the proposed solution algorithm can solve
the problem more efficiently than conventional methods. Although the numerical example
employs the solution method to solve a single origin-destination problem, it can be adapted
to solve a multiple origin-destination network as well. Furthermore, the efficient frontier
can also be used to model the joint modal split-route choice problem. The general concept
of the efficient frontier is an appropriate tool to model the general decision making
procedure when there is heterogeneity associated with the relative importance of the
parameters in the generalized cost function, such as the case when travelers face travel time
variability in addition to expected travel time when making route choice decisions.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS

6.1 Conclusions
There are variety of different decisions that a traveler needs to make for each of his/her
trips in the network, e.g. choosing starting time, destination, mode, and route of the trips.
In this respect, rational users seek choices that minimize the generalized cost of their trips.
Research shows that transportation network users consider different factors in their
decision-making procedure, while the relative importance of these factors may vary among
the heterogeneous travelers with different trip purposes. Under the realistic assumption that
the components of the cost associated with choices are increasing functions of the demand
for those choices, the cumulative result of the individual decisions of the rational users
eventually leads to the user equilibrium condition in which no one can reduce his/her cost
by changing his/her decision. In this research, we adapted the concept of the efficient
frontier from portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) in finance to represent the equilibrium
solution of the bicriterion choice problems. The efficient frontier is shown to always be a
non-increasing convex hull with a specific geometric property, determined by the
probability distribution of the preferences. Then, we employ the identified properties of the
efficient frontier to model the equilibrium condition of different choice problems in
transportation with heterogeneous user preferences.
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One of the important decisions that travelers need to make in the network is what time
to start their trips to keep their generalized costs minimized. This problem is first introduced
in Vickrey’s congestion theory, which addresses the commute problem of a single
bottleneck with a time-dependent demand and fixed capacity. Insufficient capacity of the
bottleneck to meet the time-dependent results in the formation of a queue, which causes
users to experience a combination of delay and schedule deviation in their commutes.
Rational users tend to minimize their own combination of cost by adjusting their arrival
times to the bottleneck. The cumulative result of the individual decisions of the commuters
would be the user equilibrium condition in the bottleneck in which no one can reduce
his/her cost by switching his/her arrival time to the bottleneck. In this part of the research,
we use the concept of the efficient frontier to propose an extension to the user equilibrium
model by accounting for the heterogeneity in the schedule penalty preferences of the
commuters. For that purpose, we make a use of properties of the efficient frontier to
propose an analytical model for the equilibrium arrival of the heterogeneous commuters to
the bottleneck, given the PDFs of their schedule penalty factors. On this basis, we propose
a dynamic pricing pattern that can optimize the system by avoiding the formation of the
queue in the bottleneck. In addition, we provide a demonstration on extracting the
independent probability distributions of the schedule penalty factors from a given joint
distribution. We also demonstrate how the proposed model can be inversely used to
approximate the schedule penalty preferences of the heterogeneous commuters from
empirical data derived by observing the arrival time of the users to the bottleneck.
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Although the proposed analytical solution is derived for a single bottleneck, the results
still can be extended for analyzing other transportation systems with limited capacity and
time-dependent demand. For one thing, we briefly explained that the proposed analytical
solution of the morning commute problem can be combined with the macroscopic network
model (Daganzo, 2007; Gonzales and Daganzo, 2012; Geroliminis and Daganzo, 2008) in
order to account for the heterogeneity of preferences of the users in modeling and
optimizing the network on an aggregate level. For another, we showed that a demand
responsive transit (DRT) service can be modeled as a queueing system, and then used the
proposed analytical solution of the morning commute problem to account for the
heterogeneity in preferences of the users in optimizing the operation of the DRT system.
DRT systems are a class of transit services in which a fleet of vehicles dynamically
changes routes and schedules in order to accommodate demand within a service area. A
DRT system naturally has flexibility in providing service, which allows it to adapt to
variations in the demand. This property of DRT makes it possible to eliminate the access
distance for transit users by providing a curb-to-curb trip. The inherent trade-off between
the operating cost and the quality of service of a DRT system necessitates optimizing the
operations to balance them. In this research, an analytical model based on Daganzo (1978)
is employed to approximate fleet size, VHT, and VMT of the DRT system. Accordingly,
the operating cost for the agency is estimated as a linear combination of these components.
The users are also subjected to costs of using the service. When the operating capacity of
the system is inadequate to cover the demand, users of the system incur costs of delay,
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earliness, and lateness. In this respect, we adapt Vickrey’s (1969) congestion theory to
model the DRT system, and approximate the delay, earliness, and lateness of the users in
the equilibrium condition. In addition, the total time that users spend in service can be
approximated using the analytical model from Daganzo (1978). As a result, the efficiency
of the DRT system can be optimized by minimizing the total cost for the agency and users,
where the operating capacity of the system or the number of waiting requests or both can
be considered as the decision variable(s) of the problem. This part of the research presents
optimizations for three scenarios: allowing only the operating capacity to change, allowing
both to change, or holding the fleet size fixed. In each scenario, the general problem with
an S-shaped wished curve is formulated mathematically. The analytical solution is
presented for the simplified case with an inverse Z-shaped wished curve. Two demand
management strategies are also presented to spread the requests uniformly over the peak
period in order to maintain an optimal number of waiting requests: (i) schedule
management strategy, and (ii) dynamic pricing strategy. The proposed analytical solution
of the morning commute problem is also employed to generalize the optimization method
and dynamic pricing strategy of the DRT system by accounting for the heterogeneity in the
schedule penalty preferences of the users.
Route choice is another important decision that users need to make in the network in
order to minimize the generalized cost of their trips. Conventional traffic assignment
models mostly simplify the generalized cost function to the travel time of the routes in the
network. However, the underlying assumption of homogenous travelers who can predict
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the exact travel times in the network has been also discussed in the literature. Research
shows that travelers are just able to estimate the average travel times and its associated
variations according to their previous experiences in the network. On this basis, a linear
combination of the expected and standard deviation of travel time is used to approximate
the travel cost of the users in a network under travel time variability. To account for the
heterogeneity in preferences of the travelers, we considered a probability distribution for
sensitivity of the user to risk in travel times. On this basis, we employed the concept of the
efficient frontier to model the route choice behavior of the heterogeneous users in a
network under travel time variability. The efficient frontier has specific characteristics that
can be used in formulating the traffic assignment problem as set of complementary
constraints. Under assumption that routes are labeled in an increasing order of the standard
deviation of their travel times in the equilibrium condition, the formulation of the problem
can be significantly simplified. Accordingly, we proposed a two-stage mathematical model
for this problem in which the upper stage model reorders the routes according to their travel
time standard deviation, while the lower stage model assigns the heterogeneous demand to
the routes using insights attained through studying the properties of the efficient frontier.
On the basis of the two-stage formulation of the problem, we also designed a solution
algorithm to assign the traffic to the network iteratively. The proposed model can be also
generalized to be used as a joint mode-route choice model.
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6.2 Future Extensions
The objective of this research is to account for the heterogeneity in preferences of the users
in modeling multi-criterion choice problems in transportation. For that purpose, we adapted
the concept of the efficient frontier from portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) in finance to
represent the cumulative results of the individual decisions in the user equilibrium
condition. The efficient frontier is shown to have specific properties that can be employed
to model different choice problem in transportation. In this respect, morning commute
problem is one of the multi-criterion choice problems in which heterogeneous commuters
tend to minimize the cost of their trips according to their own preferences by adjusting their
arrival times to the bottleneck. In this research, we accounted for the heterogeneity in the
schedule preferences and also schedule penalty preferences of the commuters in
formulation of an analytical model for the morning commute problem. On this basis, we
proposed a dynamic pricing strategy that can optimize the system by avoiding formation
of the queue in the bottleneck. In formulating the optimal pricing strategy for the
bottleneck, we simplified the problem by overlooking the heterogeneity in value of time
(VOT) of the commuters. However, VOT can be considered as another aspect of the
heterogeneity in preferences of the users that should be taken into account to improve the
effectiveness of dynamic pricing strategy in optimizing the system. In this respect, the
proposed analytical model for the morning commute problem can be extended to account
for the heterogeneity in the VOT of the commuters. To include such heterogeneity in VOT
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of users, VOT can be considered to have a probability distribution over the population if
the commuters as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Although such heterogeneity in VOT of the
users has no influence on the arrival of the commuters to the bottleneck in the user
equilibrium condition, it still can affect the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic pricing
strategy formulated under assumption of an identical VOT for the commuters. On this
basis, considering the heterogeneity in VOT of the commuters can enhance the
effectiveness of the dynamic pricing strategy in optimizing the system. In this respect, the
concept of the efficient frontier can be used to generalize the optimal pricing strategy of
the bottleneck by accounting for the heterogeneity in VOT of commuters in formulation of
the problem. Subsequently, the dynamic pricing strategy of the DRT system can be updated
as well.
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